Economics and gender : ways of understanding the social relations of women and men in the economy by Laing, Andrew McDonald
ECONOMICS AND GENDER:
WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING THE
SOCIAL RELATIONS OF WOMEN AND
MEN IN THE ECONOMY
by
ANDREW McDONALD LAING
B. Sc., Architecture and Planning
University College London, London, England
(1977)
M. Phil., Town and Country Planning
University College London, London, England
(1980)
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements of the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
October 1987
Andrew M. Laing 1987
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of
Author
Departmer t of Urban Studies and
Planning
Certified
by
Karen R. Polenske
Professor of Regional Political Economy and Planning
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted
by
Langley Keyes
Chair of the Ph.D Committee
MASSACHUSES INSTME
OF TWIMNOLOGY
MAR 0 8 1988
ECONOMICS AND GENDER:
WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING THE
SOCIAL RELATIONS OF WOMEN AND
MEN IN THE ECONOMY
2
Acknowledgments
My thanks first of all to the women's movement because
it made it clear that asking questions about gender
inequality and gender differences was also asking about a
revolution, both in terms of economic and social life and in
how we think.
Karen Polenske, as Chair of my dissertation committee
and advisor, kindly encouraged.a male graduate student to
pursue questions of gender in the field of economics in the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning. Lisa Peattie
confirmed for me that my interest was in the social aspects
of economic development. Harrison White showed me that
economic sociology and the history of outwork were very
interesting. Francois Crouzet taught me everything I know
about the English industrial revolution while visiting
Harvard in 1983. Metta Sorenson, Mary Stevenson, and Bob
Sutcliffe all valiantly read chapters and gave me helpful
comments.
My dissertation writers group led me from impossible
prose to what, it is to be hoped, is readable writing; thank
you to Sarah Kuhn, Lindy Biggs, Cindy Horan, John Accordino,
Francoise Carre, Vim Overmeer, Henk Wagenaar, and Brenda
Nielsen. Janice Goldman and Patricia McCarney gave me much
friendly encouragement. The Urban Land Institute gave me a
Pre-Doctoral Fellowship.
3
Abstract
ECONOMICS AND GENDER:
WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING THE
SOCIAL RELATIONS OF WOMEN AND
MEN IN THE ECONOMY
by
ANDREW McDONALD LAING
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on October 15, 1987 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
How do economists approach and deal with the issue of
gender? What is the place of gender in economic thought?
I have discovered that the place of gender in economics
is given by the purpose of economics. The goals of -
economists have been to understand the creation of national
wealth and the accumulation of capital through models of
market production. Such a definition of the scope of
economics has excluded large areas of social life and work
activity, in which gender is highly implicated. Economists'
methods of abstraction have not been designed to consider the
problem of gender. As such, economics represents a system of
power to recognise what it wants to know. Economics makes
invisible or disregards what it is not concerned with. If
and when economists have considered gender, they have
conceptualized gender through natural or biological
assumptions that ignore the social construction of gender in
social relationships. How has economics set itself up as a
system of knowledge that ignores or misrepresents the
existence of gender in the social organization of the
economy?
I investigate the evolution of economic ideas with regard
to gender. I present a historical sequence of analyses of
major dimensions of the scope of economic thinking, by
focussing on key representative thinkers: Smith, Marx,
Marshall, and the recent neoclassical and Marxist/feminist
economists. I then compare and evaluate the place of gender
in these economists' thought through an historical case study
of women workers in the cotton industry during the English
industrial revolution.
Instead of using a social theory of gender, I show how
economists have themselves produced their own understanding
of the place of gender in the economy. I discovered both an
absence of gender (which suggested a great deal about the
nature of economic abstraction) and a presence of gender
associated with biological and natural assumptions that I was
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concerned to question.
Smith neglected gender in his economic model by using
natural laws and individualism. Marx asserted gender was
both eliminated from capitalist economy and exploited in
relations of production. Marshall, by using marginalist
economics made gender invisible, but gender was present in a
morality of women's economic roles. The Marxist/feminist
economists reformulated Marxist economic categories to
acknowledge and recognize gender differences. Through the
logic of utility maximization, the modern neoclassical
economists understood gender differences.
I use the case study of the women cotton workers in the
English industrial revolution to show how the transition from
domestic based industry to factory machine production was a
process of structuring of economic gender differences between
households and the labor market. It confirmed the presence
of gender throughout economic relationships.
In comparing and evaluating the economic approaches to
gender differences, we recognize the limits of economics. In
seeking to understand wealth and market production,
economists developed economic models that ignored qualitative
social relationships and individual differences, such as
those associated with gender. The restricted definition of
what is economic resulted in a theoretical marginalization of
much of the work activity performed by women. I show that if
economics were to take gender seriously, the nature of
economic thought would be transformed.
Thesis Supervisor: Karen Polenske, Professor of Regional
Political Economy and Planning
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When Adam delved and Eve span,
Who was then the gentleman?'
'This, according to the Historiana Anglicana of Thomas
Walsingham (died 1442), was the text of John Ball's speech at
Blackheath to the rebels in the peasants revolt (1381).
Possibly adapted from lines by Richard Rolle of Hampole (died
circa 1349):
When Adam dalfe and Eve spanne
To spire of thou may spede,
Where was then the pride of man,
That now marres his meed?
Brewers' Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (1981)
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CHAPTER 1
ECONOMIC APPROACHES AND GENDER DIFFERENCES:
PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS
"When Adam Delved and Eve Span, Who was then the
Gentleman?" This proverb expresses very well the strange
mixture of status and gender that confronted me in trying to
compare and evaluate economic approaches to gender
differences. The proverb traditionally refers to the social
origins of class distinction--in the Garden of Eden, who
could have been master and who slave, or who worker and who
capitalist? In an ironic way, to my eye, the proverb also
asks who could have been "woman" and who "man" in economic
terms, when Adam delved and Eve span? According to the
proverb, Adam -and Eve were both in a division of labor that
was associated with their gender, yet it was not one that
necessarily implied an economic inequality. How did it come
to pass that being a woman or man acquired an economic
significance of inequality and thereby also of economic
gender difference? Why were women always spinners (thus, the
spinster) and why were spinners, as women, thought of in
different economic ways to men as delvers (or weavers, or
factory workers, as the case may be)?
In order to answer these questions, I investigate the
evolution of economic ideas with regard to how they approach
and deal with the issue of gender. I analyze the appearance
of gender differences in the thought of Adam Smith, Karl
Marx, Alfred Marshall, and the modern neoclassical and
Marxist-feminist economists, within the framework of their
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conflicting economic traditions. I then place the economic
approaches to gender differences together with an historical
account of the work of women in the cotton trade during the
English industrial revolution. To reflect on the
peculiarities of the different economic ways of thinking of
gender, I use a case study. The economic approaches are
compared and evaluated as I use them to interpret the
historical situation of the women cotton workers in the
industrial revolution.
I am, therefore, dealing with three problems, all of
which are inter-related: the problem of economics, the
problem of gender differences, and the problem of women
workers in the cotton trade in the 18th and 19th century.
I begin with the problem of economics and its approach
to gender differences, rather than with a general
interpretation of the nature of gender differences, as such.
My purpose is to allow various economic approaches to reveal
their own ways of interpreting economic gender differences,
subject, of course, to my own understanding of the social
nature of gender. I discovered the most concise expression
of my point of view in Sheila Rowbotham "I do not believe
that women or men are determined either by anatomy or
economics, though I think both contribute to a definition of
what we can be and what we have to struggle to go beyond"
(Rowbotham, 1974, p. x).
My own interest in the issue of gender in economic
12
thought arose out of the political discourse of the women's
movement and the related gay movement. For me, this movement
made explicit the hierarchy of inequality associated with
gender differences. (The other arena in which gender and
economy had been seriously discussed was in the social-
functionalist theory of the family developed by Parsons and
Smelser). My interest is in how this hierarchy of inequality
associated with gender is expressed in economic life and how
it is understood by economic thought.
My major concern in thinking about gender differences
and their economic interpretation has been to recognize the
limits of explanations that rely on nature and biology. I
emphasize a theoretical understanding of the social
organization of gender. That women bear children almost
always has been the signal for a supposedly natural
responsibility for women's childcare and domestic work, which
in economic terms has become a natural explanation of
widespread and unequal economic gender differences. Yet, the
physical and biological requirements of childbearing and
childcare have historically decreased (Chodorow, 1978).
Moreover, the social organization of gender is subject to
historical change and development. Chodorow maintains "that
women have the extensive and nearly exclusive mothering role
they have is a product of a social and cultural translation
of their childbearing and lactation capacities. It is not
guaranteed or entailed by these capacities themselves"
13
(Chodorow, 1978, p. 30).
These concerns of the limits to biological and natural
explanations for the social organization of gender
differences color the ways in which I show that the various
economists produce or indicate their own understanding of
gender differences. Rather than evaluating the economic
ideas against an independent theory of the nature of gender
differences, I analyze the economists and their methods to
determine their own interpretation of gender differences. (I
could not find a fully developed social theory of gender
differences that could be used for the purpose of testing the
economic approaches to gender). My comparison and evaluation
of the economic approaches to gender differences occurs here
in a way that is concretely linked to the substance of the
economic approaches themselves, because I use the economic
approaches to interpret the case study of what actually
happened to women workers in the cotton trade during the
English industrial revolution.
Investigating the evolution of economic ideas, I find
that the problem of gender differences was either absent in a
striking manner (an absence that revealed much about the
economic understanding of gender differences), or else it
appeared in ways that were strongly associated with exactly
the kinds of biological or naturalistic explanations that
served only to justify existing patterns of gender
inequality. Often the absence of gender differences in the
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assumptions of economic thought masked an underlying
ideological commitment to an existing social context in which
gender inequality was glaringly evident. The conflict
between the absence of gender in economic thought and its
prominence in the social relations of economic life is made
clear when I use the economic approaches to interpret the
historical materials on the work of women in the cotton
trade.
The problem of the absence of gender in economic
thought, or its appearance in distorted or inadequate forms
relying on biological and natural explanations for social and
historical relations, raises a larger problem of the purpose
of economics, as such. As Gould has argued in relation to
philosophy in general (Gould, 1976), the problem of gender in
economics refers to the question of how economics can (or
cannot) deal with the totality of individuals (women and men)
in the economy. The question of economic gender differences
grows out of the real historical and social facts of the
oppression and exploitation of women, which has in itself
served to constitute women as a gender distinct from men.
The problem for economists has been whether, and how, to
recognize gender differences. The recognition of gender
differences has its own political and theoretical
implications. Economists (and philosophers) have tended to
regard "real" gender differences as biological, and other
gender differences as "merely" social, cultural, or
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historical (Gould, 1976). Their lack of recognition of
gender differences, on the other hand, also has political and
theoretical implications: the definition of universal human
nature supposedly incorporating both women and men has masked
the fact that the very notion of what is human has been
defined in male terms. Thus, by using the abstract
universality of "economic individuals," they deny the real
historical, social, and cultural process of gender
differentiation--even as they purport to include both women
and men within their categories.
The widespread and unequal social divisions of gender
recognized by analysts within the women's movement do not
appear to be adequately reflected in economic thought. I
find that the place of women and men in the economy is
radically different, and apparently always has been (in
different ways): the facts of gender differences in the
economy are not very much in dispute. Women and men, by and
large, hold different jobs with unequal status, receive
unequal pay, and participate differently in the labor market.
I knew that neoclassical economists have developed
theories of discrimination (largely referring to the issue of
race) and labor market segmentation, and that Marxist-
feminists have considered women's domestic work and its
effects on gender differences in the capitalist economy,
among other issues. I knew that Marx and Engels saw the
oppression of women as determined by historical relations of
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production, a problem that would ideally be eliminated in a
socialist society. What I did not know, and wanted to find
out, was: How had economists established a general
theoretical system in such a way that they seemed to ignore
or misrepresent the existence of gender differences in the
social organization of the economy? How could an economic
theory of the market, or of the mode of production, have
emerged without their paying attention to the radically
different social positions of women and men? What was the
place of gender differences in economic thought? If gender
differences did not appear in economic thought, what was the
theoretical mechanism by which they were made absent? How
could economists understand the significance of gender
differences in the economy?
I could not ask all of these questions without some
concept with which to approach the economic approaches, as it
were. So as to allow such ideas to emerge out of the
economic approaches, such a concept had to be empty of any
predetermined theory of gender differences in itself. I
needed a term or phrase that would indicate a range of
potential problems associated with gender differences in the
economy and their representation in economic thought. The
term "economic gender differences" was sufficiently loose
enough tc encapsulate the variety of themes and issues with
which I was concerned, and I could used it to refer to the
varied types of economic thinking.
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I use the term "economic gender differences" to refer to
whatever constitutes the different social relations of women
and men in the economy and the understanding or
representation of such social relations in economic thought.
Such a-term is useful, because instead of starting to look at
economics for specific instances of gender differences, I
refer to the underlying assumptions and systems of thought
through which such differences are understood. Thus, women
and men's different labor force participation, the unequal
pay of women and men, or forms of economic discrimination
against women, for example, are all instances of gender
inequality in the economy that depend for their recognition
as social facts upon some prior concept of universal equality
among women and men as economic individuals.
My goal, therefore, is to examine how a variety of
economists have approached the problem of gender differences,
which is a question prior to their interpretation of specific
instances of gender inequality. Thus, for example, before a
theory of economic discrimination can exist, there must
already be a theoretical approach that determines that women
and men are fundamentally equivalent as economic individuals.
Alternatively, for example, if an economist, such as
Marshall, determines that women have a distinct moral
economic role from that of men, then the issue of pay
equality, or the status of women's jobs relative to those of
men, is already subject to a prior distinction of gender
18
difference.
The problem of economics for this dissertation,
therefore, begins with choosing a starting point for the
evolution of economic ideas. It would have been possible to
go back to Ancient Greece and Rome to study political
philosophy and early economics in which the place of gender
was very explicit, and from which the philosophical premises
of modern economics were strongly derived. However, the
economics of the Ancient World was totally different from
that which developed following Adam Smith--it was essentially
a morality for household and farm management (Sabine, 1973,
Finley, 1974).
I therefore begin the analysis of the economic
approaches to gender differences with Adam Smith. Smith set
up a radically new basis for economic understanding, using a
unique interpretation of the philosophy of natural laws and
individualism. Smith's economics was also (through Ricardo
and others) the foundation for the two major streams of
economic thinking that remain predominant to this day--
Marxism and the neoclassical school. Thus, Smith represents
a keystone in the later evolution of economic approaches to
gender differences, which can be seen to descend, to the one
side, from Marx to the recent Marxist-feminists, and on the
other side, from Marshall to the recent neoclassical
economists. These economists are the respective subjects of
chapters 2 through 7.
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Smith, therefore, also was the first economist with
which the problem of economic gender differences, or of
seeking for gender in economics, began. In the analysis of
Smith, I find that the problem of gender differences in
economic thought is largely associated with the underlying
premises and assumptions of economic categories--it rarely
emerges as an issue in itself. Yet, I am surprised that the
issue of gender, once I started looking, emerges so strongly
as a feature in economic thought.
In some cases, as with Smith, the issue of gender
emerges all the more strongly because of its obvious absence
from the categories of his economic thought--the denial of
gender differences associated with economic individuals is
thus a blatant statement on the lack of significance of
gender differences in Smith. With other economists, such as
Marshall, the issue of gender also emerges strongly, but
within a distinct moral plane that contrasts with the neutral
objectivity of an economic technique that ignores gender
differences. In Marx's writings, the appearance of gender
relates in a contradictory way to a wider historical
interpretation of economic development and the nature of the
capitalist mode of production. Searching for gender in
economic thought, I find both.inter-relationships between the
evolution of economic ideas and a series of conflicts within
and between the distinct schools of thought, all of which
affect the ways in which gender differences are considered.
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I therefore investigate the issue of gender differences
from within the particular assumptions, premises, and
categories of economic thought. Gender differences are
"produced" by the economic theorists themselves, and I
present them in their own terms within the wider context of
the evolution of economic ideas. As a means of comparison
and evaluation of the relative places of gender differences
in the conflicting economic approaches, I introduce the
historical account of the women workers in the cotton
industry. I use the case study to compare the particular
ways in which economists have approached gender differences,
but I cannot compare the economic approaches alongside each
other, as they all represent completely distinct forms of
knowledge. I can only compare, and hence evaluate them,
through some other mechanism, namely, a case study.
I begin my analysis of the economic approaches to gender
differences with the work of Adam Smith (Chapter 2), showing
that Smith's development of a new theory of the market was
based on natural laws governing the behavior of individuals.
His view of the economy depended on an assumption of basic
equality and equivalence among such economic individuals.
The natural laws of equality among individuals supported the
absence of gender differences in Smith's concept of the
economy.
Karl Marx (Chapter 3) turned Smith's idea of a natural
market system into an idea of the historical development of
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modes of production. I argue that Marx's understanding of
capitalist economy was based on the theory of relations of
production that ignored the significance of gender
differences. Yet, I show that Marx, nevertheless, introduced
the problem of gender differences in a contradictory and
incomplete way within his theory of historical development
and within his understanding of the particular history of
capitalist factory machine production. On the one hand,
Marx's concept of historical progress suggested that economic
gender differences would be eliminated by capitalist
development, but, on the other hand, he also argued that the
organization of capitalist industry would exploit gender
differences in factory production. Furthermore, Marx
suggested that gender differences were a factor in his theory
of the valuation of labor, but failed to resolve exactly how
gender differences were effective within such a theory. I
conclude that Marx left a theoretical quandary in which the
problem of gender differences was not satisfactorily resolved
within his economic approach.
Marshall (Chapter 4) was one of the main economists to
develop the marginalist economic approach that founded the
neoclassical economic school. I argue that Marshall, like
Marx, held a contradictory view of gender differences. His
view, however, arose between the abstraction of the
marginalist technique of economic analysis, based on the idea
of individual utility maximization, which did not refer to
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gender differences, and a wider normative framework of the
analysis of economic development, in which gender differences
were regarded as morally correct and economically efficient.
Marshall thought that women had a moral responsibility for
the care of children so as to rear them as efficient human
capital, which, in turn, affected the economic status of
women relative to men. The different moral responsibility of
women and men overshadowed the premises of individual
equivalence that underlay the marginalist technique. I
conclude that it was Marshall's moral axiom that women's
primary economic role should be as housewives and mothers
that established his perception of gender differences, rather
than his economic approach, as such, that remained oblivious
to the consideration of gender differences.
With the Marxist/feminist economic approaches (Chapter
5), I argue that a contradictory theoretical legacy from Marx
was reworked in the form of a replacement of the concern with
class by that of gender. The new theories of patriarchy,
women's domestic work, and the social relations of childbirth
were used to reformulate Marxist economic theory so that they
can explicitly acknowledge and recognize gender differences.
Yet, I argue that difficulties remain in correlating the
theory of patriarchy with Marx's understanding of capitalism.
Marxist/feminists, however, did succeed in redirecting
attention towards the relationship between women's domestic
work, the value of labor in general, and gender differences
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in the value of labor and in patterns of employment in the
labor market. There remained a stumbling block, however,
between the way in which Marxists measured value (which did
not recognize gender) and the gender-specific tasks of
housework and childcare. Similar problems arose with the
theoretical linkage between the social relations of
childbirth and the Marxist understanding of women's economic
position. I conclude that Marxist/feminists found it
difficult to theorize systematically about the relationships
that have been posited between gender, the value of labor,
and the placement of individuals in relations of production
and divisions of labor.
In returning to the later development of neoclassical
economic thinking (Chapter 6), I find that this approach more
than any other was capable of unifying the domains of
economic gender differences as socially organized between the
household and the labor market. It was a unification,
however, that depended on an inadequate theoretical
understanding by the recent neoclassicals of the social
organization of gender differences. They reproduced the
ambiguity towards women that was found in Marshall. Again,
their marginalist technique of analysis did not refer to
gender, yet, these economists held particular views on the
natural basis of gender differences or on the right and
proper economic roles for women versus men that conflicted
with the individualistic premises of their market analysis.
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Becker, in an extension of the neoclassical approach
applicable to all human behavior, analyzed economic gender
differences as the result of individuals maximizing utility.
The basis for gender specialization in the economy, however,
was given a priori by conservative biological justifications
for social relations. Other neoclassical economists found it
difficult to specify the boundary between an economic
explanation of gender differences by the market and a wider
domain of gender differences that could not be so explained.
Moreover, they foundered in their market explanations for
gender differences on the problems of discrimination and
labor market segmentation, which appeared to have origins
both "before" and "within" the market.
In Chapter 7, I present the case study of women workers
in the cotton trade during the English industrial revolution.
I use the case study to abstract elements of existing
economic and social histories of the English industrial
revolution in order to develop a framework for the
intersection of the economic approaches with historical
examples of social relations of gender differences in the
economy.
The case study refers strongly to problematic themes
that are raised by the economic approaches to gender
differences: the transition from domestic based industry by
households to factory machine production, and the re-
structuring of capitalist industry over and around
25
traditional social relations of family life. Nowhere were
these central problems of economic gender differences more
clearly expressed than in the cotton trade. It was also in
this trade that domestic outworking, which gradually came to
be a province of exploitative domestic work for women and.
children, was of major importance--a further key element in
the historical formation of economic gender differences. The
cotton trade originated in the household as a traditional
industry for women and men. The gradual migration of the
cotton industry to the factory was a complex process of the
social development of economic gender differences.
I use the historical materials on the women cotton
workers to reveal that factory industrialization occurred in
a pattern whereby men moved "upwards" into work and jobs with
more advanced technological means of production, and women
replaced them in jobs with "lower" technology in the factory
or the home. Yet, this process was dynamic. As new forms of
production became established and widespread, jobs and
machinery were adapted for the use of women and children.
There were dramatic shifts in the gender typing of jobs as
technology transformed the means and location of production.
The specific status of women in marriage, as mothers and as
housewives, had a major effect on the forms of their
participation in capitalist industry: women with children to
look after worked in outworking in the home, only younger,
unmarried, and childless women tended to be employed in large
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numbers in the factories. There were constant limitations on
the forms of women's industrial participation posed by their
childcaring and domestic responsibilities.
In Chapter 8, I bring together the economists' views on
gender with the history of the women cotton workers. A
glaring disparity appears between the absence of gender
differences in Smith's concept of the economy and the
significance of gender differences in the divisions of labor
of the outworking and early factory systems of the cotton
industry. The disparity represents the distance between
Smith's form of economic abstraction, where he ignored gender
differences, and the historical reality of these forms of
production, where gender differences were obvious.
I examine Marx's contradictory arguments on gender in
relation to his economic approach in the light of the case
study. As with Smith, I find with the history of the women
cotton workers a contradiction with one line of Marx's
thought, which suggested that capitalist development would
eliminate economic gender differences: women and men
occupied different places in divisions of labor and in
organizations of production of the cotton trade. Yet, Marx's
argument was historical. He argued that the economic
significance of gender differences would progressively
decline--and in some respects the case study supported such
an interpretation. The other line of Marx's argument,
however, suggested that gender differences would be exploited
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in capitalist production. The history of the cotton trade
confirmed that over the long-term, as technical innovations
became routine and jobs associated with new machinery were
deskilled, women were hired to replace men, thus confirming
the exploitation of gender differences in capitalist
production. Yet, Marx's logic for the exploitation of gender
differences was inconsistent with his theory of the valuation
of labor-power, because there was no reason why women's labor
should necessarily be of lower value than that of men.
Marx ignored in his theory of the value of labor-power
what we find to be important aspects of the social
organization of gender differences in the cotton trade:
women employed in the factories were younger, unmarried, and
childless; women in the domestic outwork sector were usually
responsible for childcare. Furthermore, there was probably a
relationship between the domestic work of women and the
process of the valuation of labor-power, a relationship that
affected both the ways in which women's and men's labor-power
was valued differently and the ways in which they were
employed. These relationships had been ignored by Marx.
Marshall's understanding of gender differences emerged
as a result of his moral view of women's special role in the
development of labor-power, a view that was in conflict with
the absence of gender from the marginalist economic technique
that he elaborated. He could have used his powerful economic
analysis, based on the idea of utility maximization, to
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interpret much of the history of the women cotton workers,
but he could not use it to explain the social relations of
gender differences that the case study displayed. The only
explanation that Marshall offers for economic gender
differences is based on his moral views. Yet, I find that
the case study did not confirm Marshall's ideal of women's
exclusion from the labor market so that they could rear
efficient male labor in the home--it revealed, instead, the
widespread economic participation of women, even as it was
colored by their childcaring and housework responsibilities.
The Marxist/feminists took up the unresolved problems of
Marx's interpretation of gender differences. The history of
the women cotton workers confirmed the general direction of
the Marxist/feminist perspective, which suggested that a
system of economic gender differences was established between
the work of women as reproducers of labor-power in the home
and as workers for the capitalist labor market. I find that
the case study indicated that a single social organization is
involved in the process of inserting gender differences in
the value of labor power and in patterns of employment. The
Marxist/feminists, however, remained restricted by the
Marxist theory of value, which could not be used to unify the
domestic work of women with the value of labor in the market.
The modern neoclassical economists did succeed in
unifying an interpretation of gender differences between
domestic work and the labor market. Yet, in using Becker's
29
theory to interpret the history of the women cotton workers,
I find that his explanation of economic gender differences
depended on external biological assumptions. Becker argued
that because women have children, they will specialize full-
time in childcare and housework. I use the case study to
point to the significance of women's childcare
responsibilities as a major factor in establishing economic
gender differences, but I cannot explain such
responsibilities and the associated economic gender
differences by the biological facts of childbirth.
Other neoclassical economists than Becker argued that,
regardless of biology, there were rational, utility-
maximizing reasons for the conventional gender specialization
in the economy, they assumed such rationality to show a pre-
given institutional structure to the economy that
discriminates against women and that makes it difficult for
women and men to combine childcare with waged work in the
labor market. Furthermore, they assumed that the interests
of utility maximization are shared equally among family
members--that there is not a conflict of interest between
husband and wife or forms of exploitation of labor within the
household. I find that the history of women cotton workers
did show ways in which families maximized their utility by
specializing economic gender roles, but neoclassicals cannot
explain the gendered quality of such specialization.
My comparison and evaluation of the economic approaches
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to gender differences, through the history of the women
cotton workers, indicates some general problems of how
economics can understand the social relations of women and
men in the economy, these are explored in Chapter 9.
Economists gained their strength by a process of abstraction
in which they often ignored specific aspects of social
relationships--such as gender differences. The limits of the
ways in which economists have understood gender hold
implications for how we understand the nature of economic
thought. Economists have had very strong interests in
developing their particular kinds of economic theory. They
have been concerned to understand the creation of national
wealth and capital accumulation in terms of market
production. Such a definition of what is economic has
marginalized the issue of gender, and downplayed much of the
work that women do outside of the market. Our final question
is: what would be the implications for economic thought, if
economists were to take seriously the issue of gender? Our
conclusion is that the nature of economic thought would be
transformed. We find that it is within the very foundations
of the economists' intentions and through their different
methods of abstraction, that their neglect of gender arose.
It was a neglect necessitated by the way in which their ideas
of the economy emerged.
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CHAPTER 2
ADAM SMITH: THE DENIAL OF GENDER DIFFERENCES
BY ECONOMIC INDIVIDUALISM
The absence of gender differences in the economic
thought of Adam Smith is the subject of this chapter. We
show how Smith's development of a new form of economics was
based on a theory of natural laws governing individual
economic behavior. Smith's interpretation of such laws led
him to neglect gender differences in economic activity.
The Economy as a Natural System Coordinating Self-Interested
Individuals
Adam Smith portrayed the economy as a market system that
naturally coordinated the self-interested actions of
individuals in relationships of exchange (Smith, 1976). The
commercial transactions of the market, in turn, encouraged
the development of divisions of labor, resulting in increased
productivity and economic growth. In Smith's analyses,
differences between women and men in the workings of this
economic system--which we refer to as economic gender
differences, are absent. An idea of the natural equality of
individuals underlay Smith's social philosophy and economics
which obscured gender differences as a basic category of his
thinking. This natural equality and individualism supported
Smith's idea of the homogeneity of labor, so that labor was
considered as a category undivided by gender differences.
The influence of the intellectual tradition of
individualistic natural law partially accounts for Smith's
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neglect of systematic gender differences. This tradition
permeated Smith's views on labor and the division of labor,
so that these concepts (which are the cornerstone of his
economics) do not refer to gender differences. In this
chapter, we show how this complex set of ideas worked through
Smith's economics in such a way that it excluded the
significance of economic gender differences.
Smith's central concern in An Inquiry Into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations was to explain how
economic development and growth occurred. Smith began from
the presuppositions of his social philosophy described in The
Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1966). It appeared to
Smith that humankind was endowed with the faculty of reason
and with natural propensities of both self-love and fellow
feeling. The society that resulted from the interactions of
such individuals was not chaotic; it had a natural order that
reflected a divine plan. Society was viewed as a "sublime
machine which left to itself will tend to maximize social
welfare" (Deane, 1978, p. 7).
Smith applied the idea of the natural order underlying
society to the economy and found that in this specific realm
the motivation of gain and self-interest took precedence over
fellow feeling: "it is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner,
but from their regard to their own self interest" (Smith,
1976, p. 18). In contrast to the moral sentiments governing
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the ideal society, Smith's view of the real economy was more
cynical. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith represented the
economy both as it was and how it ought to be, at one and the
same time. Eighteenth century theorists used the concept of
natural law to unite the factual and ideal world: nature
(including human nature) was both an object to be studied and
an ideal to be brought into existence (Campbell, 1971).
Thus, for Smith, the natural individualism of an ideal
society is tempered by the existence of social ranks and
inequality, the empirical economy of historical England does
not match up to the normative ideal.
For Smith, growth was the main economic problem: it
resulted from what Deane (1978) has called a natural complex
of harmony promoting forces, encouraged primarily by the
division of labor. Schumpeter (1954) notes how Smith placed
a new burden on the division of labor as almost the only
factor explaining economic and technological progress. The
division of labor that increased its productive powers, Smith
argued, was not the effect of "any human wisdom," rather "It
is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence
of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no
such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another" (Smith, 1976, p. 17).
Within the enterprise (in Smith's case the pin factory),
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the division of labor1 also led to the separation and
specialization of different trades and employments and to the
generalized incidence of market exchange. This natural human
quality to seek to exchange thus accelerated the growth of
institutions and social relationships that supported
exchange--up to the limit provided by the extent of the
market.
This process of growth of exchange and specialization
was not, Smith argues, the result of an expression of natural
differences in abilities between individuals, but rather
expressed the commonality of human exchange. Thus, although
the division of labor, as such, arose as a result of the
widespread natural human propensity to exchange, Smith did
not argue that the division of labor represented natural
differences between individuals. Smith thought that
individual differences, such as those between the abilities
of a philosopher and a street porter, were largely the result
of "habit, custom, and education." According to Smith, it
was the power of exchanging that occasioned the division of
labor and not natural or inherent qualities of differences
between people. He stated that
'The three circumstances that increase work as a result
of the division of labor are described by Smith as (1) the
increas in the dexterity of the worker, (2) saving time in
passing from one type of work to another, and (3) inventing
machines that facilitate and abridge labor enabling one
worker to do the work of many.
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the difference of natural talents in
different men is, in reality, much less
than we are aware of; and the very
different genius which appears to
distinguish men of different professions,
when grown up to maturity, is not upon many
occasions so much the cause, as the effect
of the division of labour. The difference
between the most dissimilar characters,
between a philosopher and a common street
porter, for example, seems to arise not so
much from nature, as from habit, custom,
and education (Smith, 1976, p. 19-20).
The commonality of the propensity to exchange is shared by
all and is of greater importance in explaining the division
of labor than differences in natural talent.2
Thus, it appears to Smith that there is a correspondence
between the natural propensities of individuals--their self-
love, fellow feeling, desire to exchange--and the natural
order of the market system. Furthermore, it is the resultant
system of division of labor that occasions differences in
employments of individuals and not any preordained
differences between individuals. The economic system thus
combines the natural propensities of equal individuals with
the market, resulting in the formation of divisions of labor
and the growth of exchange relationships. Underlying this
optimistic scenario is the assumption of the natural equality
2 Blaug (1980) does not recognize the equalitarian
assumption behind Smith's views on the division of labor and
the natural equality of individuals. He comments that Smith
neglected to cite the accommodation of different natural
aptitudes as one of the advantages of the division of labor.
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of individuals and the idea that it is indeed individuals who
are the motivated actors of the economy: a complex of ideas
that refers us back to the tradition of natural law and
individualism as underpinnings of Smith's economics.
Natural Law, Individualism, and the Absence of Gender.
Schumpeter, in his History of Economic Analysis (1954),
devotes 40 pages of dense text in an attempt to decipher the
chameleon-like influence of the natural law tradition upon
Classical economic thinking, a tradition that spanned from
Aristotle through to the Roman jurists and from the Medieval
Scholastic thinkers to the 18th century philosophers.' We
shall outline the natural law tradition only insofar as it
supports the equalitarian individualism of Smith's economics,
a support that indicates that Smith did not acknowledge the
gender differences of individuals.
Natural law philosophy arose as the Ancient Greek city-
states declined and the social hierarchy of the polis
collapsed after 300 BC (Sabine, 1937; Anthony, 1977). A new
philosophical attention was placed on a universal form of
individualism. Individuals began to be considered as part of
a common worldwide humanity and to be endowed with a common
nature. "Natural" referred both to the commonality between
humankind's needs, the necessities of life that all humans
'A summary of this chameleon-like tradition is provided
as an Appendix at the end of this chapter.
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share and to the sense of natural as just and reasonable--as
in the logical or true nature of a thing. Given that
everyone shared a common nature, the concept of natural law
arose as a system of law applicable to all people on the
basis of an elementary equality between individuals. The
concept of natural law came to refer to the set of rules
governing the order of society, in both an ideal sense and in
terms of the actual or necessary conditions of the real
world. Natural law theory was the first attempt at a
comprehensive social science, a theory of society.
The development of natural law philosophy by the
medieval Christian scholastics combined a doctrine of natural
liberty and equality, but, as Schumpeter notes, this was not
the assertion of a fact of human nature, but a moral ideal or
postulate. The later use of natural law philosophy by
economists such as Smith, however, developed the Christian
ideal of equality towards what Schumpeter called an analytic
equalitarianism, meaning that "man's faculties of mind and
body are about equal in the sense that the range of their
variations is so narrowly limited as to make complete
equality a permissable working hypothesis" (Schumpeter, 1954,
p. 121). It was this elementary equality of individuals that
supported Smith's individualistic premises.
The influence of the natural law tradition on Smith
crystallized in the form of his concept of an abstract
individual. Lukes (1973) has explained how this idea relied
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upon a view of the individual as having pre-given
characteristics and requirements (in Smith's case the natural
propensities we have discussed) that social arrangements are
held to fulfill. The abstract individual was the bearer of
features and attributes to which the state and the society
respond. Thus, for Smith, abstract individuals were
naturally equal, naturally desired to exchange, and naturally
became part of a market system that governed the economic
relationships between individuals. They were naturally
driven by self-interest in their economic actions and
unknowingly contributed to social wealth through the
intermediary of an "invisible hand" that coordinated their
market transactions.4 We must emphasize that Smith's
abstract individual was not specified as either woman or man.
Gender differences do not appear to characterize the nature
of the abstract individual, at least insofar as this idea
appears within Smith's economics.
Before going further in evaluating the influence of this
4 According to Smith (1976, pp. 477-478), "every
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue
of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed,
neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how
much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of
domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own
security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as
its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his
own gain, and he is in this, as is many other cases, led by
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that
it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it."
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equalitarian individualism upon Smith's economics, we must
consider whether this tradition really did presume the
equality of women and men. Okin (1979), in a study of the
treatment of women in Western political thought, has drawn
attention to the fact that even when philosophers have used
supposedly generic terms like "man" and "mankind" they should
by no means be assumed to have thereby referred to the human
race as a whole; women have often been implicitly and
explicitly excluded from their conclusions. Aristotle
(1984), who was a major influence upon Smith and modern
economic thinking from the 18th century, for example,
believed that women were naturally excluded from the
constitutional rights of the polis and were naturally
incapable of achieving high moral and political status.
Plato's utopian Republic (1968) only achieved the equality of
women in the ideal state by abolishing the family and private
property.5 We must therefore bear in mind Okin's (1979)
admonition: "Thus there has been, and continues to be,
within the traditions of political philosophy and political
culture, a pervasive tendency to make allegedly general
'The basis for the equality of women in the Republic
rested on the abolition of private property and the family--
at least for the elite class of rulers--and can thus be seen
as the forerunner of the conclusions of Marx and Engels on
the potential of socialism to liberate women (see Chapters 3
and 5). Plato also developed a concept of division of labor,
which differed from Smith's in that it was based on the
assumption of natural or innate differences between
individuals.
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statements as if the human race were not divided into two
sexes, and then either to ignore the female sex altogether,
or to proceed to discuss it in terms not at all consistent
with the assertions that have been made about "man" and
"humanity" (Okin, 1979, p. 7).
In Smith, we find that individualism does appear to
include both women and men, even though Smith's language
refers to the worker and other economic actors in the
conventional terms of "he." There are very few references
throughout The Wealth of Nations that refer specifically to
different economic roles of women versus men.' (Only in
passing does Smith refer to women workers in the traditional
household industries of textiles). It must, nevertheless, be
considered whether the idea of the economic individual that
Smith uses was implicitly a concept referring only to men,
especially given that women were hardly "individuals" given
6 In Chapter 5 "Of the Different Employment of Capitals"
of Book 2 of The Wealth of Nations, (1976, pp. 269-275) Smith
does refer to "houshold (sic) and coarser manufactures" which
accompany agriculture "which are the work of the women and
children in every private family" (1976, p. 388), an
interesting remark insofar as he specifies this economic
gender division of labor as occurring in the backward private
domain of the economy. In Chapter 10 of Book 1, on "Of Wages
and Profit", Smith also refers to women industrial workers in
Scotland: "The spinning of linen yarn is carried on in
Scotland nearly in the same way as the knitting of stockings
. . . . In most parts of Scotland she is a good spinner who
can earn twenty pence a week" (1976, p. 131). In other parts
of the book where Smith refers to the textile industry, an
industry that favored the employment of women, Smith does not
remark upon the gender of workers in these trades--as in
"Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon the real Price
of Manufactures."
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their lack of civil status in 18th century England. Yet,
Smith does not ever suggest that women are theoretically
excluded from his analysis--a point to which we shall return.
There is, furthermore, a fundamental theoretical
justification for the argument that Smith's individualism did
include both women and men on an equivalent basis: Smith
separated its constitutive parts from the traditional context
of the moral and political order in which they had previously
been conceptually embedded. In this process of disembedding
of economics, the traditional context of gender differences
was abandoned. The different (and unequal) place of women
and men is not assumed as a starting point; the idea of
individuals is without reference to gender differences. As
Bell argues, economics for the first time was distinguished
from its traditional context, whereby it became "a set of
activities that could be judged in purely instrumental
terms." He maintains that "human beings were to be regarded
as individuals detached from family, clan, class or nation,
as independent, self-determining beings, each the judge of
his own actions; a corollary of this tenet was that the rules
regulating the relations between individuals were to be
procedural, not morally substantive . . . in economics, each
man properly pursued his own self interest" (Bell, 1981, p.
71).
What was the relationship between this general
disembedding of economics and the genderless quality of
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Smith's economics? Illich (1982) has argued that the
genderless quality of Classical economics was associated with
a profound cultural and intellectual transformation that
occurred in the 17th and 18th centuries, in which the human
subject of philosophical discourse (and hence of economics)
was designated in genderless terms. The abstract individual
was not specified in terms of gender differences.
Furthermore, Illich argues, the genderless quality of the
subject of philosophy was a theoretical requirement for the
systems of thought that developed at this time: "the loss of
gender creates the subject of formal economics" (Illich,
1982, p. 9). Illich's argument is best given at length:
An industrial society cannot exist unless
it imposes certain unisex assumptions: the
assumptions that both sexes are made for
the same work, perceive the same reality,
and have, with some cosmetic variations,
the same needs. And the assumption of
scarcity which is fundamental to economics,
is itself logically based on this unisex
assumption. . . . The subject on which
economic theory is based is just such a
genderless human . . . . I argue that a se-
cond characteristic is equally constitutive
of the subject of modern social theory and
practice: the possessive individual is
genderless, anthropologically construed as
a merely sexed neuter. Logically, as I
shall argue, only the individual who is
both possessive and genderless can fit the
assumption of scarcity on which any
political economy must rest. The
institutional "identity" of Homo
Oeconomicus excludes gender. He is a
neutrum oeconomicum. (Illich, 1982, p. 9-
11, emphasis as in Illich)
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In contrast to the fundamental gender inequality
characteristic of some of the influences on Smith's economic
thinking--especially Aristotle, Illich argues that the
"individual" of 17th and 18th century thinking was
fundamentally genderless and "determined by basic needs under
the assumption of universal scarcity". Common to all of
these philosophical or ideal individuals was an equivalent
possessiveness. Following Macpherson's (1979) study of the
possessive individualism of 17th century political theory,
Illich argues that the corollary to this theory of the
individual was that all such individuals were thought of in
genderless terms.'
How was it possible for economics to set itself up in
such a way that it could be disengaged from the traditional
context in which theoretical individuals had been subject
both to moral and political constraints and had been thought
'Macpherson summarizes the characteristics of possessive
individualism as follows (and always uses the masculine gender):
(1) What makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the
wills of others. (2) Freedom from dependence on others means
freedom from any relations with others except those relations
which the individual enters voluntarily with a view to his own
interest. (3) The individual is essentially the proprietor of
his own person and capacities, for which he owes nothing to
society. (4) Although the individual cannot alienate the whole
of his property in his own person, he may alienate his capacity
to labour. (5) Human society consists of a series of market
relations. (6) Since freedom from the wills of others is what
makes a man human, each individual's freedom can be rightfully
limited only by such obligations and rules as are necessary to
secure the same freedom for others. (7) Political society is a
human contrivance for the protection of the individual's property
in his person and goods, and (therefore) for the maintenance of
orderly relations between individuals regarded as proprietors
themselves (Macpherson, 1979, pp. 263-264)
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of in terms that radically distinguished their gender?
Dumont (1977) argued that this separation of economics from a
traditional context was accomplished by imbuing economics
with its own normative postulate: an orientation to the good
of humankind. Economics required this "benevolent surmise"
as a justification for its intellectual immunity from the
interference of the state, politics, and the moral order.
Dumont explains why the surmise was necessary (1977, p. 37),
"For supposing it was shown that the inner consistency (of
economics) worked for evil, then again it would have required
the politician and the statesman to intervene."
The benevolent surmise that economics worked inherently
for the good of humankind paved the way for its radical form
of individualism, an individualism that in Smith's economics
included both women and men. Nowhere was the benevolent
surmise more in evidence than in Smith's "invisible hand,"
which spontaneously orchestrated the myriad market
transactions of self-interested individuals in such a way
that the public at large benefitted from increased national
wealth.
In fact, the philosophy of natural law suggested to
Smith that individual self-interest naturally harmonized with
the system of market prices. The "invisible hand" mediated
between individual's economic actions and the wider system of
exchange. As Schumpeter suggests, Smith's principle of
natural liberty supported the analytic proposition that the
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free interaction of individuals produces not chaos but an
orderly pattern that is logically determined. For Blaug
(1980), this coincidence of individual's behavior with the
natural order of the market system provides a key
relationship for Smith's economics. He states that "(the)
obvious and simple system of natural liberty, which is said
to reconcile private interests and economic efficiency, turns
out upon examination to be identical with the concept of
perfect competition; the "invisible hand" is nothing more
than the automatic equilibrating mechanism of the competitive
market" (Blaug, 1980, p. 59).
With the growth of the market, Smith argued, then more
and more individuals (women and men) are supported by the
network of exchange relationships and their self-interest
leads them to specialize their occupations in a division of
labor. He stated that the society becomes progressively
commercialized and "every man thus lives by exchanging, or
becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself
grows to be what is properly a commercial society" (Smith,
1976, p. 26).
The new form of commercial society represents the fourth
type of historical economy and society that Smith outlined in
a logical-historical sequence of ideal-types, previous
economies being hunting, pasturage, and farming. Each
represented differing types of productive activity, forms of
subsistence, and property relations (Skinner, 1983). The new
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commercial economy drew people away from the household with
its archaic divisions of labor, often associated with gender
differences, and placed the labor of women and men
equivalently in the commercial market place. Billet (1978,
p. 93) argues that Smith saw the freedom of the market as
having liberated individuals from old-fashioned forms of
dependency and domination; that is, "the natural human
ability to exchange one's labor and its products has become
the instrument for gradually freeing mankind from arbitrary
dependence upon others for subsistence, i.e., from slavery
and feudal institutions."
Smith, by analyzing of the nature of the new commercial
society, moved from the idea of the division of labor,
increased productivity, and widespread individualized
exchange relationships, to the question of the creation and
distribution of economic value. In this regard, Smith began
by distinguishing the use-value and exchange-value of goods,
and the natural (or real) and market prices of goods. Smith
suggests that the market price may be above or below the
natural or normal price of a good. We see that the natural
price of a good refers us back again to the concept of a
natural law or order that regulates the ideal economic
system. Naturalistic language abounds in Smith's writings.'
8 For example, in the section on the Natural Progress of
Opulence, within only five pages, Smith -refers to the natural
inclinations of man, the inversion of the natural course of
things by the policies of modern states, and the natural
order of things in general (Smith, 1976, pp. 401-406).
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The natural prices of goods were argued by Smith to be
their cost-of-production. In a rudimentary simple economy,
in which laborers produced goods by themselves with their own
means of production, and in which land was free, the labor
cost of production would be equivalent to the value and
natural price of a good. In the modern commercial society,
this primitive labor theory of value is overturned by Smith's
argument that the actual or market prices of goods were
composed of the wages component paid to labor, the profit
paid to the stock put forward by the "undertaker," and the
rent due to the landlord. Thus, within the individualistic
and natural order of the market system, there were three
distinct social orders or ranks of society that corresponded
to the three distinct factors of production of land, labor,
and capital, and the three forms of monetary return with
which Smith deals (rent, wages, and profit) (Skinner, 1983).'
The appropriation of land in the form of private property and
the accumulation of stock in the form of private wealth and
ownership of capital means that the produce of labor no
longer belongs to the laborer. The landlord and stockholder
must take their share of the produce.
So too, then, does labor have a natural price and a
nominal (or market) price, so that its real (natural) price
'Book 1 of The Wealth of Nations is titled: "Of the
Causes of Improvement in the Productive Powers of Labour, and
of the Order According to which its Produce is Naturally
Distributed among the Different Ranks of the People."
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"may be said to consist in the quantity of the necessaries
and conveniences of life which are given for it; its nominal
price, in the quantity of money" (Smith, 1976, p. 38). The
money price of labor varies with the price of the necessaries
of life. Smith also takes into account in the price of labor
the additional costs associated with hardship or superior
skill, and he was a precursor of modern human capital
theorists.1
Smith remarks on the different levels of wages and
profits that accrue to individuals engaged in various
occupations. In the natural market system with perfect
liberty, individuals will choose occupations most
advantageous to them. Inequalities of rewards to individuals
result from the nature of the type of employment itself and
not from any inherent quality of individuals (such as gender
differences). Smith suggests that economic reward will vary
according to the degree to which work is agreeable, easily
and cheaply learned, the constancy of employment, the degree
of trust involved, and the probability of success.
Inequality of reward is not associated with gender
differences. According to Smith, the rewards of the market
1
4Referring to the acquired and useful abilities of all the
inhabitants or members of society, Smith comments that: "The
acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer
during his education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a
real expence, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were,
in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of his
fortune, so do they likewise of that of the society to which he
belongs" (Smith, 1976, p. 298).
51
do not theoretically pay heed to the gender of the
individual.
In dealing with the value of labor, Smith does not make
explicit any inherent differences in the value of male or
female labor, even though the particular roles of women as
housewives and mothers are acknowledged when Smith makes it
clear that wages must cover the costs of reproducing labor
over generations. Smith argues that the wages of men and
women are intended to support an entire family, but the
variation in the composition, distribution, and value of such
wages between men and women is not drawn to any systematic
conclusion with regard to gender differences:
A man must always live by his work, and his
wages must at least be sufficient to
maintain him. They must even upon most
occasions be somewhat more; otherwise it
would be impossible for him to bring up a
family, and-the race of such workmen could
not last beyond the first generation . . .
. Thus far at least (it) seems certain,
that, in order to bring up a family, the
labour of the husband and wife together
must, even in the lowest species of common
labour, be able to earn more than what is
precisely necessary for their own
maintenance; but in what proportion . . .
I shall not take upon me to determine
(Smith, 1976, pp. 76-77)
That Smith did not confront explicitly the difference
between male and female labor is consistent with his
achievement in putting forward the general category of
homogeneous labor. In so doing, Smith moved political
economy towards a concern with the production of exchange-
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values in the market system and the creation of wealth by
living labor in the domestic economy. This was in contrast
with the previous Mercantilist concern with the gains of
international trade, and they opposed the older idea that
wealth was the product of nature and the land.
Smith's distinction between natural and market price is
associated with his idea of the market as a natural system
that is automatically self-equilibrating. Natural price is
the central price to which the prices of goods gravitate. In
the perfect liberty of a natural market system, unfettered
by government restrictions or monopolies, a balance of supply
and demand will naturally result. Associated with this ideal
of a natural market system is the strong sense of the natural
equality of individuals that runs through the basic framework
of Smith's analysis. This natural equality of individuals
precludes the possibility of gender differences being
considered a significant attribute of Smithian economics. As
with other aspects of the ideal natural market system and its
conditions of perfect liberty, there may have been historical
restrictions or policies that prevented or obstructed the
natural equality of individuals and which gave rise to
inequalities, such as those associated with gender
differences. If this were so, Smith made no statements about
them. Smith assumes that a fundamental equality existed
among economic individuals, derived from his ideas of natural
law, which allows him to neglect gender differences.
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APPENDIX: THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW
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Schumpeter (1954) argues that the origin and early
history of all the social sciences is to be found in the
tradition of natural law. The awareness of social science as
a discipline with its own problems was founded in the
philosophy of natural law. Schumpeter distinguishes between
the natural law tradition as an ethico-legal concept and as
an analytic concept.
The concept of natural law has been traced back to
Aristotle. Aristotle distinguished between the "naturally
just" and the "institutionally just," that is between a law
according to nature common to all humanity and a positive law
of a particular society. He used the term natural to refer
to several different meanings, including the idea of
something immanent in the primordial constitution of
humankind; as something that develops with the development
of human society, as a cooperation between creative mind and
instinct; and as something inherent in the final development
of humankind as a final cause or purpose (Baker, 1957).
These senses span an idea of natural law that is "a vision of
an historically developed law which has both a positive
quality and a root in the nature of man" (Baker, 1957, p.
xxxv.) Natural justice described forms of behavior enforced
by the general necessities of life. What was perceived as
natural became understood as a normative principle. Natural
law referred to what was both necessary and just.
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Aristotle also believed that women were of a different
nature than men, although not necessarily inferior, but that
they could not stand in the same relationship of equality as
could exist between men (that is men of the aristocratic
class) (Sabine, 1973). Thus what was perceived as natural
was translated into social convention or law.
After Aristotle, Greek philosophers focused on the
problem of the individual as unconnected to a life of
politics as it had been provided by the social organization
of the city-states (the polis). The gradual collapse of the
city-states led to their concern with the problem of the
individual in a universal context. The idea of the
individual as part of a worldwide humanity emerged, endowed
with a common nature (Sabine, 1937). A new concept of
equality arose, so that philosophers thought of natural law
as a universal law applicable to all people. Natural law
suggested there were ideally universal rights and binding
rules of justice that applied equally to all.
The Stoic School (300 BC onwards) considered natural law
as a reflection of the perfection of nature in the form of a
true moral order for human society (Anthony, 1977). There
was a moral parallel between human nature and nature at
large. Right reason was thus a law of nature: "Nature was
synonymous with Reason and Reason was synonymous with God"
(Baker, 1957, p. xxxv.) Previously, philosophers had
restricted the idea of equality to a privileged elite, but
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now they proclaimed an elementary equality between human
individuals. As Baker (1957, p. xxxvi) noted "its principles
were ideal principles. Among these ideal principles was that
of equality. By nature, and as reasonable creatures, all
human beings were equal. By nature the woman was equal to
the man, and the slave to the master."
The Romans took over Aristotle's and the Stoic's
development of the idea of natural law and used it to develop
legal rules. They also developed the sense of natural law to
refer to "the nature of a case" or the nature of a thing.
St. Thomas used Aristotle's idea of natural law, but he
developed it in the direction of a body of law that was
historically variable, that conformed to social expediency or
necessity. For St. Thomas, the concept of "justice" became
related to "adjustment" to what was supposed to be good. The
Christian thinkers tended to distinguish between an absolute
law of nature that had existed in the state of primitive
grace before the Fall and the relative state of nature that
was adjusted to the change in humankind's nature that
occurred after the Fall (Baker, 1957). This was in contrast
with some later interpretations of natural law that assumed
that it was outside of historical reality.
Molina (1535-1600), a Jesuit, identified natural law
with the dictates of reason, so that natural law became that
which obligates us by virtue of the nature of the case.
Molina married natural law to rational diagnosis (Schumpeter,
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1954) with reference to a Common Good of both individual
contracts and social institutions. In Molina we find that
natural law "embodies the discovery that the data of a social
situation determine . . . a certain sequence of events, a
logically coherent process or state, or would do so if they
were allowed to work themselves out without further
disturbance" (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 112.) The just became
equated with the natural, and the natural with the normal.
Natural law was both normative doctrine. and analytic theory.
Natural law analysis in the 17th century was developed
by the secular philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and Samuel von Pufendorf
(1632-1694). These philosophers aimed at a comprehensive
social science, a theory of society in the form of systems of
jurisprudence. The legal and political principles they
outlined were thought of as generally valid because they were
natural, that is derived from the general properties of human
nature. These principles were therefore in contrast to the
positive law associated with the particular conditions of
individual countries. The Christian Scholastics, such as
Molina, had developed the ideas of natural liberty and the
natural equality of humankind:
With them, however, this natural equality
was not an assertion about facts of human
nature but a moral ideal or postulate . . .
. But Hobbes, when explaining the
conditions that produce his original state
of war of all against all, asserted as a
fact that man's faculties of mind and body
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are about equal in the sense that the range
of their variations is so narrowly limited
as to make complete equality a permissible
working hypothesis (Schumpeter, 1954, p.
121)
This attitude, that Schumpeter calls philosophical
equalitarianism, was common to all philosophers of the time,
and became a characteristic of the development of economic
analysis.
The 18th century philosophers often took an idea of
natural law to refer to primitive conditions. As in Adam
Smith, an imaginary early state of society is presented in
order to develop the idea of a particular social institution.
The imaginary early state of society is thought of as natural
and as governed by natural laws. This sometimes meant that
primitive conditions became identified with what was just--as
what was natural was also supposedly just. There was also a
relationship between the scholastic interpretation of natural
law and the Rights of Man.
At a more fundamental level, however, the 18th century
thinkers used the idea of nature and natural law to hold
together the factual and ideal world (Campbell, 1971). Thus,
nature (including humankind) was an object to be studied and
an ideal to be brought into existence. This same ambiguity
went back to Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Roman law, and the
medieval scholastics. Campbell (1971, p. 53) notes that the
idea of the law of nature denoted both factual
generalizations and moral or legal imperatives, so that "the
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resuscitation of natural law theory in the 17th and 18th
centuries was part of an attempt to establish a theology
which was independent of revelation and a morality which was
independent of religion."
A further characteristic of the 18th century development
of the ideas of natural law was their stronger emphasis on
what the earlier Scholastic thinkers had termed the common
good or social expediency. The pleasures and pains of
individuals were weighted equally and quantified into a
social total that is identified with the common good or
welfare of society. Schumpeter emphasizes that this
utilitarianism was nothing more than another version of the
natural law theory, in fact its final form: "The program of
deriving, by the light of reason, laws about man in society
from a very stable and highly simplified human nature fits
the utilitarians not less well than the philosophers or the
scholastics" (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 132.)
In the 18th century, the close association between
natural law and jurisprudence was broken, natural law became
Moral Philosophy, especially in Scotland and Germany. This
new Moral Philosophy dealt with the social sciences as we now
understand them, while Natural Philosophy arose to deal with
the natural sciences. It was under this rubric that natural
law was taught to Adam Smith by his teacher Francis Hutcheson
at the University of Glasgow--and it was a Moral Philosophy
that Smith expounded in The Theory of Moral Sentiments before
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he wrote The Wealth of Nations.
61
REFERENCES
Anthony, P. D. (1977). The Ideology of Work. London:
Tavistock Publications.
Arendt, Hannah (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Aristotle (1984). The Complete Works. Volumes One and Two,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Baker, Ernest (1957). "Introduction" to Natural Law and the
Theory of Society 1500-1800 by Otto Gierke. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Bell, Daniel (1981). "Models and Reality in Economic
Discourse," in The Crisis in Economic Theory. Edited
by Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol. New York: Basic
Books, pp. 46-80.
Billet, Leonard (1978). "Justice, Liberty, and Economy," in
Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations. Edited by Fred
R. Glahe. Boulder, CO: The Colorado Associated
University Press, pp. 83-110.
Blaug, Mark (1980, third edition). Economic Theory in
Retrospect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, T. D. (1971). Adam Smith's Science of Morals.
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Deane, Phyllis (1978). The Evolution of Economic Ideas.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dumont, Louis (1977). From Mandeville to Marx, the Genesis
and Triumph of Economic Ideology. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Gierke, Otto (1957). Natural Law and the Theory of Society,
1500-1800. (Including a lecture on "The Ideas of
Natural Law and Humanity," by Ernst Troeltsch).
Translated with an introduction by Ernest Baker.
Boston: Beacon Press.
Hirschman, Albert (1977). The Passions and the Interests.
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Illich, Ivan (1982). Gender. New York: Pantheon Books.
Lukes, Steven (1984 reprint). Individualism. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
62
Macpherson, C. B. (1979). The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism, Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Okin, Susan Moller (1979). Women in Western Political
Thought. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pierce, Christine (1971). "Natural Law Language and Women"
in Woman in Sexist Society, edited by Vivian Gormick
and Barbara K. Moran. New York: Basic Books.
Plato, (1968). The Republic of Plato. Translated with Notes
and an "Interpretive Essay." New York: Allan Bloom.
Sabine, George Holland (1937, 4th edition). A History of
Political Theory. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden.
Schumpeter, Joseph A (1954). History of Economic Analysis.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Skinner, Andrew (1983). "Introduction," to The Wealth of
Nations, by Adam Smith, Books 1-111. Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd.
Smith, Adam (1976). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations. Edited and with an
Introduction by Edwin Cannan. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Smith, Adam (1966). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. New
York: Augustus M. Kelly.
Spiegel, H. S. (1983). The Growth of Economic Thought.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Tribe, Keith (1981). Genealogies of Capitalism. New Jersey:
Humanities Press.
63
CHAPTER 3
KARL MARX: THE ELIMINATION OR THE
EXPLOITATION OF GENDER DIFFERENCES IN
CAPITALIST ECONOMY
The problem of differences between women and men in the
social relations of the economy--what we refer to here as
economic gender differences--appears in two conflicting ways
in Marx's writings. The purpose of this chapter is to
unravel these conflicting lines of thought which Marx did not
bring to any complete resolution, but which have,
nevertheless, remained the basis for the widespread and far
reaching development of Neo-Marxist thinking on the problem
of economic gender differences.
Genderless Economic Categories
First, Marx suggests that economic gender differences
will be progressively eliminated in the historical
development of modes of production. Capitalism, in
particular, marks the first step towards the liberation of
individuality from traditional forms of inequality associated
with natural differences, such as those of gender. The
individualism characteristic of capitalist economic relations
is a movement away from traditional roles for women and men:
both women and men are made theoretically equivalent by the
social structure of capitalist economy; both are subject to
class relationships based on the institution of private
property and private ownership of means of production. Marx
notes that "the emancipation of society from private property
. . . is expressed in the political form of the emancipation
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of the workers . . . (which) contains universal human
emancipation . . . every relation of servitude is but a
modification and consequence of this relation (of private
property)" (Marx, 1982, Economic and Philosophic, p. 118).
Second, Marx suggests that, contrary to his idea of the
decline of economic gender differences in capitalist
development, and contrary to his idea that their significance
could be reduced to the primary problem of private ownership
of means of production (the class division), the organizers
of capitalist production will seek to take advantage of
natural and social differences between genders so as to
increase the surplus value (and thereby profit) extracted
from the labor force. More specifically, Marx suggested that
the value of women's labor is lower than that of men's. This
meant that gender differences emerged within the crucial
concept of the valuation of labor-power, the center piece of
Marx's theory of value and of his economics as a whole.
Thus, at the level of philosophy of history, of the
sequence of modes of production, Marx suggests that
traditional, naturally based, social divisions, such as those
associated with sexual differences, will decline. For Marx,
human social progress implies the control of nature and the
overcoming of naturally based social divisions. In fact,
Marx argues that historical progress is a movement from what
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is natural to what is human in social relations1 . In the
place of traditional social relations, some based on natural
differences, such as those of gender, or on kinship, or
tribal associations, a new form of individualism in
capitalism has arisen, organized through the equal exchange
system of the market and structured by economic and social
classes based on ownership of means of production.
In the economic analysis of this form of society, Marx
develops categories that appear to ignore the significance of
gender differences. Yet, in describing the detailed
operations of the system of production relations, especially
the problem of the valuation of labor-power, Marx does refer
to the particular qualities of gender differences in the
capitalist economy.
Gender Differences and the Social History of Individuality
For Marx, gender differences are an aspect of the social
realization of individuality that occurs through the labor
process, which is understood as generalized human activity.
The change and development in the social relations of labor,
that is, in the mode of production of society, is also the
production of human individuality. According to Marx,
'According to Hobsbawm (1977, p. 12) "For Marx progress
is something objectively definable and at the same time
pointing to what is desirable. The strength of the Marxist
belief in the triumph of the free development of all men,
depends not on the strength of Marx's hope for it, but on the
assumed correctness of the analysis that this is indeed where
historical development essentially leads mankind."
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Labour is in the first place, a process in
which both man and nature participate, and in
which man of his own accord starts, regulates,
and controls the material re-actions between
himself and Nature . . . . By this acting on
the external world and changing it, he at the
same time changes his own nature (Marx, 1977,
Capital, Volume One, p. 173).
Thus, human individuality is historically created through the
change and development of social relationships of laboring
and production. Marx argues that "the entire so-called
history of the world is nothing but the creation of man
through human labor" (Marx, 1982, Economic and Philosophic,
p. 145).
Marx broke away from the natural law concept of
individuals used by Smith. Although Smith suggested in his
natural law theory that all individuals were inherently equal
(including women and men) and that it was only economic
conditions (especially the division of labor) that encouraged
the differences between individuals, Smith did not suggest
that the nature of individuality, as such, was subject to
social and historical transformation.
Marx, in contrast, examined the historical
transformation of individuality through changing forms of
labor. Marx, thus, agreed with Smith in arguing that human
potentiality was only limited by social conditions, but he
also went further in specifying that these conditions were
historically created. Slave, serf, and wage labor, for
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example, all appear to Marx as forms of external forced labor
and not the voluntaristic self activity of the free will of
the individual. In this sense, even the progressive social
relations of capitalism appear to remain partly in the realm
of what he called natural necessity and are not.the free
expression of individual wants and needs.
For Marx, laboring is the essential means of human self-
realization. Laboring is most liberating when individuals
can posit their own aims and objectives in how they work and
produce things. In capitalist and earlier societie-s,
laboring always appeared as "repulsive, always as external
forced labour; and notlabour, by contrast, as freedom and
happiness" (Marx, 1977, Grundrisse, p. 611).
Even in capitalist society, the workers' creation of
objects proves the creative consciousness of humanity,
although the products of labor are estranged from the
laborer. For Marx, the estrangement of the laborer from the
product of labor is also the estrangement between
individuals. These relations of production between the
worker and the capitalist are centered in the institution of
private property, which is according to him, "thus the
product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated
labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and
to himself" (Marx, 1982, Economic and Philosophic, p. 117).
In centering the analysis of modes of production on
forms of property, and thereby on relations of production,
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Marx concluded that capitalist social relations were the most
historically removed from nature. As such, gender
differences of individuals appeared to have declining
historical significance.
The Declining Significance of Economic Gender Differences
In the progress of different modes of production, from
precapitalist society, through feudalism, to capitalism, Marx
observes a tendency for the economic significance of gender
differences to decline. In contrast to many pre-capitalist
societies, in which gender differences and kinship relations
were often principle forms of organization of economic life,
it was clear to Marx that modern capitalist society does not
create an absolute division between the economic activities
of women and men. On the contrary, Marx thinks of both women
and men in capitalism as universal individuals: they are the
precursors of a new form of individuality that could be
completely realized in a communist society. These universal
individuals have overcome natural differences, such as those
of gender, and are themselves the products of communal social
relations. They are historical not natural products, which
Marx describes as
(these) universally developed individuals,
whose social relations, as their own
communal relations, are hence also
subordinated by their own communal control,
are no product of nature, but of history.
The degree and the universality of the
development of wealth where this
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individuality becomes possible supposes
production on the basis of exchange values
as a prior condition (Marx, 1977,
Grundrisse, p. 162).
The development of individuality thus proceeds through
historical stages characterized by differing forms of the
social organization of labor and production--to which
correspond differing degrees of importance of gender
differences in the economic life of society. Marx observes
an inherent tendency in these stages of development for the
significance of naturally based social divisions, such as
those of gender differences, to decline progressively.
For the purposes of our argument, we contrast Marx's
ideas on an early primitive society with his ideas of
capitalism. In a discussion of early societies, Marx begins
from the premises of real individuals, from the physical
characteristics of the natural human species and their
relation to the rest of nature (Marx, 1972, German Ideology).
In so doing, Marx emphasizes that human history begins from a
natural basis, but is modified in the course of history by
the actions of human society. Again, we find that Marx sees
the unique quality of society (as opposed to animal
existence) as human consciousness, which enables humans to
produce their means of subsistence. This mode of production
is more complex than merely the reproduction of physical
existence: it is a definite form of activity, a mode of life.
According to Marx, "As individuals express their life, so
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they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their
production, both with what they produce and with how they
produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the
material conditions determining their production" (Marx,
1972, German Ideology, p. 114). The gradual development of
productive forces encourages a division of labor, a division
that is associated with different forms of ownership. The
division of labor determines the relations of individuals to
one another and to the context of the laboring activity.
The first and historically earliest form of ownership
that Marx describes is that of a tribal society.2 In this
underdeveloped stage of production, people live by hunting
and fishing; they rear beasts and later develop agriculture.
Marx indicated that the division of labor in this early stage
of economy "is still very elementary and is confined to a
further extension of the natural division of labour existing
in the family. The social structure is, therefore, limited
to an extension of the family; patriarchal family
chieftains, below them the members of the tribe, finally
2 The second form of property ownership Marx refers to as
constituting a distinct mode of production is the Ancient
Communal and State form, which combined communal and private
property and rested on slave labor. The third is the Feudal
or Estate form based on the rural community, with a class
division between serfs and landed owners. The fourth form is
Capitalism, centered on the class division between capital
and labor, based on private property in means of production.
Elsewhere, Marx also describes an Asiatic mode of production
combining centralized state control and large-scale
irrigation. Hobsbawm (1977) provides an excellent discussion
of Marx's various modes of production.
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slaves" (Marx, German Ideology, 1972, p. 115). He notes that
the society of the family itself, as the only social
relationship, was historically and analytically prior to even
the tribal society. This micro-society, Marx argues, is
later subordinated to other created social relationships
associated with the emergence of new needs. According to
him, the original division of labor in tribal society emerged
directly from that within the family:
. there develops the division of
labour, which was originally nothing but
the division of labour in the sexual act,
then that division of labour which develops
spontaneously or "naturally" by virtue of
natural predisposition (e.g., physical
strength), needs, accidents, etc., etc.,
Division of labour only becomes truly such
from the moment when a division of material
and mental labour appears (Marx, German
Ideology, 1972, p. 122-23).
It was this original division of labor, based on gender
differences within the family, that Marx argues was the first
form of property, which confirms his argument that it is the
form of property that constitutes the basis of the mode of
production and division of labor. He maintains that this
original form of property was the ownership by the husband
and father of his wife and children as slaves:
with the division of labour . . . (which)
is based on the natural division of labour
in the family and the separation of society
into individual families opposed to one
73
another, is given simultaneously . . . the
unequal distribution . . . of labour and
its products, hence property: the nucleus,
the first form, of which lies in the
family, where wife and children are the
slaves of the husband. This latent slavery
in the family, though still very crude, is
the first property. (Marx, 1972, German
Ideology, p. 123)
Property is the means of disposal over the labor-power
of others and originated within the family. Thus, the
original division of labor in tribal society was, indeed,
based on what Marx calls the natural differences of age and
sex--so that gender differences were inscribed in the,
foundation of the economy. In a later discussion of the
origins of division of labor, Marx again refers back to
gender differences within the family as the source of the
problem:
Division of labour in society, and the
corresponding tying down of individuals to
a particular calling, develops itself, just
as does the division of labour in
manufacture, from opposite starting points.
Within a family, and after further
development within a tribe, there springs
up naturally a division of labour, caused
by differences of age and sex, a division
that is consequently based on a purely
physiological foundation . . . . On the
other hand, as I have before remarked, the
exchange of products springs up at the
points where different families, tribes,
communities, come into contact . . . . In
the latter case, the social division of
labour arises from the exchange between
spheres of production, that are originally
distinct and independent of one another
. . . . In the former, the physiological
division of labour is the starting point.
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(Marx, 1977, Capital, Volume One, pp. 332-
333)
Economic gender differences are simply presented as natural
differences between individuals in what is, in a sense, also
a natural economy.
Thus, while the division of labor within the primitive
tribal society was presumed by Marx to have its starting
point in the natural and physiological individual differences
of age and s.ex, the later development of the social division
of labor was based on the exchange of products between
communities. Marx goes on to distinguish between the social
division of labor in general, and the division of labor in
manufacture, and he argues that it is in the latter that
differences among individuals, including natural
physiological differences of age and sex, form the basis of
division of labor.3
Marx emphasized that capitalist relations of production
are utterly different from those of a primitive tribal
society. In capitalism, a landless and propertyless class of
workers emerges who are sellers of labor-power in a commodity
form in exchange for a wage. The social forms of wage labor
and capital becomes dominant. The individual is no longer
internally related through the natural ties of kinship and
community but through the external relationships of the
3 We shall return to Marx's argument on the gender
differences associated with the division of labor in capitalist
manufacturing later in this chapter.
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market. This was the commercial society that Smith
described, but in which Marx emphasizes the social division
created by unequal ownership of means of production. Marx,
nevertheless, comments that political economists, such as
Smith, had made a breakthrough in describing the "civil
society" in which "every individual is a totality of needs
and only exists for the other person, as the other exists for
him, in so far as each becomes a means for the other" (Marx,
1982, Economic and Philosophic, p. 159).
For Marx, however, the individual equivalence of this
market exchange system was underscored by a fundamental
relationship that Smith neglected: the development of
division of labor and the system of exchange that Smith
described depend essentially upon private property. In so
far as it is the relations of production of labor that enable
the division of labor, and the spread of exchange
relationships, so it is also labor that is the heart of
private property. Division of labor and exchange are
embodiments of private property. The division of labor is
the economic expression of the social character of labor: a
form of labor that is created by relations of property that
estrange the laborer from the object and means of production.
In capitalism, as Marx described it, relations of
production are not basically organized around the principles
of gender differences; rather, they are organized around the
principles of private ownership of the means of production
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and the sale of labor-power by workers. In other words, the
class division defined around ownership of means of
production and the sale of labor-power as commodities is
analytically more significant than the question of gender
differences. The capitalist economy has created a new form
of individuality (in which gender differences are not
important) by means of the generalized system of market
exchange and the sale of labor-power as commodities.
According to Marx,
Capital's ceaseless striving towards the
general form of wealth drives labour beyond
the limits of its natural paltriness, and
thus creates the material elements for the
development of the rich individuality which
is all-sided in its production as in its
consumption, and whose labour also
therefore appears no longer as labour, but
as the full development of activity itself,
in which natural necessity in its direct
form has disappeared; because a
historically created need has taken the
place of a natural one (Marx, 1977,
Grundrisse, p. 325).
For both Smith and Marx, the social connection of
individuals through the exchange of commodities releases
people from the older ties of blood or personal dependency.
Relationships between individuals thus appear to Marx to be
universal and social, unbounded by community or nature, so
that "the reciprocal and all-sided dependence of individuals
who are indifferent to one another forms their social
connection" (Marx, 1977, Grundrisse, p. 156). Individuals
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are related through the impersonal network of commodity
transactions in the market place. In Marx's famous dictum,
the social relationships between individuals now appear as
the relationships between things: the fetishism of
commodities.
Yet, for Marx, this alienating form of social
relationships is far preferable to the forms of natural or
communal relationships that characterized earlier forms of
society--and in which gender differences played a key role.
He states that "certainly, this objective connection is
preferable to the lack of any connection, or to a merely
local connection resting on blood ties, or on primeval,
natural or master-servant relations" (Marx, 1977, Grundrisse,
p. 161).
As with Smith, Marx's economic individuals, now
distributed in an opposition between capital and labor, are
not necessarily specified by gender differences. Thus, one
major line of thought in Marx's economic framework remains
connected to the idea of the individual in class
relationships, but this individual is not thought of as
either male or female in the fundamental categories of the
theory.
Gender Differences in the Capitalist Relations of Production
As we have seen, when Marx presented individuals in
capitalist social relations as genderless, he dealt with the
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overall historical tendencies of development of different
modes of production. When we now turn to the examination of
the detailed relations of production of labor in capitalist
economy, and particularly to the problem of the valuation of
labor-power, we find that gender differences emerge as a
quality of the economic relations of labor.
When Marx first introduces the concept of labor in
Capital, he does not refer to gender differences. In a way,
Marx is saying that the capitalist does not care whether
workers are male or female, all the capitalist wants is
labor-power. The gender of that individual unit of labor-
power is not important. Marx takes pains to emphasize that
the concept of labor is an abstraction representing the
homogeneity and exchangeability of labor-power as a
commodity. In developing the concept of abstract social
labor, Marx ignored what he called individual differences in
labor, such as gender, age, or skill. Social labor therefore
represented the average capacity of units of labor-power
given then existing conditions of production.
The key analytical development Marx is making is to show
that the laborer, in selling labor-power for a period of time
to the capitalist, must work under the control of the
capitalist. Labor-power becomes the property of the
capitalist in exchange for a wage. As a general social
relation, this form of exchange does not refer to gender
differences of the individual worker. This process of
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exchange allows the capitalist to appropriate the value
produced by the wage laborers in the form of surplus value,
through the private ownership and control of the means of
production and the labor time of the workers. Part of the
value produced by each worker under such conditions is
returned to the worker in the form of the wage, while the
remainder is appropriated by the capitalist.
However, in contrast with the undifferentiated,
homogeneous concept of social labor, Marx also analyzed how
the development of machinery incorporated the human worker in
the labor process, and how this process involved gender
differences as an aspect of the detailed division of labor in
the factory. He now begins to show a specific concern with
economic gender differences.
Marx distinguished between the social division of labor
in general and the detailed division of labor at the level of
production.* By social division of labor, he meant the
division of social production into major sectors and
branches, beginning with distinctions between agriculture,
industry, and commerce, and their sub-branches of activity.
We have already seen how Marx suggested that detailed
divisions of labor in production originated with natural
*Rattansi (1982) notes that Marx's ideas on the division of
labor evolved in his various writings. In the early writings
Marx conflated the concepts of class and division of labor, so
that abolition of property would also entail the negation of
division of labor. In later writings, (from Grundrisse on) the
concepts of class and division of labor are separated.
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individual differences of age and sex within the family,
while the social division of labor originated with the
exchange of products between communities. Marx argues,
furthermore, that the detailed cooperation of labor under the
direction of the capitalist took two distinct forms. Labor
could be organized by bringing together various different
handicrafts, or it could be organized by collecting all
laborers together to perform similar tasks. The former
organization Marx called detail labor and the latter he
called collective labor.
The capitalist division of labor within the workshop or
factory is a result of direct control of the labor process
and means of production by the capitalist. Marx said that
"the division of labor in the workshop implies concentration
of the means of production in the hands of one capitalist;
the division of labour in society implies their dispersion
among many independent producers of commodities" (Marx, 1977,
Capital, Volume One, p. 336). Thus, the social division of
labor is common to many different forms of economy, but the
division of labor within the factory or workshop is specific
to capitalism.
In the division of labor of capitalist manufacture, the
collectivity of workers becomes "a form of existence of
capital" (Marx, 1977, Capital, Volume One, p. 340) in that
the labor time of numerous workers is possessed by the
capital advanced for their wages. The organization of labor
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is based on a hierarchy of activities resulting in workers
becoming "mere appendages" of machines. The individual
laborer is emasculated.
Suddenly, we see that Marx moves from the abstraction of
the social relation of labor in general, to the reality of
individual differences between workers. Workers are divided
between those with desirable skills and those without. Marx
(1977, Capital, Volume One, p. 346) argues that manufacturing
divides up workers, and "adapts the detail operations to the
various degrees of maturity, strength, and development of the
living instruments of labour, thus conducing [sic] to
exploitation of women and children, yet this tendency as a
whole is wrecked on the habits and the resistance of the male
labourers." Immediately, abstract social labor has been
transformed and broken into skilled or unskilled, strong or
weak, female or male characteristics of individual workers.
The actual labor of capitalist relations of production is
highly differentiated, and gender differences are a
fundamental aspect of this differentiation.
Marx makes frequent reference to the political struggles
that went on between women and men over their respective
roles in the world of work. He notes that in England before
the Factory Acts (which limited the labor of women and
children under the age of 10 years) "women are still
occasionally used instead of horses for hauling canal boats,
because the labour required to produce horses and machines is
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an accurately known quantity, while that required to maintain
the women of the surplus population is below all calculation"
(Marx, 1977, Capital, Volume One, p. 372).
As the above remarks suggest, Marx made a very specific
argument about the introduction of machinery and the nature
of economic gender differences. The introduction of factory
machine production is argued by Marx to weaken the
traditional hierarchies of skill associated with adult male
laborers in the division of labor. He says that the use of
machinery has "become a means of employing laborers of slight
muscular strength, and those whose bodily development is
incomplete, but whose limbs are all the more supple. The
labour of women and children was, therefore, the first thing
sought for by capitalists who used machinery" (Marx, 1977,
Capital. Volume One, p. 372).
Marx goes on to argue that the introduction of machinery
allowed capitalists to enlarge the pool of available labor by
incorporating all members of the family regardless of age or
sex:
We have seen that the development of the
capitalist mode of production and of the
productive power of labor--at once the
cause and effect of accumulation--enables
the capitalist, with the same outlay of
variable capital, to set in action more
labour . . . . the capitalist buys with the
same capital a greater mass of labour-
power, as he progressively replaces skilled
labourers by less skilled, mature labour-
power by immature, male by female, that of
adults by that of young persons or children
(Marx, 1977, Capital, Volume One, p. 595)
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This waged labor of women and children "usurped the place,
not only of children's play, but also of free labour at home
within the moderate limits of support of the family" (Marx,
Capital, Volume One, p. 372). In a footnote to this passage,
Marx describes how "capital, for the purposes of its self
expansion, has usurped the labour necessary in the home for
the family" (1977, p. 372).
The introduction of factory machine production made the
division of labor less hierarchical and more homogenized.
Because less skill and physical strength was required on the
part of workers, Marx argued that the new machine production
encouraged the employment of women and children in the place
of skilled adult males, implying that women and children were
considered as unskilled cheap labor. The traditional
economic relationships of family life were overturned. He
said that
modern industry, in overturning the economic
foundation on which was based the traditional
family, and the family labour corresponding to
it, had also unloosened all traditional family
ties . . . . However terrible and disgusting
the dissolution, under the capitalist system, of
the old family ties may appear, nevertheless,
modern industry by assigning as it does an
important part in the process of production,
outside the domestic sphere to women, to young
persons, and to children of both sexes, creates
a new economic foundation for a higher form of
the family and of the relations between the
sexes (Marx, 1977, Capital, Volume One, pp.
459-460)
A fundamental question remained excluded at this point:
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why was it assumed by Marx that the historical conditions of
labor were such that female labor was inevitably cheaper and
less skilled than male labor? In Marxist economic terms, why
was the value of female labor-power inevitably lower than
male?
Gender Differences in the Valuation of Labor-Power
In Marx's theory of the value of labor-power, the
problem of gender differences was recognised, but he finally
explicitly excluded it from his approach.' Marx developed
the theory of labor-power as a commodity. His theory of the
value of labor-power is therefore generally the same as that
which he applies to the value of all commodities. The value
of a commodity is given by the labor time embodied in its
production, assuming the expenditure of a uniform or
homogeneous quality of labor-power:
The total labour-power of a society, which
is embodied in the sum total of the values
of all commodities produced by that
society, counts here as one homogeneous
mass of human labour-power, composed though
it be of innumerable individual units.
Each of these units is the same as any
other, so far as it has the character of
the average labour-power of society, and
takes effect as such; that is, so far as
it requires for producing a commodity, no
more time than is needed on an average, no
'In discussing the Marxist theory of value, we shall only
examine Marx's idea in so far as it relates to the valuation of
human labor-power, avoiding the wide-ranging controversy over the
labor theory of value in general.
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more than is socially necessary (Marx,
1977, Capital, Volume One, p. 46).
Thus, the value of the commodity is provided by what
Marx calls the socially necessary labor that should go into
its production, given the average degree of intensity of
labor and average skills in production of the given
historical level of development of techniques of production.
As we have already seen, by using the concept of socially
necessary labor embodied in the value of a commodity, Marx
assumes that differences in individual units of labor-power
have been averaged out. He excludes individual differences
of labor-power associated with gender, for example, from this
concept. The same principle applies with his theory of the
valuation of the commodity of human labor-power.
Human labor in motion creates value, but is not itself
value, according to Marx. This is why he distinguishes
between human labor-power and the individual, as it is the
potential for human labor, or labor-power, that is sold as a
commodity to be used for a limited period of time by the
capitalist, rather than the laborer as such. The consumption
of labor-power in the process of capitalist production is the
embodiment of labor in the produced commodities and thereby a
creation of value. Labor-power, as such, is the capacity of
the individual laborer to labor, an aggregate of mental and
physical capabilities. There may be natural differences in
the quality of individual units of labor-power, and Marx
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certainly implies that female labor-power is naturally less
physically strong than male labor-power. He states that the
sale of labor-power as a commodity, however, is an
historical, rather than a natural, condition, specifying that
"nature does not produce on the one side owners of money or
commodities, and on the other men possessing nothing but
their own labour-power. This relation has no natural basis,
neither is its social basis one that is common to all
historical periods" (Marx, 1977, Capital, Volume One, p.
166).
Thus, the value of labor-power, as a commodity that is
sold in the wage labor market, is given by the socially
necessary labor that goes into its "production." According
to Marx,
the value of labour-power is determined, as
in the case of every other commodity, by
the labour-time necessary for the
production, and consequently also the
reproduction, of this special article. So
far as it has value, it represents no more
than a definite quantity of the average
labour of society incorporated in it.
Labour-power exists only as a capacity, or
power of the living individual. Its
production consequently presupposes its
existence. Given the individual, the
production of labour-power consists in his
reproduction of himself or his maintenance.
For his maintenance he requires a given
quantity of the means of subsistence.
Therefore the labour-time requisite for the
production of labour-power reduces itself
to that necessary for the production of
those means of subsistence; in other words,
the value of labour-power is the value of
the means of subsistence necessary for the
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maintenance of the labourer (Marx, 1977,
Capital, Volume One, p. 167).
As we have seen, the idea of socially necessary labour
implies an average intensity of labor, of average skill,
using normal techniques of production. In transferring this
concept to the "production" of the commodity of human labor-
power itself, Marx is thereby indicating that, as with other
cases of "socially necessary labor," the distinctions of
gender, age, or skill involved in its production have been
averaged into an homogenous quantity. Furthermore, Marx is
defining the value of human labor-power only as accounted for
by the accumulation of values of commodities that have gone
into its "production," or creation. This means that the
value of human labor-power excludes the inputs of non-
commodity values, all those other goods or services, or forms
of training and education, that are not provided for by the
capitalist market in the form of commodities or exchange
values. The idea of the value of labor-power therefore also
excludes all those noncommodity forms of development of
labor-power provided by the work of parents in their homes,
including the domestic work of women in rearing children and
reproducing labor-power.
At this point, Marx's makes no mention that the value of
labor-power necessarily includes provision for the support of
a wife, or, indeed, that the commodity labour-power, as such,
is necessarily a male attribute. (It does not seem valid to
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assume that Marx's reference to the generic laborer in male
terms, such as "he," implies that the concept refers only to
male workers, especially since Marx has remarked on the fact
that capitalists were eager to employ women). Neither does
the concept.suggest that the laborer's wife and family must
do unwaged housework in order to maintain and reproduce
commodities of exclusively male labor-power. All Marx
suggests is that the value of labor-power will be given by
historical circumstances; the standard of living of workers
will vary according to culture, customs, and moral ideas
around a physical minimum of subsistence.
Although Marx did not explicitly show gender differences
in his concept of the value of labor-power, he did indicate
the need for the wage to cover the costs of supporting the
children of workers: "the sum of the means of subsistence
necessary for the production of labour-power must include the
means necessary for the labourer's substitutes, i.e., his
children, in order that this race of peculiar commodity-
owners may perpetuate its appearance in the market" (Marx,
1977, Capital, Volume One, p. 168).
Furthermore, Marx makes it clear that the value of
individual units of labor-power will vary according to the
degree of education and training, and consequently skills,
that have been acquired by the individual. The
specialization of labor-power will cause its value to be
increased as "a special education or training is requisite,
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and this, on its part, costs an equivalent in commodities of
a greater or lesser amount . . . . The expenses of this
education . . . enter pro tanto into the total value spent in
its production" (Marx, 1977, Capital, Volume One, p. 168).
Thus, so far, Marx has not varied the value of individual
units of labor-power according to gender differences.
It is only when Marx comes to analyze the effects of the
introduction of factory-based machine production on the
valuation of labor-power that the idea of gender differences
is made explicit. The development of the division of labor
in factory production, led by the introduction of machinery,
was argued by Marx to have caused a general revaluation of
labor-power. Marx now appears, for the first time, to assume
that the value of labor is generally that of an adult male
laborer and is sufficient to support a wife and a family,
while the new valuation of labor-power occasioned by the new
factory machine production is individualized and based on the
average values of men, women, and children. He says that
The value of labour-power was determined,
not only by the labour-time necessary to
maintain the individual adult labourer, but
also by that necessary to maintain his
family. Machinery, by throwing every
member of that family on to the labour-
market, spreads the value of the man's
labour-power over his whole family. It
thus depreciates his labour-power . . . now
the capitalist buys children and young
persons under age. Previously, the workman
sold his own labour-power, which he
disposed of nominally as a free-agent. Now
he sells wife and child. He has become a
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slave dealer (Marx, 1977, Capital, Volume
One, p. 373).
Later, in the first volume of Capital, Marx acknowledges
this problem of historical change in the role of gender
differences in the valuation of labour-power, but he decided
to ignore it by stating:
The value of labor-power is determined by the
value of the necessaries of life habitually
required by the average labourer. The quantity
of these necessaries is known at any given epoch
of a given society, and can therefore be treated
as a constant magnitude. What changes, is the
value of this quantity. There are besides two
other factors that enter into the determination
of the value of labour-power. One, the expenses
of developing that power; . . . the other, its
natural diversity, the difference between the
labour-power of men and women, of children and
adults. The employment of these different sorts
of labour-power, an employment which is, in its
turn, made necessary by the mode of production,
makes a great difference in the cost of
maintaining the family of the labourer, and in
the value of the labour-power of the adult male.
Both these factors, however, are excluded in the
following investigation (Marx, 1977, Capital,
Volume One, p. 486).
These "other factors," which Marx excludes from his
general analysis, both involve gender differences: first, in
the straightforward assertion that the value of labor power
naturally varies by gender; and second, in that gender
differences are implicated in the expenses of developing
labor-power. This second aspect arises in so far as the
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development of labor-power occurs, at least partly, in the
family environment, which must be supported by the wage. The
wage for the adult male, however, has been devalued by the
addition of female and child labor-power into the labor
market with the development of factory machine production.
Furthermore, if the male wage were assumed to support a wife
and family, but no longer does so, and the wife and children
were also waged workers, then the whole question of the
reproduction of labor-power is left unanswered.
Marx has in fact left us in a quandary. Marx's general
philosophical historical approach led us towards the idea
that gender differences were absent from the categories of
his economics. We see this both as a theoretical result of
the analysis of the functioning of capitalism, in that this
form of economy did not fundamentally differentiate economic
individuals according to gender, and as a progressive
historical development of social relations away from the
dictates of natural or biologically based social divisions.
Then, in reading Capital, we find that beneath the abstract
categories of Marxist economics the impetus of gender
differences emerges. But the way in which he deals with
gender differences is itself contradictory.
Thus, Marx argues, on the one hand, that the
introduction of machinery into the factory has removed the
natural basis to the gender differences of labor. The
recruitment of labor can occur regardless of gender, as
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neither traditional male skills nor the on-average greater
physical strength of men any longer deters the employment of
women (and children). On the other hand, Marx takes the
argument further and twists it in another direction, in
suggesting that women and children will actually displace
male workers. They will be employed rather than men on the
assumption that the value of their labor is inherently less
than that of men, so that, in fact, factory machine
production has not removed the basis of gender differences of
labor. Factory machine production has encouraged a new form
of economic gender difference in which the lower value of
women's labor-power is preferentially employed to that of
men s.
Thus, Marx used an assumption of the valuation of labor-
power that implicitly was that of an adult male laborer whose
wage was designed to support a wife and family; and that the
entrance of women and children into the labor pool,
facilitated by the development of machinery, transformed and
individualized this generic valuation of labor-power. Yet,
we have seen that Marx explicitly excluded any inherent
gender differences from his general explanation of the
valuation of labor-power.
In defining the value of labor as the labor time
necessary for its production, measured in terms of the
commodities required for its maintenance and reproduction
over time, Marx had no a priori reason to value women's
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labor-power less than that of men. Regardless of gender
differences, the value of labor can vary according to the
degree of skill it has acquired, accounted for in terms of
the additional commodities in the form of education or
training that have gone into its "production." With this
premise, Marx could have argued that women's and children's
labor is historically of lower value than adult males because
it has been less invested in as human capital (we would still
want to know why this has been the case historically). With
such a logic, Marx could then have explained the substitution
of women and children for skilled adult males that occurred
with the introduction of factory machinery. Such machinery,
Marx argued, had caused the deskilling of factory jobs,
making them suitable for less-skilled workers. But the less-
skilled workers could just as easily have been unskilled
males as unskilled women or children. Therefore, there has
to be an historical explanation, which Marx does not offer,
for the relative lack of skills acquired by women relative to
men.
Marx also needs to explain why, regardless of skill
differences, women's labor appears to be of less value than
men's, unless we are to assume that Marx has reverted to the
argument of natural differences between the value of women's
and men's labor. Yet, the whole thrust of Marx's thinking
has been away from using natural differences to explain
social relations, especially in capitalism. Marx has made
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explicit that modern machine production has made physical
differences between women and men more or less redundant in
the valuation of labor-power.
Marx therefore leaves us with an historical fact that is
unexplained by economic theory: the value of male labor is
assumed to support that of women and children. This means,
perhaps, that women's and children's labor-power was cheaper
because Marx assumed they did not have to support wives and
families, or that, indeed, part of the costs of their own
reproduction would be supported by their husbands or fathers.
The result is a situation where the gender differences in the
value of labor-power have become entirely dependent upon
assumptions of who is supporting whom according to historical
circumstances.
We find, finally, that there is a problem of
interpreting what the value of labor-power is assumed to
cover versus how the value of labor-power is to be
determined. The coverage of the value of labor power--that
is who is supposed to support whom--is argued by Marx to vary
historically according to the particular circumstances of
moral and cultural conditions, the level of political
organization of the working class, and the types of forms of
production--such as factory machine production that
encourages the employment of unskilled women and children.
This historical variation in the coverage of the value of
labor-power can obviously include gender differences, such as
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whether adult male wages are sufficient to support wives or
families, or whether women's wages are lower than men's
because Marx assumed that women are generally supported by
the wages of men. As with the gender differences in the
generic value of labor-power, these variations are contingent
on historical social circumstance and are not explained by
Marx's theory of the value of labor-power, as such. His
theory only explains that the value of labor-power in general
is determined by the socially necessary labor that goes into
the commodities that are used up in the creation of
individual labor-power. His theory therefore does not refer
to gender differences.
Thus, we are left with a paradox: the philosophical-
historical approach of Marxist theory led towards a
genderless conceptualization of economics and of the social
relations of capitalism, but in the detailed operations of
this historical economy, Marx acknowledged the significance
of gender differences even within key concepts, such as the
value of labor-power. This acknowledgement, however,
remained contradictory and was largely removed from the
overall conceptual arrangement of Marx's economics.
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CHAPTER 4
ALFRED MARSHALL: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
MARGINALIST ECONOMICS AND THE MORAL ROLE OF WOMEN
The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the nature of
the conflict and ambiguity of Marshall's ideas on economic
gender differences. First, we sketch the nature of
Marshall's economics in relation to classical political-
economy; second, we discuss how the marginalist technique
provides a theoretical link between abstract individuals and
social groups in the market system--a link in which gender
differences are not apparent; third, in turning to
Marshall's treatment of labor, we find that women
nevertheless occupy a special role in the economy governed by
their maternal responsibilities. Thus, behind his abstract
analysis of the system of market prices, Marshall held strong
normative judgments on what the respective economic roles of
women and men should be. Women occupy an ambiguous position
in Marshall's economic thought: on the one hand, Marshall
asserts that women should be partly excluded from the labor
market; on the other hand, Marshall treats women and men
equivalently in his economic technique of marginalism.
"An Implanted Masterfulness Towards Womankind"
In a memorial to Alfred Marshall, John Maynard Keynes
wrote that "an implanted masterfulness towards womankind
warred in him with the deep affection and admiration which he
bore to his own wife, and with an environment which threw him
in closest touch with the education and liberation of women"
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(Keynes, 1982, p. 7-8).1 Marshall's complex attitude towards
women is reflected in the economic principles that he is
famous for having elaborated: women were placed in a moral
sphere where their virtue depended on their duties and
obligations to their families and children; their work in
any other field was deemed secondary and subordinate. In
Marshall's economic terms, the role of women as breeders and
rearers of high quality labor was theoretically and morally
paramount over their participation as economic individuals
equivalent to men. Women thus appear on the margin of an
economy defined as a system of market prices. They are of
great importance for such an economy, but their participation
is morally and practically affected by their roles and
responsibilities in the home.
Marshall led a new school of neoclassical or marginalist
economics that dominated economic thinking until at least
after the Second World War. Marshall redirected economics
away from classical politicaleconomy, but at the same time
insisted on a wider social and ethical framework for the new
technical and mathematical methods of economic analysis. In
so doing, he also introduced a conflict between the abstract
and genderless quality of the marginalist economic method and
'Keynes' comment on Marshall's attitude towards women is
revealing. Marshall actively opposed the award of degrees by
Cambridge University to women. Keynes suggests that Marshall
never overcame the influence of his father who wrote a tract
entitled "Man's Rights and Woman's Duties". Keynes' memorial to
Marshall originally appeared in the Economic Journal, Vol. 34,
Sept. 1924, pp. 311-72.
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his own deeply held beliefs and values concerning the
ethical, social, and economic roles to be performed
differently by women and men. According to Levitt (1982 p.
422), "on the one hand, he [Marshall] constructed . . . a
powerful 'engine of analysis' that was analytically pure and
unforgiving as the mathematics on which he based its
essentials. Yet it was also infused throughout with an
effluvium of moral maxims, ethical prescriptions and public-
policy insistences."
The problem of economic gender differences in Marshall's
thought thus parallels a wider conflict between the vestiges
of classical political-economy, with its regard for
qualitative social relations and the underlying determinants
of the market system, and the a-social marginalist method,
the efficacy of which depended on its abstraction from the
social context of the market. This conflict provides the
basis of the ambiguity of Marshall's treatment of gender
differences, and sets the stage for the later neoclassical
treatment of the issue.
Marshall's Economics
Marshall defined economics as the study of humankind in
the ordinary business of life, so that economists study "that
part of individual and social action which is most closely
connected with the attainment and with the use of the
material requisites of wellbeing" (Marshall, 1961, p.1).
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All individuals share the need and desire for goods in a
world of scarcity. All individuals experience diminishing
returns in satisfaction from additional increments of each
good. This idea of diminishing marginal utility allowed the
marginalist economists to present a new (relative to Smith
and Marx) theory of value that could cover the whole terrain
of economic thought.2 Individual consumers maximize utility;
individual firms maximize profits. Both forms of
maximization are subject to the marginal principle--which was
that the marginal alteration of any economic resource will be
most efficient if the gain from the change will just equal
the loss.
Marshall differed from both the actual originators and
later developers of marginalist economic theory in seeking to
link the new form of economic analysis to the tradition of
classical economic thought. Marshall remained concerned with
the classical problems of growth, development, inequality,
and poverty, and sought to graft the marginal method onto
these concerns. He maintained a classical awareness of the
historical context of economic development.
For Marshall, the growth in political rights for
2 As many commentators have noted, Marshall did not originate
the so-called Marginal Revolution in economics in the late
nineteenth century. Menger in Austria (1871), Jevons in England
(1871), and Walras in Switzerland (1874), all more or less
simultaneously introduced remarkably similar ideas on marginal
utility and general equilibrium. Marshall's Principles was not
published until 1890. For discussion on the origins of the
Marginal Revolution see Blaug (1980), Cooke (1982), Deane (1978),
and Schumpeter (1954).
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individuals, the demise of traditional customs governing
social life, and the expansion of productivity with the
Industrial Revolution, gave a new prominence and definition
to economic conditions in modern society. By this, Marshall
meant that economic actions, as such, could now be recognized
and analyzed more clearly. The predominance of the market
supplied a fertile field for the new economics, as it meant
that all forms of economic activity could be treated with the
marginalist calculus.
Marshall acknowledged that the classical economists of
the 18th century, such as Smith and Ricardo, had developed
key ideas for understanding the market economy. These
economists, however, remained caught in a view of the economy
in which natural laws governed the rates of reward for the
three factors of production (land, labor, and capital); so
that each was conceptualized differently. Land rent was
determined as a surplus from marginal costs of cultivation;
wages were derived from the long-run costs of production of
means of subsistence; and the rate of profit on capital was a
residual (Blaug, 1980). The classical political economy had
been concerned centrally with the constitutional order within
which capitalism could best develop to the advantage of the
nation as a whole and with the relationship between classes
that was proper to such a development (Clarke, 1982). The
classical economists had tried to penetrate below the
features of market exchange to discover underlying
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determining relationships. They came up with a labor theory
of value and a theory of distribution of the economic surplus
between various social ranks or classes.
Marshall and the marginalists moved the central concern
of economics to the question of the rigorous determination of
prices, as a way of understanding the optimum allocation of
resources between individuals and firms through the exchange
processes of the market. This development of economic
thinking meant that the question of distribution in terms of
social class was by-passed. The new individual subjective
theory of value based on utility ignored classes and any
underlying determining relationships of market exchange
(Meek, 1977). The marginalist analysis thus released
economics from many issues and focussed it more generally and
uniformly upon the issue of prices.'
Marshall, therefore, sought through the price mechanism
to place the discipline of economics on a wider systematic
foundation than it had previously held. Economics referred
to the material basis for social well being, but its means
and methods were given by the measure of money in the form of
prices. Marshall maintained that prices are the core of
economics because they alone provide it with the exactness of
a science. Economics cannot be an exact physical science,
however, because it deals with the "changing and subtle
3 As Blaug comments, "An unkind critic might say that
neoclassical economics indeed achieved greater generality,
but only by asking easier questions" (Blaug, 1980, p. 314).
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forces of human nature" (Marshall, 1961, p. 15). Although
price is the cornerstone of economics as a proto-science,
according to Marshall, it is nevertheless merely the measure
of "desires, aspirations, and other affections of human
nature, the outward manifestations of which appear as
incentives to action in such a form that the force of
quantity of the incentives can be estimated and measured"
(Marshall, 1961, p. 15).
Marshall thought that if economics could be defined only
in terms of prices, then it could have ideological
neutrality. Economics could be a science of price
determination. He was aware that such a "pure" economic
theory would be a useful abstraction at best. His focus on
prices did, however, mean that he was concerned with the
efficient allocation of resources by the market. With this
focus, the neoclassical economists retained the classical
basis of economics in individualism and laisser-faire, but
by-passed its concerns with value and distribution.*
By defining value as individual subjective utility (for
both consumers and producers), the marginalist economists
avoided the problematic issue of the objective meaning of
value that plagued Smith, Ricardo, and Marx. Instead of
'As Deane explains: "the problems of value and
distribution which had preoccupied the Ricardians were
solved, or, more accurately, one might say swept under the
carpet, by simple process of definition." (Deane, 1978, p.
101).
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socio-economic relations, the starting point for the
marginalist economists became the psychological relationship
between individuals and goods: the utility preference.'
They diverted attention away from the problem of the
intrinsic value of goods by defining value in terms of
utility as expressed in the exchange relationship. Thus,
they developed a theory of exchange rather than one of value
(Deane, 1978). The marginalists, including Marshall, showed
that it was the marginal increment of utility on which the
exchange-value or price depended.
Marshall succeeded in- combining the revolutionary
implications of defining value as utility in the relation of
exchange with the classical notion of value as cost-of-
production. He introduced a famous metaphor of a pair of
scissors, with supply and demand as its blades, to illustrate
the unity of value as both utility in demand and as cost-of-
production in supply. Thus, he based the theory of demand on
the marginal utility to the individual and the theory of
supply on the marginal productivity of the firm. He used
prices as the signals of the interdependence of the whole
economic system, with the equilibrium price in the
competitive market being the intersection of the demand and
sIronically, this was exactly what Marx referred to as the
fetishism of commodities: relationships between people are
experienced and expressed in capitalist society as the
relationships between things or commodities: "a definite social
relation between man, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic
form of a relation between things" (Marx, 1977, Capital, Volume
One, p. 77).
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supply curves. Keynes summarized Marshall's achievement as
"the general idea, underlying the proposition that Value is
determined as the equilibrium point of Demand and Supply, was
extended so as to discover a whole Copernican system, by
which all the elements of the economic universe are kept in
their places by mutual counterpoise and interaction" (Keynes,
1982, p.37).
Marginalism, Individuals, and Gender.
The individual, as the bearer of subjective utility
preferences and as a rational maximizer of utility or profit,
is assumed by Marshall to be the atom of economic action.
The marginalist economic technique was developed by Marshall
to model the economic actions of such individuals; it was,
however, a model of economic individuals that excluded gender
differences.
Although Marshall modelled individuals, he was also
concerned with aggregations of individuals to the extent that
this overcame or counterbalanced the "peculiarities of
individuals". Economics could not work if it had to take
into account every peculiarity or idiosyncrasy of the
individual. Marshall therefore aggregated individuals into
groups, such as all adult males in a certain trade or all
families. Thereby, the differences among individuals were
averaged. Other aggregations of individuals used by Marshall
are those of income, where he refers to the rich, the middle
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class, and the poor. Marshall sometimes appears to
distinguish men and women as specific aggregations for
economic analysis, but his general approach was to ignore
gender differences as qualities of individuals. The purpose
of the aggregations was to enable economists to work with a
measure of human motives on a large scale. He stated that
"economists study the action of individuals, but study them
in relation to social rather than individual life; and
therefore concern themselves but little with personal
peculiarities of temper of character" (Marshall, 1961, p.
25).
The aggregation of individuals in groups also enabled
Marshall to develop his well-known "partial analyses"--
economic analyses of small sectors of the economy. These
groups have a characteristic homogeneity, a unity of form,
that allows for the general analysis suitable for economic
reasoning.
Marshall's development of the idea of marginalism
provided a means of extrapolating between individual demand
and the wider system of market prices, and thereby between
6 By referring to income groups, Marshall arrays
individuals along a homogeneous continuum defined by prices
(money income). This approach reveals the radical difference
between marginalism and classical political economy in their
definition of social groups and classes; the classical
approach was to define social groups in terms of their
particular socio-economic relationships, as owners of land,
as sellers of labor, as undertakers or stock holders of
capital in production, for example--all qualitative
references to social structures that are absent in the
marginalist analysis of income aggregation.
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the idiosyncracies of individual desires and tastes and the
aggregation of social groups. Individual's wants may be
endlessly varied, but each separate want will be limited, so
that with increasing amounts of a particular good the
incremental utility from each additional unit will decrease.
As Schumpeter described this phenomenon, "as we go on
acquiring successive increments of each good, the intensity
of our desire for one additional "unit" declines
monotonically until it reaches--and then conceivably falls
below-zero" (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 910). Marshall himself
described it more simply as "the marginal utility of a thing
to anyone diminishes with every increase in the amount of it
he already has."
The idea of diminishing marginal utility then became
the basis for a new theory of value-in-exchange based on the
use or utility value of goods to consumers. By looking at
the combination of all individual's economic behavior in
terms of marginal utility, the marginalist economists found
that a picture of the total economy emerged. The economic
rationality of individual utility maximization covered the
behavior of households as well as firms, consumption as well
as production, demand as well as supply.' The efficient
'Meek (1977) notes that this logic of rational economic
choice can be applied to any kind of human behavior governed by
the principle of maximization of utility. This praxiology, or
logic of human action, provided the basis for Gary Becker's
radical extension of the domain of economics to cover everything
from the choice to divorce, commit a crime, or have a baby
(discussed in Chapter Six).
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price (determined at the margin) equilibrated between demand
and supply. Allocation of resources in production and
pricing of goods in distribution could be unified within a
single method of analysis. For the first time, economists
saw the supply and demand of goods as part of a single
interdependent mechanism of market activity--as the twin
blades of Marshall's scissors. Furthermore, they found that
the laws of exchange resembled those of equilibrium in
mechanics as derived from Newtonian physics (Deane, 1978).
With the aid of calculus and myriad simultaneous equations,
they could model the whole economy in terms of priced
transactions. Marginal utility analysis "created an analytic
tool of general applicability to economic problems . . . pure
economics thus finds itself unified in the light of a single
principle--in a sense in which it never had been before
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 912-913).
Parallel and complementary to the idea of marginal
utility, Marshall developed the idea of diminishing marginal
returns from Ricardo's analysis of agricultural productivity.
Marshall broadened the problem to express the efficient
allocation of any resources of production to yield better
results--to get the greatest marginal return. Furthermore,
Marshall argues that the tendency for additional "doses" of
varying combinations of labor and capital to lead to
diminishing marginal returns is counterbalanced by increasing
productivity, greater volume of production, and growth in the
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supply of better, more vigorous, and more efficient labor.
Increased wealth facilitates a greater increase of wealth.
Economies of scale of production promote increased wealth.
Thus, Ricardo's idea of diminishing marginal returns in
agriculture (associated with the finite supply of fertile
land) is countered by Marshall's optimistic assertion that
highly developed industrial organization can lead to
increasing returns. He said "in other words, we say broadly
that while the part which nature plays in production shows a
tendency to diminishing return, the part which man plays
shows a tendency to increasing return" (Marshall, 1961, p.
318).
A given historical situation of economic development can
then be seen to be subject to economic laws, or tendencies.
For Marshall, such laws were the monetary price measurement
of conduct that may be defined as "normal," that is conduct
that can be expected in the long run under certain
conditions. By using the term "normal" Marshall did not
refer to undisturbed free competition nor to what may be
morally right; on the contrary, he intended economics to
measure and refer to what actually exists. Economists
present the facts of the world as they are. Marshall (1961,
p.26-7) said that "in all this they deal with man as he is:
not with ar. abstract or "economic man"."
By focussing on price and by aggregating individuals in
groups to avoid their "peculiarities," Marshall however
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avoided a specific consideration of gender differences. The
marginalist method tended to abstract from the social or
historical context of individual's lives, and thereby also
from the significance of gender differences as an aspect of
individuality. The starting point of the marginalist
analysis was a utility-maximizing individual, endowed with
given tastes, skills and resources, making rational choices
in conditions of scarcity. But the marginalists moved away
immediately from the concrete quality of any specific
individual and away from differences between women and men as
attributes of individuals in general. Yet, Marshall
consistently referred to a special role that women must
perform in the economy. We shall see that it is a role that
falls largely outside of the scope of the marginalist
economic analysis and leaves women marking the boundary
between what is defined as economic versus what is defined as
social. There is a conflict between the asserted goals of a
neutral economic science based on the marginalist technique
and the wider normative structure that Marshall derived from
the classical political economists.
The Unique Factor of Labor and the Special Role of Women
Although Marshall emphasized the substitutability
between "agents" and "appliances" of production, and
therefore equates labor with other factors of production, he
was careful, nevertheless, to acknowledge the unique
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characteristics of human labor. The supply of labor was
actually segmented between what Marshall referred to as hand-
workers and brain-workers and between different "classes" and
"grades." In discussing distribution, Marshall followed
Smith's break away from a "natural" subsistence theory of
wages, recognizing that the condition of the market, itself,
regulated the levels of wages at a given historical period.
With the development of advanced industrial processes,
Marshall argued that high wages increased the efficiency of
labor and led to the intergenerational growth in the supply
of efficient labor. Marshall's idea of distribution combined
the individual reward of labor with its distribution within
families and over time between generations. It is within
this complex of relationships that Marshall began to refer to
the specific roles of men and women in families and in the
labor market.
Marshall argued that the necessities of life required to
support labor will vary historically and from society to
society. The necessities of life for the laborer are defined
by what is required to determine the efficient supply of
labor by type. A certain level and quality of consumption is
necessary for specific grades of labor to be able to work
efficiently and also to ensure the supply of efficient labor
in future generations. Wages must be considered in relation
to the costs of rearing, training, and sustaining the energy
of efficient labor. Thus, he explained that the necessities
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of life to enable the efficient market supply of unskilled
labor entails the economic dependence of a housewife on the
male laborer, stating that
(if) we consider here what are the
necessaries for the efficiency of an
ordinary agricultural or an unskilled town
labourer and his family, in England, in
this generation. They may be said to
consist of a well-drained dwelling with
several rooms, warm clothing, with some
changes of under-clothing, pure water, a
plentiful supply of cereal food, with a
moderate allowance of meat and milk, and a
little tea, etc., some education and some
recreation, and lastly, sufficient freedom
for his wife from other work to enable her
to perform properly her maternal and her
household duties (Marshall, 1961, p. 69)
Without these "necessaries" unskilled labor will be less
efficient.
Given that efficient labor required a domestic system of
support that depends upon a gendered division of labor
(essentially the existence of a housewife), Marshall argued
that economists would do well to consider the whole problem
of distribution in terms of families rather than individuals.
he said that
in estimating the cost of production of
efficient labor, we must often take as our unit
the family. At all events we cannot treat the
cost of production of efficient men as an
isolated problem; it must be taken as part of
the broader problem of the cost of production
of efficient men together with the women who
are fitted to make their homes happy, and to
bring up their children vigorous in body and
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mind, truthful and cleanly, gentle and brave
(Marshall, 1961, p. 564)
Marshall acknowledged, however, that while it is the economic
function of families (and especially women) to prepare the
supply of labor, the actual relationships of the labor market
remain individualistic and are not based upon the
organization of the family.
Marshall saw the role of women in the family as of vital
importance. He argued that the inter-generational effects of
family life upon the distribution of income are very great.
Well-off families invest in the future labor-power of their
children and cumulate benefits for the next generation.
Marshall saw housewives and mothers as the major factor in
increasing the value of future labor. Without the mother's
full-time support, the next generation of workers will be
less efficient and will remain in poverty. He stated that
if we compare one country of the civilized
world with another, or one part of England
with another, or one trade in England with
another, we find that the degradation of
the working classes varies almost uniformly
with the amount of rough work done by
women. The most valuable of all capital is
that invested in human beings, and of that
capital the most precious part is the
result of the care.and influence of the
mother, so long as she retains her tender
and unselfish instincts, and has not been
hardened by the strain and stress of
unfeminine work (Marshall, 1961, p. 564)
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Or again, in commenting on how the sons of artisans are more
likely to succeed, Marshall noted that "His parents are
likely to be better educated, and to have a higher notion of
their duties to their children; and, last but not least, his
mother is likely to be able to give more of her time to the
care of her family" (Marshall, 1961, p. 564).
It therefore seems that women are an unacknowledged
problem for economic theory: should their unpaid domestic
labor be counted as part of national income? As housewives,
should their labor be counted only as part of the necessities
of life required by efficient adult male labor? Can women be
counted in the aggregations of individuals into groups by
income, or by trade? Perhaps women should be aggregated into
a group by themselves?
Several comments by Marshall indicate that these issues
were not resolved clearly, so that the position of women in
his economics remains ambiguous. For example, in a footnote
referring to the economic value of immigrant labor, Marshall
commented that
so far we have not taken account of the
difference between the sexes. But it is
clear that the above plans put the value of
the male immigrants too high and that of
the female too low: unless allowance is
made for the service which women render as
mothers, as wives and as sisters, and the
male immigrants are charged with having
consumed their services, while the female
immigrants are credited with having
supplied them (Marshall, 1961, footnote on
p. 565).
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A similar problem arose with counting the labor of domestic
servants in national income, where Marshall said "there is
however some inconsistency in omitting the heavy domestic
work which is done by women and other members of the
household where no servants are kept" (Marshall, 1961, p.
80).
Sometimes Marshall argued that women are indeed included
within the forms of economic aggregation. He said, for
example, that "in large markets, then--where rich and poor,
old and young, men and women, persons of all varieties of
tastes, temperaments and occupations are mingled together,--
the peculiarities and wants of individuals will compensate
one another in a comparatively regular gradation of total
demand" (Marshall, p. 98). But if we disaggregate the
groups, Marshall suggested we shall find differences in their
demand curves, for example, between the rich, middle class,
and the poor. Yet, Marshall did not indicate whether the
demand curve of women will be different from that of men.
The theme of gender differences is further developed in
a discussion on the changing pattern of earnings. Marshall
argued that the development of modern industry means that
individual's work experience is less of an advantage, so that
older men earn less than young men in many cases. The wages
of children have risen relatively to those of their parents,
and machinery displaces men in favor of boys. Customary
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restrictions that excluded boys from some trades are giving
way, while boys and "even girls" can "set their parents at
defiance and start life on their own account." The increased
participation of women in paid employment, however,
contradicts their primary moral and economic duty towards the
home and the family, that is, as suppliers of efficient labor
to the economy as opposed to being laborers themselves.
According to Marshall,
the wages of women are for similar reasons
rising fast relatively to those of men.
And this is a great gain in so far as it
tends to develop their faculties; but an
injury is so far as it tempts them to
neglect their duty of building up a true
home, and of investing their efforts in the
personal capital of their children's
character and abilities (Marshall, 1961, p.
685)
Thus, women occupy a contradictory position in
Marshall's economics. To the one side, the labor of women
appeared subject to the marginalist laws of the market along
with that of all other individuals, and could be aggregated
by income or grade of occupation and type of work,
accordingly. On the other side, however, was a moral and
economic efficiency argument in which Marshall insisted that
women should remain partly excluded from the labor market
because of their vital role as producers of vigorous labor.
At certain points, but not consistently, Marshall argued that
women's labor is a priori of less value than men's, as when
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he suggested that a minimum wage policy should set a lower
wage rate for women than for men, although he goes on to
argue that such a wage policy would be ineffective because it
does not deal with the familial context of income. Marshall
confirmed that the economic position of women cannot be
separated from their family position. The social function of
women's family work was seen as the key determinant of their
economic roles and of the value of their labor in the market.
When Marshall considered the growth of population, and
therefore the overall supply of human labor, he made explicit
the degree to which gender differences are a fundamental
aspect of the basis of the economic theory. Marshall was
concerned with industrial efficiency, with the muscular
strength and vigorous character of labor that is produced by
families for use in the economy. According to Marshall
(1961, p. 195) the role of the full-time housewife is to
produce the most vigorous labor for the economy. He said
that "Much depends on the proper preparation of food; and a
skilled housewife with ten shillings a week to spend on food
will often do more for the health and strength of her family
than an unskilled one with twenty." He noted that mortality
rates are higher in the towns "especially where there are
many mothers who neglect their family duties in order to earn
money wages" (Marshall, 1961, p. 198).
The argument that women should work primarily on rearing
and supporting the best workers for the labor market, rather
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than becoming such workers themselves, is supported in a
general sense by Marshall's views on the correspondence
between the principles of growth in nature and those of the
economy. Marshall argued that there is a fundamental unity
between the physical laws of nature and those of the moral or
social world. Thus, the division of labor and the
progressive integration of functions that accompany it are
analogous to the differentiation of the species in nature and
their evolutionary development. In this sense, Marshall was
a Social Darwinist.8
In Marshall's understanding of the economy, the natural
tendencies of differentiation, specialization, and
evolutionary growth are realized in the division of labor
between different classes of workers and by the allocation of
responsibility for childcaring and rearing to women and not
men. These domestic duties, as the proper province of women,
not only remained largely outside of the market basis of
marginalist economics, but served in Marshall's eyes to limit
practically and compromise morally women's participation in
the labor market.
'Parsons (1982) makes explicit that the "other side" of
Marshall's utility theory was a theory of social evolution
involving a normative idea of the improvement of human character
through the rigors of the free enterprise system. This
qualitative side of Marshall's economics, closely associated with
his affiliation to classical political-economy, has been largely
ignored by the later neoclassical economists who only took up his
development of marginalist technique. On this theme see also
Levitt (1982).
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Women as the Margin Between Economy and Society
Marshall placed market price at the center of his
economics, so that it provided the link between individual
economic action and the aggregation of social groups.
Marshall thereby used prices to generalize the economic
approach to a social level. Yet, underneath the generalizing
approach provided by prices, Marshall referred.to specific
aggregations of individuals, such as those associated with
income--the rich, middle class, and the poor, as well as
other aggregations, such as the workers in particular trades
and individuals in family units. Furthermore, we saw that
Marshall referred to a wider social whole, involving the
problems of long-term growth, development, and demographic
change. These elements of a wider social whole also had
their corollaries of distribution, welfare and the ideas of
progress--strong willed vestiges of classical political-
economy that Marshall never relinquished entirely to the
abstract neutrality of the marginal analysis.
Within such a wider scope of economics, Marshall made
clear that gender differences were in fact a fundamental
aspect of his economics. Women played the key role as
mothers in "producing" strong and vigorous laborers. Women
were therefore preferably employed as full-time housewives.
In fact, the definition of the necessities to be bought for
out of the male laborer's wage included the economic
dependency of a housewife. The laborer was consistently
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referred to as male. Yet, women were nowhere explicitly
excluded from the categories of economics, nor were they
definitely included in them. Women thus appeared to straddle
the boundary between the domain of economics (the world as
measured by market prices) and a wider society in which their
role as housewives and mothers was understood to be of great
importance for the economy, but which was nevertheless
considered only partly of the economy, as defined by
Marshall.
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CHAPTER 5
MARXIST/FEMINISM: THE REPLACEMENT OF CLASS BY GENDER
In order for Marxism to prove useful as a
revolutionary weapon for women, we have to
encounter it in its existing form and
fashion it to fit our particular
oppression. This means extending it into
areas in which men have been unable to take
it by distilling it through the
particularities of our own experience
(Sheila Rowbotham, 1974, p. 45)
The international eruption of the women's liberation
movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s brought a new wave
of women into the orbit of Marxist thought. It was a strange
meeting of two very different experiences and traditions,
both of which claimed to speak for each other but which never
seemed able to achieve a conversation based on shared
understanding. The relationship between Marxism and feminism
is, of course, ripe for analysis in the metaphorical terms of
love and hate between women and men: an approach best
exemplified by Hartmann's account of "The Unhappy Marriage of
Marxism and Feminism" (1979). Some feminists proclaimed
women as a revolutionary class opposed to men (Delphy, 1984);
some Marxists asserted that women's oppression was subsidiary
to that of the working class and could be explained by the
nature of capitalism.
The feminist tradition within Marxist thought had been
largely forgotten and ignored. Socialist-feminist women were
subject to ridicule and abuse by men in leftist organizations
(Mitchell, 1971). The particularity of women's experience of
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their own oppression had been hidden and invisible ("the
problem without a name" described by Friedan in the 1960s).
The emergence of a new shared consciousness in the women's
movement occurred in ways that were outside the forms of
discourse and ways of thinking of traditional Marxist theory
and socialist political activity.
The reinterpretation of Marxist economic thought by the
recent feminist movement is to be found in theories concerned
with understanding the oppression of women as a totality.
The issues of economics are important but subsidiary. Our
study of Smith, Marx, and Marshall (Chapters 2, 3 and 4)
started from the opposite perspective: economists' theories
of gender differences were found within their major concern
with the economic totality. This replacement of the primary
concern of the theory mirrors our interpretation of how the
feminist theory has dealt with the Marxist economic concepts:
the basic concern with class has been replaced by that of
gender. Our purpose in this chapter, however, is not to
explain the development of feminist theory in general, but to
evaluate its specific development of the Marxist
understanding of economic gender differences. If we searched
for gender in Smith, Marx, and Marshall, here we search for
economics in the Marxist/feminist theories of women's
3ppression.
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Marx's Contradictory Legacy to Feminism
In analyzing Marx's theories, we outlined two
conflicting lines of thought regarding gender differences and
the economic and social position of women (see Chapter
Three). One thought was that the evolution of economic and
social development resulted in the elimination of gender
differences: capitalist economy would use the labor of women
equivalently to men, which, in turn, would eradicate
traditional patriarchal relationships in the family and
society as a whole. Corresponding to this historical
tendency, the basic structure of Marx's economic concepts do
not refer to gender differences.
Contradictory to this line of thought was Marx's second
line of thought: factory machine production did eliminate
natural physiological differences between the labor-power of
women and men,' but resulted not in the equivalent employment
of women and men, but in the displacement of men by women and
children. Instead of women receiving the same wages as men,
women were preferentially employed because their labor was
cheaper. The value of women's labor-power was inherently
lower than that of men. Instead of the technological
'According to Marx, factory machine production at least
removed those physiological gender differences associated with
average differences of muscular strength between women and
men; Marx does not comment here on the continued natural
gender differences with regard to childbirth and the
implications that domestic childcare had for women's economic
participation.
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progress of capitalist factory production equalizing the
value of labor-power on an individualistic basis--regardless
of gender--women were paid less than men. Marx's theory of
the value of labor-power, however, explicitly excluded gender
differences from the way in which the value of the commodity
labor-power was formed. Yet, paradoxically, Marx also
maintained that the traditional value of labor-power was
assumed to be that of an adult male wage--the family wage--
which was expected also to support a wife and family.
The legacy of Marx to recent feminist thought is
therefore contradictory and confusing. It is also a legacy
filtered through other Marxist theories of the nature of
women's oppression and their specific economic situations.
The process of filtration tended to by-pass the complexity of
Marx's ideas on gender differences and to simplify the
problem in the direction of one side of his ideas: -the
argument that women's social position in capitalist society
would tend to become equal to that of men, because their
labor-power was equivalently exploited in capitalist
relations of production.2
2 Given that Marx's thought on economic gender differences
is contradictory and paradoxical, it may seem pedantic to
criticize later Marxists for their simplifications. However,
the one-sided focus of interpretation on the equalization of
gender differences with capitalist development results in a
distortion of Marx's thinking. Without seeking to
rehabilitate a dogma, we find it useful to dwell on the
complexity of the issue as it appears in Marx's writings and
to move forward on the basis of that complexity.
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The genderless concepts of Marxist economics reflect
what appeared to Marx to be the crucial structure of the
capitalist economy. We concluded that, for Marx, this
structure was not fundamentally organized in terms of gender
differences, however important such differences appear in the
detailed social relations of this type of economy and
society. For the feminists, the question has become: how
useful is such an approach for an understanding of the
oppression of women? Our own question must be: how useful
is such an approach for understanding economic gender
differences?
The consideration of gender differences was not
precluded by Marx's economics, neither was it facilitated.
Rather, a hierarchy of social relations of inequality was
proposed, in which class divisions on the basis of property
ownership of means of production was privileged over the
inequalities and distinctions of social relations associated
with gender differences. The feminist tradition in Marxist
thought has attempted to reconcile the disparity between a
genderless economics and the historical circumstances of
economic gender differences. The first development in this
direction was the work of Engels.
Engels: The Origins of Feminism in Marxism
Engels used Marx' and his own theory of history and
social change to develop an historical anthropology of the
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family (1972).' The oppression of women was considered
through an analysis of the family.
Engels argued that inequality between the sexes was the
first form of oppression and antagonism in human society and
was based on the relative physical weakness of the female of
the human species. Patriarchy, according to Engels, had
arisen on the basis of the paired monogamous family system,
which had established the certainty of paternity upon which
the patriarchal system of power depended. Knowledge of
paternity, combined with male primogeniture of inheritance,
enabled the establishment of secure property rights and their
transmission through families to male heirs. Women became
private servants of men through the institution of monogamous
marriage. This was what Engels called "the world historical
defeat of the female sex" (Engels, 1971, p. 68), the end of
prehistorical matriarchy. Women became second-class
citizens. The patriarchy was integrated into the rise of the
state and the growth of civil society during the feudal and
early capitalist periods.
Engels' (and Morgan's) analysis of the social relations
of pre-capitalist "primitive" societies showed them to have
been organized predominantly around gender differences
associated with kinship relations and the family. With the
development of feudal and capitalist societies, however,
'The anthropology used by Engels came from Morgan (1974)
and is now widely regarded as inaccurate.
132
Engels argued that the social relations associated with
gender differences were displaced in importance by those of
property ownership of means of production. Property
ownership remained associated with gender differences in
certain respects--as in the patterns of male primogeniture
and the economic dependence of women upon their husbands.
This trend of social evolution, which displaced the
importance of gender differences as a basis of social
relations, was in accord with Marx's own views on the
historical development of forms of the division of labor, as
we have seen in Chapter 3. Engels drew these tendencies to
their logical conclusions for the relationship between the
sexes: the age of capitalism signalled the end of the era of
male domination,' "since large scale industry has transferred
the woman from the home to the labour market and the factory,
and makes her, often enough, the breadwinner of the family,
the last remnants of male domination in the proletarian home
have lost all foundation" (Engels, 1972, p. 77).
Women's entrance into the industrial labor force will
ensure their liberation. Engels maintained that "the
emancipation of women and their equality with men are
impossible and must remain so as long as women are excluded
'It remains unclear in Engels' writing whether or not
women's liberation can be achieved before socialism. Women
can enter social production in capitalism (which is his
prerequisite for their liberation), but housekeeping and
childcare remain privatized, so there remains a contradiction
in the double burden assigned to women.
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from socially productive work and restricted to housework,
which is private. The emancipation of women becomes possible
only when women are enabled to take part in production on a
large, social, scale, and when domestic duties require their
attention only to a minor degree" (Engels, 1971, p. 152).
Engels (and Marx) never make exactly clear how housework
and childcare are to be accomplished when wives and mothers
are all supposedly liberated by entering the capitalist labor
market. They never explicitly suggest that men should do
this work, or that it should be shared with women, or that it
could be entirely taken over by the capitalist market. Women
must either earn money wages and neglect their families, or
vice versa. Engels notes that "when she (the proletarian
woman) fulfills her duties in the private service of her
family, she remains excluded from public production and
cannot earn anything; and when she wishes to take part in
public industry, she is not in a position to fulfil her
family duties" (Engels, 1971, p. 81). The situation under
socialism will be disarmingly simple: "Private housekeeping
is transformed into a social industry: the care and
education of children becomes a public matter" (Engels, 1971,
p. 83).
The individual family will be abolished as the economic
unit of society, as all individuals, whether they are women
or men, will each earn according to the value of their labor-
power--a value that is not predetermined by natural
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differences. Engels explains that "the first premise for the
emancipation of women is the reintroduction of the entire
female sex into public industry . . . (which) demands that
the quality possessed by the individual family of being the
economic unit of society be abolished" (Engels, 1971, p. 82).
The conditions in which patriarchy had arisen and was
sustained were being destroyed by capitalism.
It is important to notice that Engels' analysis of
patriarchy united the problem of gender differences and the
issue of property rights: the patriarchy created the
possibility of the secure establishment of property rights
and thereby the basis for the rise of capitalist relations of
production that required private ownership of means of
production. The unequal status of women in relation to men
was inscribed within the very basis of capitalist relations
of production. Yet, the development of capitalism tended to
destroy the basis of the gender inequality from which it had
arisen. The auto-destructive power of capitalism reappears
here in the guise of the removal of the basis of patriarchy
by modern capitalist social relations.'
'A recurrent theme of Marxist thought is the auto-
destruction of capitalism--expressed in various forms as the
contradiction between the forces and relations of production;
the tendency for the rate of profit to fall; or, the genesis
of political consciousness by the working class leading to
revolution. Here, auto-destruction takes the form of
capitalism devouring the patriarchy, its own father, so to
speak. This kind of -social parricide also entails a further
contradiction: that between the social aspirations of women
who have entered the labor market and their discovery of both
discrimination and the double shift of domestic work and waged
135
We must also recognize that Engels' analysis of
patriarchy, of the unequal status of women to men, did not
suggest that this inequality was the basis for a class
division. As Coward (1983) has analyzed, the key to Engels'
argument here is that inequality associated with gender
differences in the marriage relationship did not express an
economic class division. The division of labor and the
inequality between women and men in early forms of society
did not amount to a class division between the sexes.
Marriage was a unitary social relation between the sexes,
and, as such, it could not be thought of as expressing an
antagonistic class relationship.
Whatever the conflict between the idealized and the
actual circumstances of the employment of women, Engels
confirmed the Marxist tradition of insistence on the priority
of class defined by relations of production outside the
family over gender. This priority would not be overturned
until the Marxist/feminists replaced class with gender in the
1970s.
The Feminist Replacement of Class with Gender
A problem for the modern feminists working within the
Marxist tradition has been the obvious tenacity of the
inequality between women and men in capitalist economy and
labor. This contradiction is itself an example of Marx's idea
of the reproduction of contradictions on new levels as the
older ones are resolved.
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society--whether women are of the working class or not. The
entry of women into the labor force did not remove
inequality; it was restructured into new forms. But this
resistant inequality forms only part of the feminist
understanding of the oppression of women. The traditional
Marxists tended to see the cause and solution to inequality
in terms of relations of production, or labor force
participation; the feminists present a picture of gender
antagonism that reaches far beyond the confines of the
capitalist labor market.
In contrast to the civil rights and reformist
orientation of the earlier feminist movements, the analysts
of the modern women's movement question the whole foundation
of social and economic organization in terms of the relations
between women and men:
By giving expression to the hitherto silent
frustrations of women who spend their lives
in unrecognized labour in the home, who are
helpless in pregnancy and childbirth
without a man, who carry subordination
within their souls from the earliest memory
of childhood, this revolt has unleashed a
new species of social passion (Rowbotham,
1974, p. xiv)
The most startling and yet obvious feminist reaction to
the Marxist optimism regarding the equality of women and men
in capitalism was to replace the whole established hierarchy
of inequality between economic classes with one of gender
differences. The Marxist concept of class, defined in terms
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of ownership of means of production, has been replaced so
that it is the antagonism between women and men that is seen
to form the basis of the class division in capitalist
society. This replacement has taken several distinct forms,
which have their particular ways of relating to, or
contradicting, the previously established Marxist economic
and social categories.
An astounding array of theoretical invention of the
relations between gender inequality and capitalism has
emerged. Three ways that feminists have coped with the
Marxist legacy in interpreting economic gender differences
can be identified as broad categories.6 First, the concept
of patriarchy has been used to identify a realm of women's
domestic or reproductive work that parallels, supports, and
maintains the economic activity of capitalist production.
The traditional Marxist focus on production has been
redirected to the reproduction of capitalist social and
economic relations and to the activity of women as unpaid
domestic laborers. Second, the analysis of women's domestic
work has provided an entrance into a way of reformulating the
problem of the valuation of labor-power so that it
6 There is now a large literature on feminist economics,
and even on explicitly Marxist or socialist-feminist
economics. The following arguments can only refer to major
types of analysis in general terms. The focus is necessarily
on the formulations of the nature of economic gender
differences by means of the development of Marxist feminist
analysis.
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acknowledges gender differences. The work of women in the
home has been analyzed as a domestic mode of production that
affects the value of labor-power and that has its own
specific relationships to the capitalist mode of production.
Third, the family has been analyzed as the center of
ideologies that form the gender differences between
individuals, as the site of cultural forces that constitute
women and men as gendered beings. The question of biological
differences between women and men, especially women's ability
to bear children, has been re-considered in terms of a
relationship between what is natural and what is social.
These three theoretical links between Marxism and
feminism structure the way in which this new discourse has
conceptualized economic gender differences, the ways in which
women and men enter into the social relationships of the
economy. In examining these links in the following sections
of this chapter, our concern is to evaluate whether the new
approaches have resolved the confusions and paradoxes of
Marx's legacy to feminism. How successful has been the
attempt to infuse Marx's economic concepts with gender? How
is it possible for the value of labor-power to be re-
formulated so that it can acknowledge gender differences?
Patriarchal Domestic Froduction and Capitalism
Delphy (1984) has been the most explicit in
appropriating the structure of Marx's analysis of modes of
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production and applying it to the analysis of women's
oppression.7 For Delphy, women are subordinated to men in a
patriarchal domestic mode of production (Delphy, 1984, p.
18). The unpaid labor of women in housework and childcare is
appropriated by husbands through the marriage contract.
Women constitute a class defined by their common oppression
as a social group in relation to men.
Delphy argues that there are, therefore, two modes of
production in capitalist society: the domestic mode in which
women produce goods and services under specific relations of
production and the capitalist industrial mode as analyzed by
Marx. The work of women in the home does not produce value
in the Marxist sense, as it is outside the market exchange
process. She argues that this work performed by women is
only not paid for when it is done within the context of the
family (as such services as childcare, food preparation, or
washing clothes, for example, are all also paid for in the
market). The fact that women's domestic labor is excluded
from exchange results not from the nature of what they
produce, but because women do it privately in the family.
Thus, what is now called housework is that work to which the
unpaid labor of the housewife has been limited. Even when
women work outside the home, Delphy argues that often their
wages are appropriated by their husbands and that women must
7 Delphy's article "The Main Enemy" was first published in
1970 and circulated in England in 1974.
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still fulfil their "family duties" as well.
Many other Marxist/feminists also identified the
domestic work of women as a whole sector of production
distinct from (although related to) capitalist relations of
production. Household labor became central for a Marxist
explanation of women's oppression. Their analyses of this
noncapitalist production, the work of women, appeared to
offer "an understanding of the material basis for the
oppression of women in capitalist society" (Himmelweit and
Mohun, 1977, p. 16).
By identifying domestic work either as a mode of
production or as contributing to the valuation of the
commodity of human labor-power, Marxist/feminists were able
to transfer the traditional categories of Marxist analysis
onto this domain of women's work. They saw women's
oppression in terms similar to those of the exploitation of
the working class, as governed by specific relations of
production and susceptible to analysis in terms of Marx's
theory of value. According to Himmelweit and Mohun (1977, p.
18), as a mode of production, women's domestic labor
therefore had a material basis--and by having a material
basis, according to the Marxist view, it was "not merely a
cultural phenomenon."
By analyzing women's domestic labor as a mode of
production and giving women's oppression a material basis in
the Marxist sense, Marxists could treat the problem more
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seriously--because according to the hierarchy of
determination of social "levels," it is the economic base of
the society that determines, in the last instance, all the
other social levels of ideology, politics, culture--the
superstructures (see, for example, Althusser, 1974). At
least in the early formulations of Marxist/feminism their
concern was to insist on the economic functionality or
necessity of women's oppression for the capitalist economy,
so that they could conceptualize it in economistic and
functionalist terms. Later reactions away from these kinds
of reductions rehabilitated, in a sense, the importance of
culture and ideology for understanding the nature of women's
oppression.
By interpreting women's oppression in these terms, the
Marxist/feminists avoided a fundamental conflict between the
means of analysis of Marxism and feminism. Nevertheless, the
subsuming of women's oppression by the Marxist/feminists
under the rubric of patriarchal domestic labor understood as
either a mode of production in itself, or as contributing to
the value of labor-power in capitalism, was a project fraught
with difficulty.
As Barrett (1980) has commented, we have difficulty
interpreting the relationship between the
patriarchal/domestic and the capitalist modes of production.
How can we explain patriarchy as a system of male power
external to capitalism, yet which is also somehow functional
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for capitalism? Why are male domination, female unpaid
domestic labor, or the culture of gender differences,
necessarily functional for the development or reproduction of
the capitalist economy? Why is it necessarily in the
interests of capital to pay lower wages to women and have
them at least partly supported by husbands, who are then
supposedly sometimes paid the breadwinner's wage? Why are
women and not men always associated with unpaid domestic
labor? How is the class position of women to be defined--in
terms of their position in relations of production outside
the home, that is, as workers or capitalists, or in terms of
their relationship to a husband, that is, as housewives and
mothers? No one has specified exactly how the social
structures of patriarchy and capitalism inter-relate in terms
of the economic roles and status of women.
Furthermore, many theorists often assert that the very
concept of patriarchy is a monolithic determining structure
that is not explained. Adlam questioned how useful it is to
posit "an ultimate antagonism between the sexes whereby men's
interests are served and women's denied," saying this occurs
when "the categories of 'men' and 'women' are constituted and
function differently at different points in society, . . .
'woman is not always constituted in opposition to 'man' and
(that) the two cannot always be conceptualized as a single
opposition always functioning to oppress all women according
to the same principle" (Adlam, 1979, p. 99).
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Marxist/feminists found a way to relate patriarchy to
capitalism and avoid asserting two parallel modes of
production (and thereby also avoid the problem of theorizing
their interconnection) by subordinating the social relations
of patriarchy to those of capitalism. McDonough and Harrison
(1978) argued that the form of patriarchal social relations
within the family is governed by the historical form of
capitalist relations of production. The class position of
women as either workers or members of the bourgeoisie would
limit and condition the form of the patriarchy they would
experience within the social relations of the family.
Harrison (1974) specified the relation between domestic
and capitalist modes, defining housework as a "client" mode
of production to the dominant capitalist mode. As with
Delphy's conceptualization of dual modes of production,
Harrison does not show how the two modes are inter-related.
Himmelweit and Mohun argue--if housework is client to
capitalism, why is not capitalism also client to housework?
In other words, the dynamic of a relationship between
domestic labor and capitalism remained unclear.
Barrett (1980) proposed the concept of the family-
household system as an historical institution mediating
patriarchal and capitalist social relations, on both an
ideological and economic level. The institution
traditionally depended on the husband-father receiving a male
breadwinner's wage for its primary economic support. Thus,
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the domestic-based kinship systems served as ideological
centers through which a culture of gender differences is
developed. They also serve as the point of intersection
between patriarchal and capitalist social relations in the
way that women perform unpaid domestic labor for men (and
children) and are also recruited for subservient positions in
the capitalist labor market.
Other Marxist/feminists (Kuhn and Wolpe, 1978,
Himmelweit and Mohun, 1977, Humphries, 1977) have continued
to apply Marxist economic concepts to the specific domain of
women's unpaid domestic work, without asserting that such
work constitutes an entire mode of production that parallels
or serves the capitalist mode of production. They have also
avoided using the concept of patriarchy as a social system,
but have instead looked for specific characteristics of
domestic work and its relationships to capitalism.
The approach used, for example by Kuhn and Wolpe (1978),
was to define domestic labor as the production of use-values
outside of capitalist relations of production." For some,
this was seen as a vestige of pre-capitalist forms of
production, in which use-values were produced by family units
of production for their own immediate consumption, as opposed
to production for exchange which was later re-located from
the home to external sites such as the factory. Kuhn and
'Much of the following account of the varieties of
theories of domestic labor was elaborated by Himmelweit and
Mohun (1977).
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Wolpe (1978) analyzed the oppression of women in terms of the
production of use-values in the home by women and the
production of exchange-values in capitalist relations of
production outside the home by men. The problem with their
approach is that they failed to specify why such domestic
work should be associated with women or that it has anything
to do with the reproduction of labour-power. Nor did they
explain why an obsolete pre-capitalist mode of production
should remain vital work for women in households in modern
capitalism.
A second group exemplified by Himmelweit and Mohun
(1977) began by defining domestic labor as "that labour that
directly maintains and reproduces labour-power." They
explicitly identified domestic labor as women's work for two
reasons. First, because it refers to the work of mothers in
childcare (related to the biological fact that women bear
children),' and, second, because housework is defined as the
work that housewives do in supporting other living laborers
(husbands as well as children as future laborers). More
than merely the production of use-values in a domestic
setting, women's domestic labor is the work of reproducing
laborers. Such work therefore indirectly supports the
creation of the commodity of human labor-power, which is only
'A "fact" that raises a host of theoretical difficulties
for Marxist feminist theory, problems we shall examine in
terms of theorizing the relationship between the natural and
the social.
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finally consumed in the process of capitalist production
outside the home.
Domestic labor, understood as the reproduction of
labor-power, was therefore internal and integral to the needs
of the capitalist mode of production. The problem was
returned to Marx's own analysis of the nature of the
commodity of human labor-power and especially to the problem
of the method of its creation and valuation. The production
of human labor-power became "the material foundation for the
existence of domestic labour as a category, different from
and equal in status to the category of wage labour"
(Himmelweit and Mohun, 1977, p. 22).
Domestic labor had been invisible to Marx, because Marx
analyzed the problem of labor-power from the perspective of
capital (Himmelweit and Mohun, 1977; Humphries, 1977). Marx
looked at the consumption of labor-power by capital rather
than the production of labor-power by domestic labor, because
it was this feature that, after all, defined the nature of
the mode of production that dominated the economy and society
he was examining. The actual ways in which labor-power was
produced and reproduced outside capitalist relations of
production were unexamined. It was through the examination
of this reproduction of human labor-power that
Marxist/feminists were able to introduce gender differences
within the Marxist concept of value of labor-power and at the
same time to theorize a material basis for women's
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oppression.
Gender Differences in the Value of Labor-Power
As we saw in Chapter 3, Marx did not resolve the
contradiction between the genderless formulation of his
theory of the value of labor-power and his recognition of
gender differences in the value of individual's labor-power.
Humphries (1977) has described this contradiction in terms of
the invisibility of the working class family in Marx's
economic analysis. Marx's theory of the value of labor-power
abstracted from the activity of the working class family in
producing goods for its own consumption and in helping to
create the value of labor-power, which its members sold on
the market for wages. As Humphries remarks, Marx treated the
working class family like neoclassical economics treats the
firm, "as a black box whose inner workings are simultaneously
neglected and mystified" (Humphries, 1977, p. 243).
Humphries states that
Marx abstracts from the problem of domestic
labor by dealing with a situation in which
all workers are engaged in capitalist
production and perform no domestic labour
whatsoever. No use-values are produced
within the household and the capitalist
sector provides everything required to
replace the labour-power used up in
production. . . . Wages are used to
purchase a subsistence bundle of
commodities whose "consumption"
mysteriously leads to the replacement of
used-up labour-power. (Humphries, 1977, p.
243)
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This abstraction also meant that Marx ignored the
relationship between the value of labour-power and the
employment structure of the family, because he finally based
his analysis on the assumption that the social norm was the
male adult worker supporting a wife and children (see Chapter
3). The implications of women's wage labor in relation to
their domestic work in the family context were never drawn
out for the gender differences in the value of labor-power. *
Himmelweit and Mohun (1977) argued that if the focus of
Marxism was moved from the relationship of labor to capital
to the relationship between domestic work and the production
of labor-power, the material basis to women's oppression
could be recognized and made visible. They suggested looking
at labor-power from the perspective of its own production
and, in so doing, examining the visible relationships of
economic gender differences.
Starting from Seccombe's earlier analysis (1974),
Himmelweit and Mohun argued that the family as a unit of
reproduction of labor-power is dependent on inputs from the
capitalist mode of production (wages and consumer goods).
Seccombe argued that the domestic labor of women was
1
*Humphries goes on to make an argument that it was
therefore in the political interests of the working class
during the period of industrialization to defend the
traditional family system of a male breadwinner's wage
supporting female domestic labor.
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"congealed" into the value of labor of other family members
when it was exchanged in the market. But, as Himmelweit and
Mohun argued, domestic labor was outside the limits of
capitalist market exchange; therefore, it could not be valued
precisely as part of the commodity labor-power. Domestic
labor could not be both private and part of the social
process of valuation of labor-power. Nevertheless, the
Marxist/feminist examination of domestic labor revealed the
duality of women's position. As both unpaid domestic workers
and wage laborers, women were in the middle of the process of
valuation of labor-power that operated between the family and
capitalist relations of production. Himmelweit and Mohun
(1977, p. 24) concluded that "the extent of domestic labour
and the number of wage-labourers in the family are among the
historical and moral elements which enter into the
determination of the value of labour-power. The latter
therefore depends in contradictory manner both upon
capitalist relations of production and upon the economic
structure of the family." Although domestic labor cannot be
calculated as a direct effect upon the value of labor, its
indirect effects can be theorized.
Harrison (1974), for example, took Marx at face value
and asserted that the value of labor is simply the total
value of the subsistence goods required by the adult male
breadwinner. The domestic labor of women in the home is then
a form of "surplus labor," which is appropriated by the
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husband in addition to the value of his labor-power as
measured in consumption goods sold on the market. The effect
of this domestic surplus labor, however, is to enable the
capitalist to pay wages below the value of labor-power. He
assumed that it is "cheaper" for capital to have housewives
produce use-values in the home than to have the equivalent
goods produced by capitalist production as consumption goods
sold on the market. However, he remained unclear as to how a
comparison between the value of domestic labor and its
equivalent in market production can be made, given that
domestic labor is, by definition, outside the scope of market
valuation.
Beechey (1977) tried to solve this dilemma of comparing
incommensurate quantities (domestic labor and commodity
production) by conceptualizing the impact of women's unpaid
domestic labor on the valuation of both women's and men's
labor-power as mediated through the family context. She
argues that women's unpaid domestic labor necessitates a
modification of Marx's theory of the valuation of labor-
power. Domestic labor contributes to the value of labor-
power as a commodity, yet Marx defined the value of labor-
power only in terms of the commodities necessary for its
consumption. Marx neglected the input of use-values from
domestic labor. Furthermore, Marx also neglected to analyze
the implications of his assertion of the adult male
breadwinner wage as a social norm for the valuation of
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women's labor-power.
Beechey takes up Marx's argument that the employment of
women in capitalist industry will tend to reduce the average
value of labor-power--because instead of being based on a
male breadwinner's wage, sufficient to support a wife and
family, the new value of labor-power will be based on
individualized units of labor-power. Her reasoning has
several implications for gender differences in the value of
labor-power.
First, women's labor-power has a lower value than men's
historically because it has traditionally been less invested
in as human capital--it is less skilled. The deskilling of
capitalist production therefore encourages the employment of
this "cheaper" form of labor-power. This results in a
lowering of the value of the average labor-power in
employment.
Second, given that many women remain partly dependent on
their husbands for economic support, and in so far as a male
breadwinner's wage continues to exist, she argues that part
of the costs of reproduction -of the value of women's labor-
power remains a responsibility of their husbands. Such
married women can therefore be profitably employed by
capitalists and paid wages below what the value of their
labor-power would have been had they not been at least partly
supported by their husbands. In this sense, such women are
like semi-proletarianized workers and their wages are below
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the value of their labor-power.
Molyneux (1979), however, argued against the idea that
unpaid domestic labor performed by women serves to lower the
overall average value of labor-power by "cheapening" its
costs of reproduction. Her argument is, again, because
housework is outside the capitalist exchange system, insofar
as it is private and not performed in exchange for wages, it
is impossible to calculate the effect of such work on the
value of labor-power. Furthermore, the actual performance of
domestic work will depend on whether the market prices of
equivalent goods or services are high or low: "no invariant
relationship between domestic labour and the value of labor
power can be assumed" (Molyneux, 1979, pp.10-il). Only in
the case where market prices of consumption goods were high
can we say that housewives' labor necessarily served to lower
the value of labor-power in general. We cannot therefore
assert that women's unpaid domestic work is necessarily a
requirement of capitalist relations of production.
Folbre (1982) took issue with the idea that housework is
immune from the demands of efficiency associated with market
work, suggesting that families do indeed maximize their time
and resources in distributing housework, childcare, and waged
work between their members, and in so doing are implicitly
aware of the relative values of family members' contributions
(this argument is considered further in Chapter Six).
Furthermore, the changing relative productivity of housework
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versus waged work for women and families has led to women's
increased labor-force participation and the consequent
decline in fertility rates.
Moreover, the adjustment to Marx's theory of the
valuation of labor-power by taking into account the unpaid
work of women in the home did not, in itself, give an
adequate explanation of why it is women that are doing this
work and not men. It was this problem that Marxist/feminists
have recently analyzed in terms of the relationship between
the natural and the social.
The Relationship Between the Natural and the Social
The fact that it is women and not men doing unpaid
domestic labor remains as the Achilles' heel of the
Marxist/feminist attempt to theorize women's oppression in
terms of pre-existing Marxist categories. Himmelweit argued
that Marxists have so far failed to acknowledge that the
specific quality of domestic labor as women's work cannot be
entirely reduced to Marxist economic categorization:
domestic labour has some specific
characteristics, crucially, that it is
nearly always performed by women, which
cannot be captured simply by talking of
ways in which it is or is not being taken
over by capitalist production. . . . the
mistake was to concentrate on what could be
encapsulated in existing Marxist categories
when precisely what was needed was to lay
aside those categories, in order that
others appropriate to the analysis of the
family be developed (Himmelweit, 1984, p.
171)
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The specific quality of domestic labor that has
associated it with women and that has remained more resistant
than any other to the encroachment of capitalist relations of
production, is the role of women in bearing children.
Women's domestic labor is not merely the production of use
values that can serve to lower the costs of reproduction of
labor-power on a daily level--all the cleaning, cooking, and
mending--it is also the production of babies and the
generational reproduction of labor-power. In a capitalist
economy, many aspects of the reproduction of labor-power can
be commodified, but responsibility for the birth and
parenting of children must still remain outside of capitalist
relations of production and exchange to a large extent.11
This has remained a women's and a familial responsibility.
According to Himmelweit (1984, p. 174) "the family continues
in existence as a unit separate from other units of
production, not because of its role in the production of
things, but because it is an essential part, under current
social arrangements of the way in which labour power is
"
1 The recent technological breakthroughs in artificial
conception and genetic engineering suggest that even this last
vestige of domestic labor could finally become part of
capitalist production. This brave new world was in fact
called for by Firestone's radical feminism (1970), who argued
that the class struggle between the sexes was based on the
biological bondage of women in childbirth. Women's liberation
could only be achieved by overcoming this biological
restriction through technological means.
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produced."
In the early "domestic labor debate," Marxist/feminists
avoided the consideration of the biological role of women in
childbirth as a major aspect of the relationship between
domestic work and capitalism. They were understandably
concerned to avoid falling into biologically deterministic
explanations of social relationships, which have for so long
been used to justify the subordination of women. The lack of
consideration of this important subject was tantamount to a
taboo. It seems that Marxist/feminists were not prepared to
risk an explicit acknowledgement of women's role in
childbirth and its relationship to economic gender
differences. The concept of the reproduction of social
relationships was conflated with biological reproduction of
the species (see Edholm, 1977).
There was also another reason for its avoidance: the
transposition of the Marxist economic categories onto
domestic labor worked best when this activity was seen as the
production of use-values equivalent to the production of
commodities in the market, that is, housework as a mode of
production of special types of goods and services. The use
by feminists of Marxist economic concepts to comprehend the
intergenerational and gender-specific aspects of domestic
labor, such as childbirth and parenting, was much less
effective.
More recently, the impasse experienced by the Marxist
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feminists of trying to subsume domestic labor and family
relationships within pre-existing Marxist categories has led
them to a reconsideration of biological sexual difference and
the social construction of gender differences. The role of
women in childbirth is now acknowledged as a fundamental
consideration in understanding both the social organization
of women's oppression and economic gender differences.
The Marxist/feminist debate has returned to what had
perhaps been its unacknowledged centerpiece: the
relationship between biological sexual difference and the
genderless Marxist concepts of the capitalist economy.
Brenner and Ramas (1984, p. 387) ask "how is it possible,
given the capitalist drive to accumulate and use up labour
power, that women are left out of capitalist production and
remain in the home to the extent that they do?" They asked
this question as part of a wider consideration of the attempt
by Marxists to understand the nature of women's oppression.
They argue that the "domestic labor debate" reduced the
problem of gender differences to a need of the capitalist
mode of production to reproduce labor cheaply, but in so
doing, failed to account adequately for the fact that women
and not men undertook this work. Neither did
Marxist/feminists prove through this debate that such
domestic work cheapened the value of labor, because they
could not compare nonmarket and market values of production.
They could not find concepts to deal with the concrete
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quality of gender differences associated with domestic labor.
The limited success of the Marxist/feminist development of a
theory through this debate was to focus on the duality of
women's roles as distributed through a family context, which
affected the ways in which women and men entered the labor
market.
The other tendency that Brenner and Ramas criticize is
the analysis of women's oppression only in terms of ideology
or patriarchal culture, thereby removing it from a material
basis or from any specific historical determination. In the
place of either reducing the problem of women's oppression to
domestic labor, or to a question of ideology or culture,
Brenner and Ramas propose that Marxism should be considered
as a means of analysis that can refer to the relationships
between different social structures, and not merely to the
issue of economic production.
The alternative they propose begins from what they argue
is a material basis for the oppression of women in
capitalism. They turn the focus from domestic labor and
ideology to the biological facts of reproduction. Following
Timpanaro (1975), they insist that such biological facts do
not in themselves determine social relations, but must be
analyzed in terms of a relationship between the natural and
the social. They reformulate the question as: How do
capitalist relations of production incorporate the biological
sexual difference involved in childbirth, and to what extent
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does this difference condition women's participation in
economic life? They propose "to analyze the development of
the sexual division of labour in capitalism and the formation
of the family-household system within the context of the
contradiction between the capitalist dynamics of production
and the exigencies of biological reproduction" (Brenner and
Ramas, 1984, p. 48).
Brenner and Ramas argue that there is a contradiction
between the tendency for capitalist accumulation to pull
women into the labor force (thereby laying the groundwork for
the material independence of women from men) and the facts of
childbirth and of women's responsibility for childcare.
These biological facts and social tasks of childcare
associated with women have "posed a significant barrier to
the fullest development of (the) tendency" of capitalism to
draw women into the labor force and have conditioned the
forms of their participation in that labor force.
In terms of the economics of capitalism, Brenner and
Ramas' conclusion is simple. Pregnancy, childbirth,
lactation, outlays for maternity leave, and nursing
facilities and childcare posed significant costs to capital
without comparative increases in productivity to be gained
from hiring female.laborers if and when equivalent male
laborers were unavailable. Childcare has generally remained
a privatized domestic responsibility, and given the weight of
cultural tradition, its responsibility has fallen on women
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and not on men. This responsibility, in turn, has affected
the competitiveness of women in the labor market. "Given the
historical condition under which the system emerged, the
forces and relations of capitalist production imparted a
coercive charge to biological reproduction" (Brenner and
Ramas, 1984, p. 53).
How Far can Feminism Stretch Marxism?
Feminists have sought to explain the nature of women's
oppression. They have turned to the confusing and
contradictory legacy of Marxism as.an aid to understanding,
even though aware that much of women's experience of
oppression was far removed from the form or substance of
traditional Marxism. The admixture of feminist consciousness
with the Marxist concepts of economy and society has been
both exhilarating and problematic. Within this unusual
combination of feminism and Marxism, we have tried to
elaborate an emerging understanding of the nature of economic
gender differences--the ways in which women and men enter
into the social relations of the economy.
From our analysis of Marx (in Chapter 3), we know that
complex difficulties are associated with Marx's
interpretations of economic gender differences. These are
centered around two opposing lines of thought that foresaw
the elimination of gender differences as well as their
exploitation in capitalist relations of production.
160
Furthermore, the question of gender differences in the theory
of the valuation of labor-power was left ambiguous and
unresolved.
The feminist starting point for this intertwining with
Marx's legacy was the work of Engels. For the modern
Marxist/feminists, however, Engels' vision of the
relationship between patriarchy and capitalism was too
optimistic and incomplete. Engels had patriarchy defeated by
capitalism, at least for the working class.
Feminists were well aware that the defeat of patriarchy
by capitalism had not yet occurred. Engels' ideas were at
best an exaggeration of trends that encouraged female
participation in the labor force and the partial economic
independence of women from men. He ignored precisely what
these theorists had to contend with: the weight of culture
and ideology in fixing unequal gender differences in society
and economy, in housework and waged work, and the continuing
responsibility of women for childrearing and unpaid domestic
work within a privatized domestic environment.
We suggested that the feminist reaction to the Marxist
legacy was a variety of replacements of the traditional
Marxist hierarchy of inequality: class was replaced by
gender. These replacements represented different ways in
which gender inequality and capitalism were theoretically
inter-related.
The first replacement took the form of identifying
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women's unpaid domestic work as a patriarchal mode of
production or activity in which labor-power is reproduced.
Marxist/feminists could not express the linkage between
patriarchy and capitalism satisfactorily. On the one hand,
the system of male power did not translate into capitalist
relations of production as described by Marx; on the other
hand, Marx's theory of value based on market exchange could
not account for the work of the housewife. Neither could
they show that women's subordination in the family was
functional or necessary for capitalist economy. Finally,
although the theory of patriarchy can assert a system of male
power over women, Marxists cannot specify why it should be
women as opposed to men that are always performing unpaid
domestic labor.
The second replacement of class by gender took the form
of the reformulation of the theory of the value of labor-
power by the consideration of gender differences based on the
role of women as domestic laborers. This project came
closest to overcoming some of the paradoxes in Marx's own
analysis of the relationship between gender and the valuation
of labor-power. By ignoring the theory of patriarchy and
focussing on the relationship between women's domestic labor
and the production of labor-power within the family,
Marxist/feminists have shown how women occupied a dualistic
and contradictory role in capitalist economy. Women were in
the middle of the process of valuation of labor-power that
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operated between the family and capitalist relations of
production. Even though this inter-relationship between
value, labor, and women's role in the family was indicated,
it remained extraordinarily difficult for Marxist/feminists
to develop into a coherent theory. Again, they came against
the unresolved problem of measuring or accounting for the
relationship between unpaid domestic work and the value of
labor-power in the market. They also could not explain
through their reformulation of the value of labor-power what
was the fundamental nature of the gender differences involved
in the process: again, why was it women and not men who
performed unpaid domestic labor?
The third replacement of class by gender took the form
of the analysis of the relationship between women's role in
childbirth and capitalist relations of production, the
relationship between the natural and the social.
Marxist/feminists asserted that the concept of domestic labor
represented two distinct activities with different
implications for Marxist conceptualization. The first
activity was the work of the housewife in the daily
reproduction of labor. This was seen to be parallel to the
capitalist production of consumption goods. It was therefore
amenable to analysis by Marxist economic categories. The
second activity was the work of the housewife in childbearing
and the generational reproduction of labor-power, which was
seen to be more fundamentally gender specific (only women
163
have babies) and was less capable of conceptualization by
Marxist economic categories. Nevertheless, Marxist/feminists
saw the relationship between biological childbirth and
capitalist relations of production as a contradiction between
the dynamics of production and the exigencies of biology.
This contradiction in the relationship between the natural
and the social served to subordinate the place of women in
the labor market. Although we find it useful to acknowledge
the real effects of the social relations of biological
childbirth in structuring women's economic activity,
Marxist/feminists have not clarified exactly how this
operates in given historical circumstances. The facts of
childbirth may indeed be biological, but the ways in which
they are socially embedded will vary, a variation that cannot
be explained by the assertion of a contradiction between the
dynamic of capitalism and the biology of childbirth.
In seeking to understand economic gender differences
through the feminist analysis of women's oppression, using
the tools of a reinterpreted Marxism, we have looked at the
inter-relationship between women's subordination and
capitalism. This linkage was necessarily focused on
relationships between an economic structure (the capitalist
mode of production) and a wider social context in which women
worked (the domestic domain). Our focus on this relationship
between market production and the household/family meant that
we did not confront in depth the actual detailed positioning
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of women within the labor market. In establishing the
relationships between the domestic and the productive realms,
Marxist/feminists have not fully analyzed the particularities
of women's waged labor. They have asserted rather than
explained the actual patterns of economic inequality between
women and men in capitalist relations of production.
Nevertheless, their establishment of a series of ways of
thinking about the relationships between women s productive
and reproductive roles has laid the groundwork for a wider
Marxist-feminist analysis of economic gender differences.
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CHAPTER 6
NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS
ON GENDER DIFFERENCES: STRETCHING
THE LIMITS OF MARKET EXPLANATIONS
The contradictory position of women that we found in
Marshall's economics (Chapter 4) has been reproduced by
recent neoclassical economists. In Marshall, on the one
hand, the labor of women was subject to the paramount laws of
the market as with all other economic factors. On the other
hand, Marshall's moral and economic efficiency argument
called for women to be partly excluded from the labor force
so that they could produce and care for what he called a race
of vigorous male laborers. The supposedly natural role of
women as mothers and homemakers (justified by the fact that
women have babies) interfered with the pure economic
individualism of the market analysis.
This tension between an economic approach that is
universal in its intent and scope (subsuming all economic
phenomena underneath rationalist market principles) and an
external world of natural gender differences (distinct from,
or resistant to, the logic of the market) forms a constant
theme running through the later development of neoclassical
economic thinking on gender. The purpose of this chapter is
to show how neoclassical economists have resolved this
tension in one of two ways: either they extend economic
principles so as to include what were previously considered
external or exogenous phenomena (such as gender differences
and housework), or else they assume such issues are
exogenous.
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These forms of resolution of the problem of gender in
neoclassical economic thinking are examined here in terms of
whether they have offered meaningful ways of understanding
economic gender differences--the social relations of women
and men in the economy. Our argument is that although some
neoclassical economists have brought gender within the margin
of economic thought, they have done so at the price of
ignoring the social significance of gender differences as
such. Compared with the difficulty of the Marxist-feminist
formulation of an economics of gender differences (see
Chapter 5), the neoclassicals have succeeded in encompassing
issues of gender in an almost effortless extension of the
basic parameters of the theory. In so doing, however, they
have glossed over critical problems and stretched their basic
premises beyond their useful capacity.
According to Marshall, women were caught on a boundary
between a moral view of gender roles in society and the
abstract individualistic technique of marginalist analysis,
which did not refer to concrete differences between women and
men. Similarly, the later neoclassical writers concerned
with explaining the economics of gender differences have
insisted on the usefulness of a marginalist approach. The
very power of marginalist economics, however, derives
precisely from its abstraction from an understanding of
historical social relations. The technique presupposes
abstract ungendered individuals active in market
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relationships. The dilemma for neoclassical economists has
been how to reconcile the marginalist technique and its
implicit lack of consideration of gender differences among
individuals with the historical and social reality of gender
differences in the economy.
We examine this dilemma in the following ways: first,
we show that Marshall's contradictory position towards women
is a reoccurring line of thought in later neoclassical
thinking; second, we examine the two forms of resolution of
this contradictory way of thinking about gender differences--
the wide extension of economics to include gender differences
(as exemplified in the work of Gary Becker), or, the
treatment of gender as an exogenous variable that is
unamenable to economic reasoning because it is outside the
market; third, we argue that both the extension of economics
and the exclusion of gender from economics founder upon the
problems of discrimination1 or labor-market segmentation,
which threaten the very basis of the economic approach,
'There is now a large neoclassical economic literature
on discrimination, mainly referring to racial discrimination.
Becker (1971) and others have argued that it may be applied
also to discrimination by sex. Our concern here, however, is
not primarily with the neoclassical economics of
discrimination, but with the economic approach to gender
differences, of which the theories of discrimination are a
subordinate part. Before a theory of discrimination can be
formulated, we must establish an approach to gender
differences--because if it is assumed, for example, that
women are naturally different from men as economic
individuals, then the concept of discrimination will be
different from one that asssumes all economic individuals to
be the same.
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because the market (or its shadow prices) can no longer be
used reliably as the basis for economic understanding.
The Power of Marginalism and the Problem of Gender
Marshall defined the economy as a system of market
prices that could be understood by means of a marginalist
technique (as we showed in Chapter 4). Part of the great
power of these tools of analysis and measurement is that they
do not refer to gender differences, as their generality
depends on abstraction from the concrete qualities and social
relationships of individuals. The basic assumption is that
individuals (firms) maximize utility (profits) and that such
maximization is always subject to the marginal principle. We
argued in Chapter 4 that Marshall never completely reconciled
the abstract technique of the marginalist method with his
normative morality of different economic roles for women and
men.
Other early British neoclassical economic theories of
gender differences have been reviewed by Madden (1973). Most
of the early theories assumed imperfect competition: thus,
Fawcett (1918) argued that women were overcrowded into
unskilled occupations which reduced their wage levels.
Edgeworth (1922) argued there were certain occupations that
were efficient either for women, for men, or for both
(mixed)--thus, suggesting that the individual subject of
economics was "already" gendered before the operation of the
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market. Men received higher wages because they supported a
family. Women required lower wages because they had fewer
dependents to support. Thus, wages were based on gendered
status rather than individual contributions to production, a
theory that contradicts the usual neoclassical marginal
productivity assumptions. Finally, Robinson (1934),
developed the theory of monopsonistic labor markets where
different supply curves of the labor of women and men, and
different degrees of labor market organization, created wage
differentials by sex. Madden points out that the recent
theories of discrimination associated with Becker and the
Chicago School generally have assumed perfect competition.
Marshall's ambiguity on the question of economic gender
differences has been incorporated by later neoclassical
economists. Parallel to Marshall's value judgement that
women should first and foremost be mothers and housewives,
neoclassical economists have in general taken the facts of
women's role in childbirth and their traditional activities
in childcare, and they made these into permanently fixed and
natural attributes affecting all women's economic
participation and economic worth. This qualitative
categorization is inconsistent both with the claim by
neoclassical economists that their economics is a value-free
science and with their commitment to an individualistic view
of the economy in which the gender of individual economic
actors should not be significant.
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The Extension of Neoclassical Economics to Include Gender:
Gary Becker.
Becker inherited the marginalist technique elaborated by
Marshall and the founders of the neoclassical economic school
and used it to extend the domain of economics. Although
Marshall's marginalist economics referred to the material
world of goods and services measured by money prices,
Becker's marginalism refers to any and all human behavior
associated with utility maximization. Marshall's views on
gender differences reflected his judgments as to the
different moral and efficient roles of women and men within
the context of longterm economic development, but Becker's
views on gender differences depend more strongly on
biological assumptions that have a immediate effect on the
marginal productivity of women and men in both the household
and the market.
Becker (1976,1981) defined the economic approach as
referring to individual maximization of utility from basic
preferences that do not change rapidly over time. The
behavior of such individuals is coordinated by both explicit
and implicit markets, characterized by possible equilibrium
conditions. His economic approach is not restricted to wants
or markets with monetary transactions, but provides a
framework applicable to all human behavior.
Becker's extension (1981) of the economic approach led
him to consider explicitly the family and economic gender
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differences. According to him, the economic approach to the
family will be "applicable at least in part, to families in
the past as well as in the present, in primitive as well as
modern societies, and in Eastern as well as in Western
cultures" (1981, p. 3).
Because our primary concern is with the neoclassical
economic approach to gender differences, rather than the
neoclassical literature on economic discrimination, we are
not considering here the application of Becker's theory of
discrimination (1971) to gender. That theory, as Madden
(1973) has argued, presupposed men and women as independent
"societies" in a competitive market in which wage
discrimination results from the taste or preference for
discrimination, which is a cost. Discrimination is seen as a
restrictive practice that interrupts free trade between
individuals. The problem with the application of this theory
of discrimination to the question of gender is that male and
female societies are by no means independent. On the
contrary, the marriage relationship is often a relationship
of economic dependency of women on men. We therefore find it
more useful to look at Becker's treatment of marriage and the
household as an entry into the neoclassical thinking on
gender differences, rather than his theory of discrimination
which was developed largely in reference to economic racism.
Becker extended marginalist economics to incorporate
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gender differences by means of his analysis of time.'
Whereas traditional neoclassical economists assumed household
economic behavior concerned only the allocation of money
income, Becker introduced the household allocation of time as
well as money. Furthermore, the earlier economists treated
households as though they were single member units of
consumption, while Becker treats the household as involving
several members in the co-production of various commodities,
such as health, skills, children, and emotional values.
In a 1965 paper on the theory of the allocation of time,
Becker argued that the problem of the allocation and
efficiency of nonworking time was an important economic
concern. He considered foregone earnings as being vital to
an understanding of the economics of human capital
investments and introduced the idea of productive
consumption. He thought of households as small factories--
combining time and market goods to produce other commodities
that contribute to the maximization of household utility.
Instead of allocating time efficiently among commodities
through income expenditures, households also allocated the
time of their various members. He stated that
'As Amsden (1980) noted: "Since for neoclassicists a
problem qualifies as economic if scarcity is involved, and
scarcity involves choice, precious time spent outside the
monetary sector becomes a respectable subject of inquiry"
(Amsden, 1980, p. 15).
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members who are relatively more efficient
at market activities would use less of
their time at consumption activities than
would other members. Moreover, an increase
in the relative market efficiency of any
member would effect a re-allocation of the
time of all other members towards
consumption activities in order to permit
the former to spend more time at market
activities (Becker, (1965) 1980 re-print,
p. 75).
The full income of the household then includes money income
as well as income foregone or lost by the use of time and
goods to obtain utility. Household production of goods takes
place according to the cost-minimization rules applicable to
the traditional firm.
Instead of having the individual spend income to
maximize utility, subject to an income constraint, Becker
expanded the utility function to include the allocation of
time as well as money. He added a time-budget constraint to
the money income budget constraint. Income is no longer
"given," but is determined by the overall allocation of time
between different activities. Time has its own marginal
utility value.
Becker then applied this expanded concept of utility to
the activity of individuals in two sectors of the household
and the market (both of which are productive in the sense of
creating utility) (1981). The unique development by Becker
was the establishment of equivalence between the market and
the household, using his expanded version of the time-utility
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function. He thought of both sectors as producing
commodities that satisfy utility. The products of the
household, however, cannot be purchased from the market and
are consumed by the households themselves. Because they are
not exchanged, these commodities do not have market prices,
but they do have "shadow prices" equal to their costs of
production. Becker thought of this household production as a
special relation between goods and time to produce the same
commodity. He says, for example "fish and meat are inputs
into the production of health and taste; or parental time and
nursery schools are substitutes in the production of
children" (Becker, 1981, p. 9).
In comparing market and household "production," Becker
notes that the most obvious form of what he calls the sexual
division of labor is between women and men who are married to
each other. It is a division that Becker sees as having
historical roots, in that married women "traditionally have
devoted most of their time to childbearing and other domestic
activities, and married men . . . have hunted, soldiered,
farmed, and engaged in other "market" activities" (Becker,
1981, p. 14).* He asserted that the division of labor by
'Becker's suggestion that married women have
historically been excluded from market work, including
farming, seems to be an inaccurate generalization. We
believe it to be more likely that before the period of the
exclusion of market work from domestic life that women would
engage in such work when they could more easily combine it
with childcare. 'Many historians have reported such activity.
Such as, Scott and Tilly (1975), see also the discussion of
domestic outworking in Chapter 7--an industrial market
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gender is partly a product of biology, in that "the various
divisions of labor among family members are determined partly
by biological differences and partly by different experiences
and different investments in human capital" (Becker, 1981, p.
14).
Before explaining how biological differences explain
divisions of labor among family members, however, Becker
argued that "individual specialization in the allocation of
human capital would be extensive in an efficient family.even
if all members were biologically identical" (Becker, 1981, p.
14). He set up the problem in terms that explicitly avoid
gender.
The optimal investment of all types of human capital by
individuals between activities in either the household or
market sector will be based on maximizing utility. In the
context of the household which shares a utility-maximizing
function, he argued that the optimal decision must take into
account the skills of the different household members.
Different members of the household will have differing
relative comparative advantages and relative efficiencies in
the household versus the market sectors of economic activity.
These relative relationships are determined by the ratio of
the marginal products of each member in the market versus the
household sectors.
activity on a mass scale that employed thousands of married
women in many trades.
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Assuming that variations among household members only
arise from differences in skills (investments in human
capital) regardless of biology, he showed that each member
with a greater comparative advantage in the market would
specialize completely in the market, and each member with a
greater comparative advantage in the household would
specialize completely in the household. This complete
specialization would benefit the household as a whole, as the
investment of individual's time in one or the other sector
will increase the returns from that sector over time. The
investor in the household or the market has no incentive to
invest in the opposite sector. In the efficient household,
all members would invest their time completely in either the
market or the household sector. Thus, so far, what has
determined the relative comparative advantages of individuals
for work in the market or the household has not been their
biological sex, but their different experiences and
investments in human capital.
When Becker finally reintroduces biological
determination into the model, the results are not at all
surprising:
Although the sharp sexual division of labor
in all societies between the market and
household sectors is partly due to the
gains from specialized investments, it is
also partly due to intrinsic differences
between the sexes . . . women not only have
a heavy biological commitment to the
production and feeding of children, but
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they are also biologically committed to the
care of children in other, more subtle ways
. . . moreover, women have been willing to
spend much more time and energy caring for
their children because they want their
heavy biological investment in production
to be worthwhile (Becker, 1981, p. 21)
People therefore marry to increase their utility. Women
"hire" men as breadwinners, because men earn more than women
in the market, as women's earnings are less because of their
childbearing and rearing activities. Men "hire" women as
mothers, nursemaids, and housewives, in a mutually beneficial
division of labor that maximizes utility for the household as
a whole (Amsden, 1980).
Becker's logic of gender specialization is circular.
The best example of it can be found where Becker argues that
human biological orientation calls for girls and boys to
receive traditional stereotyped human capital investments.
Becker argued that
since specialized investments begin while
boys and girls are very young, they are
made prior to full knowledge of the
biological orientation of children, which
is often not revealed until the teens and
even later. If only a small fraction of
girls are biologically oriented to market
rather than household activities, and if
only a small fraction of boys are oriented
to household activities, then on the face
of no initial information to the contrary,
the optimal strategy would be to invest
mainly household capital in all girls and
mainly market capital in all boys until any
deviation from this norm is established
(Becker, 1981, p. 24).
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Becker asserted that there is a strong complementarity
between the bearing and rearing of children that reinforces
women's roles. Men, on the other hand, "have been less
biologically committed to the care of children, and have
spent their time and energy on food, clothing, protection and
other market activities" (Becker, 1981, p. 22). Thus,
although the exact degree of biological determination of
relative comparative advantages between women and men in the
market and household sectors cannot be known, Becker
suggested that
an hour of household or market time of
women is not a perfect substitute for an
hour of the time of men when they make the
same investments in human capital . . . an
efficient household with both sexes would
allocate the time of women mainly to the
household sector and the time of men mainly
to the market sector (Becker, 1981, p. 22).
Elsewhere, Becker is not so reticent about the explanatory
power of biology, stating that "biological differences in
comparative advantage between the sexes explains not only why
households typically have both sexes, but also why women have
usually spent their time bearing and rearing children and
engaging in other household activities, whereas men have
spent their time in market activities" (Becker, 1981, p. 23).
The ambiguity that we found in Marshall's analysis of
economic gender differences has therefore reappeared in a
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slightly different guise in Gary Becker's economics. For
Marshall, gender differences were caught between the abstract
logic of a marginalist analysis that ignored gender and his
normative values of women's moral and efficient economic
roles that were different from men. The morality was
justified by the biological fact of women bearing children.
In Becker, the marginalist technique has been significantly
extended: it constitutes a universalistic economic approach
to human behavior. Yet, it is odd that in arguing that the
marginalist analysis of individual utility maximization can
explain all human behavior, Becker also resorted to biology
to explain economic gender differences. Moreover, Becker
admitted that the boundary between biological determination
and human capital investment is unclear in explaining
economic gender differences. The logic of Becker's economics
is weakened by the impetus of biology.
Becker, in extending the economic approach, claimed to
subsume gender differences in the family and the household,
but actually he remained dependent upon a crude and
unexplained biological determination. He used biology to
justify the results of the economic logic of utility
maximization. Becker claimed to have developed an economic
approach with which to understand all human behavior, but, at
least in the case of gender differences, he merely grafted
the marginalist technique onto traditional stereotypes of
gender roles based on conservative biological assumptions.
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Specifying the Boundary Between Economics and Gender
Becker internalized the problem of gender by means of
extending the marginalist economic approach. Other
economists, such as Lloyd and Niemi (1979), Mincer and
Polachek (1974), Mincer (1962), and Phelps Brown (1977), have
been less ambitious in their claims for the capacity of
neoclassical economics to explain gender differences in the
economy. They have tried to specify which aspects of the
problem of gender differences can and should be explained by
the market (understood in terms of the systematic interaction
of individuals or firms maximizing utility or profit) and
which cannot and should not be so explained. Furthermore,
for these economists, what is external to the logic of the
economic approach is not a simple biological determination of
gender differences, but a more complex array of social and
historical factors that have structured the relations between
women and men in the economy.
Yet, the problem of specifying this boundary is
difficult. We have no clear definition as to exactly where
the market begins and ends, and we cannot determine how the
market explanation will work when its boundaries are not
clearly defined. The problem of inclusion or exclusion of
issues of gender within the market explanation is subject to
twin perils: internalizing gender within the neoclassical
approach necessitates reducing the cultural, ideological, and
institutional context of gender to the format of economic
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factors measured by price and the marginal calculus;
excluding gender means that the economic approach abdicates
its responsibility to explain those problems in which we are
interested.
Neoclassical economists have therefore presented the
problem in terms of whether gender differences can be
explained by the functioning of the market. As with
Marshall, they rely upon the market and the marginal method
to offer an explanation. Their formulation of the problem
becomes one of whether or not economic gender differences are
"before" or "within" the market (Phelps Brown, 1977).. By
"before" the market, they mean that gender differences are a
factor of individual differences created outside of the
determinations of the market mechanism, thereby not subject
to its influence and so external to economic thinking; or,
they are a factor of individual differences falling "within"
the determinations of the market mechanism, therefore subject
to economic analysis.' The question for the neoclassical
analysts becomes one of whether or not they can reduce gender
differences to the characteristic form of reckoning of this
form of economics--to make these differences equivalent to
7 As we have seen, Gary Becker resolved the
contradiction between the "before" and "within" market
factors by converting the "before" factors into the format of
the "within" factors. By treating the economics of
production (market) and consumption (household) as formally
similar, with the household understood as a factory, he
eliminated the traditional distinction between economic
behavior and the wider society.
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all other factors measurable by price and subject to the
marginalist calculus. In solving this problem, neoclassical
economists have to move from the concept of an individual to
the concept of relationships between individuals who are
characterized by gender differences.
Mincer (1962) looked at the increasing labor force
participation of married women. The status of marriage for
women led Mincer to consider that the economic position of
such women.cannot be thought of only in terms of the
opposition between work and leisure. The economic position
of such women also must be conceptualized in terms of the
nonmarket work that such women do in the home. We especially
note that the need arises to reconceptualize the dichotomy
between work and leisure by the consideration of nonmarket
work at home only when considering the economic position of
women as opposed to men. That women and not men should do
nonmarket work at home appears obvious, yet it is
unexplained. The work of women in the home is taken for
granted as a social fact. Economists must now account for
such work, because so many women are also entering the labor
market.
The housework of women is "a demand for a productive
service derived from the demand by the family for home goods
and services" (Mincer, 1962, p. 43). (We are reminded of
Marshall's consideration of the economic position of women
from the starting point of their place in the family).
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According to Mincer, this family context of women's economic
position means that women's work is considered only in
relationship to the tastes and skills of other family
members. He states that "the distribution of leisure, market
work, and home work for each family member as well as among
family members is determined not only by tastes and by
biological or cultural specialization of functions, but by
relative prices which are specific to individual members of
the family" (Mincer, (1962) 1980 reprint, p. 44).
Again, as with Becker, Mincer uses a biological (and
cultural) specialization of functions associated with gender
in a manner that does not actually indicate how or why such
specialization has occurred. Given the unexplained "facts"
of such specialization, Mincer sees the problem as the
substitutability between the wife and other mechanical or
human factors of production, and between work in the home and
market production. Mincer states that because certain female
activities are less easily substitutable than others
"substitutes for a mother's care of small children are much
more difficult to come by than those for food preparation or
for the physical maintenance of the household" (Mincer, 1962,
p. 45).
For Mincer, the specialization of gender in which women
are biologically and culturally allocated to childbirth and
childcare has an effect on women's general economic
participation. The effect of such responsibilities of
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married women is the key to understanding their higher
turnover rates of labor-force participation. Furthermore,
the participation of married women is governed primarily by
their husbands' earning power--because it is the family
context of total income that is the key determinant of their
participation.
The family context of women's economic participation was
further elaborated by Mincer and Polachek (1974). As with
Becker's analysis, Mincer and Polachek introduce the problem
in terms that do not at first refer to gender, suggesting
that the division of labor within the family arises from
"complementarity and substitution relations in the household
production process and by comparative advantages due to
different skills and earning powers with which family members
are endowed" (Mincer and Polachek, (1974) 1980 reprint, p.
169). Individuals in such families have a genetic endowment
and are invested in as human capital. The gender differences
associated with such endowments and investments, however, are
not analyzed, even though Mincer and Polachek are
investigating family investments in human capital and the
earnings of women. They state "that the differential
allocation of time and investments in human capital is
generally sex linked and subject to technological and
cultural changes is a matter of fact which is outside the
scope of our analysis" (Mincer and Polacheck, (1974) 1980
reprint, p. 170).
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They must therefore take as a given that there is a "sex
linkage" behind the problem that is entirely ignored. They
consider only the time/allocation of investments in human
capital that give rise to the observed market earnings of
women. Furthermore, they refer to, but do not consider
directly, the discriminatory attitudes of employers and
workers, even though they do acknowledge an earnings
differential between women and men.
Given that unexamined factors external to economic
analysis (biology and culture) result in most women having a
less continuous work history experience in the labor market
than men, (which is furthermore affected by unexamined
problems of discrimination against women), Mincer and
Polacheck argue that it is likely that women's human capital
depreciates relative to that of men over time. This effect
influences both women's own decisions and the decisions of
their employers--young women are less likely than men to
augment their job skills, given the likelihood of their
intermittent labor market participation, while employers will
be less likely to invest in female human capital for the same
reason. Thus, for Mincer and Polacheck, the market can
explain at least some of the wage differentials between women
and men, but only in terms that must take for granted
fundamental structures of gender differences that are
"before" the economic analysis.
Lloyd and Niemi (1979) used the neoclassical economic
190
approach, but they try to acknowledge to what extent the
"before" the market factors contribute to economic gender
differences. They note that the traditional theories of
labor supply (Robbins 1930, Marshall 1961) were exclusively
theories of male labor-force participation. Becker (1965)
and Mincer (1962), on the other hand, assumed that the
presence of children was "the primary determinant of the
division of labor between the sexes" in the household and the
labor market (Lloyd and Niemi, 1979, p. 36). They argue that
the picture is not so simple. There has been a dramatic
reduction in what Lloyd and Niemi call sex differentials in
labor-force participation, especially for women of child-
bearing age. Yet, women continue to work for fewer hours
than men and to be part-time workers much more often than
men. They argue that marriage and childcare still deter some
women from the labor market (to a decreasing extent) and that
discrimination against women is a further obstacle (the
extent of which is not known).
Basically, the problem becomes one of trying to specify
whether there are objective differences in the marginal
utility of women's labor relative to that of men's as
revealed by the market. If the market were a reliable
measure of objective differences in the value of women's and
men's labor, Lloyd and Niemi argue that employment would be
adjusted so that the- value of the marginal product of labor
would equal the wage rate. They note that "under such
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conditions, since there would be no leeway on the demand side
of the market to generate unequal compensation for equal
work, any observed sex differences in earnings, which are the
products of wage rates and hours of work, would have to be
rooted in the supply side of the market, stemming from
variations in the amount/or skill level of the labor
supplied" (Lloyd and Niemi, 1979, p. 155).
As Lloyd and Niemi mention, however, the supply of labor
is affected by objective differences in the range and type of
opportunities available to women as opposed to men:
thus women and men with the same
characteristics will be faced with
different opportunities in the labor market
. . . to the extent that women and men on
the average differ, or are believed to
differ, in types and levels of
characteristics which are valued by
employers as indices of potential
productivity, they will be hired for
different jobs and paid different wages
(Lloyd and Niemi, 1979, p. 4)
To what extent are such different opportunities the result of
discrimination or of objective differences in the quality of
male and female labor?
In answering this question, Lloyd and Niemi immediately
confront the dilemma of women's fecundity, which they assert
adds a particular "option and constraint" to the economic
activity of women. In other words, women's traditional roles
in childbirth and childcare have to be factored into the
analysis from the beginning. Neoclassicals therefore cannot
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operate on the basis of an equivalent individualism between
women and men: the "before" the market social position of
women is generally considered to be different from that of
men. Gender differences have already disturbed the basis of
the economic analysis.
The natural fecundity of women, differences in levels of
education and training, the relative physical strength of men
and women on the average, and other such factors that affect
the nature of the labor of women compared to men as it is
presented to the market, represent various forms of "before"
the market gender differences. Neoclassical economists
examine these natural and socially determined differences as
potentially objective differences in the value or utility of
women's labor relative to men.
The problem, however, is that their measure of objective
differences in the utility of male and female labor is itself
crooked: the market mechanism of prices and the derived
economic tool of the marginal calculus have been warped by
institutionalized discrimination. The prices are false; the
market is imperfect. Lloyd and Niemi argue that
discrimination is apparent both "before" and "within" the
market, and exactly where it begins and where it ends cannot
be known. They ask
Do the lower earnings, higher unemployment,
and occupational segregation of women
result from their higher turnover and lack
of continuous job experience? Or are
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discontinuous job histories and high
turnover the inevitable result of being
restricted to secondary occupations,
characterized by low earnings, unstable
employment and little or no opportunity for
advancement (Lloyd and Niemi, 1979, p. 13)
They state that the balance between what are objectively
different qualifications of women and men and what are the
results of discrimination is impossible to measure. As soon
as the issue of gender is raised, the individualistic
premises of neoclassical market analysis break down. The
opportunity choices of individuals seeking to maximize
utility are generally different for women than men.
Biological and social factors inter-relate to constitute
women and men as different types of economic individuals.
The "before" the market facts of women's fecundity and their
traditional responsibilities for childcare and housework,
serve to present the labor of women to the market in a
different way from that of men. Differences are then also
compounded by "before" the market discrimination against
women, in such areas as education and career choices.
For Becker, for example, these "before" the market
gender differences allowed him to trade-off the division of
labor between men and women in the household and the market.
Lloyd and Niemi have a less benign regard for such trade-offs
and insist that neoclassical economic individualism should be
based on an elementary equality between individuals in the
market, regardless of their gender. Yet, Lloyd and Niemi are
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forced to acknowledge that the fecundity of women and their
traditional roles as caretakers of children and the home are
factors that do not remain exogenous to the economic
analysis. The neoclassical economists cannot disregard
gender differences. But the way in which such gender
differences are included in neoclassicals' market analysis is
complicated by the issues of discrimination and labor market
segmentation by gender, both of which suggest that the market
fails to live up to its own individualistic premises.
As with Marx, we have returned to the question of what
does the wage, or the price of labor, mean in terms of
economic gender differences? The problem for the
neoclassical economists is that the wage may represent a
conventional or customary price, associated with issues such
as the maintenance of a station or status in life (Phelps
Brown, 1977). In cases where employer's discriminate, women
are not paid what the market suggests is required to attract
their labor, but a conventional valuation of women's labor.
If so, then the wage does not, in fact, represent the true
market value in the- price form of the economic factor under
consideration--in this case, the relative value of women's
and men's labor.
One such status or station in life is the so-called
"breadwinner's wage", by which we assume that adult men are
paid sufficient to support a wife (at least partly) and a
family. Other problems of status associated with the
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measurement of economic gender differences revolve around the
issue of occupational segregation. Women have been denied or
restricted entry into certain jobs and occupations, by
employer's discrimination, legal restrictions and trade union
practices, for example. The solution is to compare women's
jobs with men's jobs according to their intrinsic worth, a
task jeopardized by the neoclassical economists' reliance
upon the market as the measure of economic value, because
part of the problem is that the market measurement is not
reliable.
Labor-market segmentation is a contradiction for the
ideals of neoclassical economic individualism. Orthodox
neoclassical economists regard such segmentation as resulting
from exogenous causes, such as women's choices to invest less
in their human capital given the likelihood of their
intermittent labor force participation. Critics of this view
have analyzed segmentation as being historically produced
within the development of the economy (Reich, Gordon, and
Edwards, 1973). Lloyd and Niemi (1979) note that the radical
changes in women's labor-force participation has not been
matched by a dissolution of the systematic differences
between women and men in occupational categories.
Neoclassical economists have, nevertheless, attempted to
factor in and out the various complex attributes that affect
the relative value of male and female labor, and they have
tried to take into account the effects of discrimination and
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"before" the market gender differences. The conclusions, not
surprisingly, are not straightforward. Differences of
physical strength between women and men cannot account for
all the inequality in income between women and men, according
to Phelps Brown. Lloyd and Niemi argue that children are no
longer the deterrent to women's labor-force participation
that they once were, although marriage and childcare still
deter women from participation and affect the forms of their
participation at certain stages of the lifecycle. According
to Phelps Brown, the interruption of employment
characteristic of many women's lifetime commitment to the
labor force does affect the value of women's labor relative
to men. Yet, Lloyd and Niemi note that, outside of
educational attainment, all other aspects of human capital
investment are subject to substantial sex differentials that
work against women. They conclude that the lower earnings
and higher unemployment of women are products of both
differences in productivity between the sexes and the result
of discrimination against women, stating that "sex
differentials in years of work experience and job training
have been established as primary factors in an explanation of
sex differences in earnings. However, it is unclear whether
these differences result from sex differences in
participation and career choice or from external constraints
imposed by the market" (Lloyd and Niemi, 1979, p. 169).
We cannot resolve within the terms of the neoclassical
197
economic analysis the actual balance between these endogenous
and exogenous, market and nonmarket factors, in explaining
the "objective net worth of women's labor" relative to men's.
Thus, we cannot solve the problem of causation in
understanding economic gender differences. The ideal
neoclassical explanation (perhaps only used by an orthodoxy
that never actually existed) is that women's lesser labor-
force participation (resulting from their motherhood
responsibility) leads them to choose jobs in which they have
less opportunity to enhance their skills and receive on-the-
job training that would increase their human capital. As
Amsden notes, the problem with the logic is that lower human
capital values for women can just as logically be derived
from either cause or effect of their observed intermittent
labor-force participation: "low wages due to discrimination
. . . may discourage women from investing in human capital;
and low investments in human capital perpetuate women's lower
earnings" (Amsden, 1980, p. 16). She also notes that even
when the different job experience of women is controlled for,
there remains a 20 percent differential between average
earnings for women and men.
The neoclassical analysts cannot calibrate the market
and nonmarket factors. The social relations that embed
economic gender differences obviate the premises of a form of
economics that must ultimately rely upon the assumptions of
the market.
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Stretching the Limits of the Market Explanation
We have observed a tension between the neoclassical
economic analysis of the market, based on the idea of
individuals regardless of their gender, and economists' other
views as to the fundamental differences between women and men
in their economic roles and relationships. The ideas of such
gender differences have varied from a morality of efficiency
(Marshall) to the claim that biological sexual differences
justify different economic roles for women and men in the
market and the household (Becker).
Neoclassical economists tend to treat gender differences
just as they would any other factor or input into the
marginal economic equation. In trying to subsume gender
within the normal economic logic, however, these economists
have consistently had to refer to explanations or determining
causes that remain external to economics. Economists in
attempting to reduce gender differences to fit the
neoclassical economic approach have stretched its premises
too far.
Thus, Becker attempted to subsume the issue of gender
differences within the simple logic of household utility
maximization. However, as we have seen, the basis for his
understanding of gender differences derived from biology.
Other neoclassical economists, whom we have examined, such as
Lloyd and Niemi, tried to explain how economic gender
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differences were not a function of biology, but could to a
certain extent be explained by the operations of the market.
They, however, did not clarify the boundary between the
limits of the market explanation and the domain of gender
differences (whether thought of in socio-historical or
biological terms).
Without referring to biology as a straightforward
explanation of economic gender differences, some neoclassical
economists nevertheless acknowledged the "option and
constraint" of fecundity for women as well as their
traditional childcare and housework responsibilities. So
long as this option and constraint--to put it in terms of
opportunity cost--was only an attribute of women, then the
ideal individual of neoclassical economics could no longer be
thought of as neuter. Yet, the way in which individuals were
gendered, in the form of being the people who gave birth to
children or who had the responsibility for their care and for
domestic work in general, lacked a clear theoretical
justification in economic terms.
The ideal neoclassical economic actor, who must evaluate
opportunities presented in the market, is actually placed in
a series of social roles and groups that affect the nature of
choices available. One such role or group, if it can be so
called, is that of gender. The placement of individuals in
gendered groups implies different frameworks of resources for
women and men. The placement of individuals as women and men
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having to some extent pregiven frameworks of economic choices
cannot be explained by neoclassical economists.
The overstretching of premises involved in the
neoclassical attempt to explain economic gender differences
has taken two forms: either economists weaken the market
explanation by acknowledging market failure in the form of
discrimination and segmentation and by resorting to extra-
market explanations such as biology, or they trivialize the
market explanation of gender differences by reducing them to
the format of the economic calculus (as in Becker's
equivalent treatment of women's domestic work with men's
labor-market work). These results correspond to what we
suggested was the characteristic duality of the way in which
neoclassical economists conceptualized gender differences:
the division of the problem into what is internal to the
economic logic and what is exogenously determined. The
division of the problem in this way, however, has been
unsatisfactory in explaining economic gender differences.
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CHAPTER 7
FACTORY WORKERS AND OUTWORKERS:
WOMEN IN THE COTTON TRADE DURING
THE ENGLISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
In examining how several types of economic theory have
approached the problem of gender differences, we have looked
at conflicting ways of understanding the social relations of
women and men in the economy. The conflict occurs on several
different levels, so that we cannot make a straightforward
"one on one" comparison between the types of theory. The
economic ideas of gender differences as portrayed by Adam
Smith, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, and their modern
offspring, represent divergent systems of thought,
paradigmatic ways of appropriating knowledge about the social
world. We cannot, therefore, put one small element of each
type of theory alongside a small element of another type of
theory and examine it in equivalent terms, using the same
language. We cannot, for example, place the Marxist-feminist
theory of the exploitation of women in domestic labor
alongside Becker's idea of the productivity gains to be had
from women specializing in housework and consider whether the
one or the other can better help us understand the problem of
economic gender differences. Instead, we need a device that
will allow us to examine the relative merits of the economic
approaches to gender differences.
To overcome this problem of comparison, we introduce an
historical "case study." The case study portrays the
economic activity of women workers in the cotton trade during
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the English industrial revolution.1
Before describing why this particular historical
material should be useful, we explain what the case study is
not intended to do. It is not intended to be "a history" of
women workers in the cotton trade during the English
industrial revolution, as such. Rather, we use the case
study to abstract elements of already existing economic and
social histories of the English industrial revolution to
present a framework for the intersection of economic theories
with examples of the social relations of gender differences
in the economy. In the case study, therefore, we will not
prove or disprove a specific theoretical argument, rather we
will use it as a means for interrogating types of economic
theory and their understanding of gender differences. We
will use it as a framework of instances of social relations
of economic gender differences through which the economic
ways of understanding can be displayed and then evaluated.
We therefore do not use this framework to show a simple
dichotomy between empirical facts of history and a series of
'We hesitate to refer to the case study as a history,
which would suggest that original empirical material has been
collected and theoretically formulated into a coherent
exposition of a specific chronological period. The case
study takes the form of the assemblage of various different
"histories" that offer tangential insights into the problem
of economic gender differences, without adding up to a
totalistic historical picture. The purpose of the case study
is not to present a history as such, but to present material
through which diverse economic approaches to gender
differences can be evaluated.
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theoretical approaches to their understanding2 . On the
contrary, the very need for the case study arises because we
cannot counterpose the "facts" of economic gender differences
and the economic theories that are used to understand them.
We have already seen that the facts are already somewhat
determined by the particular economic approach--what is a
fact for the Marxist/feminist approach is entirely invisible
to Gary Becker (and vice versa).
To these differences that are inherent to the different
types of economists, we must also add the problem of the
relationship between the period of the case study (late 18th
and early 19th century) and the sequence of development of
the economic theories themselves. Thus, for example, Smith's
economics appeared before the industrial revolution was
recognized; Marx wrote before women entered the labor force
to the extent that occurred in the twentieth century; recent
Marxist/feminist theories presupposed a level of technical,
social, and legal advances in women's status that belong to a
fundamentally different social context of gender differences
than that which obtained either for Smith, Marx, or Marshall,
or, indeed, for those women who worked in the early cotton
mills.
All of these problems of the relationship between facts
and theory, or between the case study history and the
2 In this sense, we are following Althusser's rejection
of the idea that theory is abstract and reality is concrete
(Althusser 1975).
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sequence of development of the economic theories, serve to
emphasize the need to regard the case study as a device for
reflection. The limitations of the case study, nevertheless,
reveal something useful: when we say, for example, that Adam
Smith would not have recognized the specific role of women in
outworking forms of production, or Karl Marx's concept of
gender in the process of valuation of labor does not match
with what happened to the women cotton factory workers, we
have learned something about the limits of the economic
approaches.
Why Women Cotton Workers in English Industrial Revolution?
We chose the history of the women workers in the cotton
trade to illustrate the different economic approaches,
because it refers very strongly to a series of themes that
continually reappeared in our analysis of the problem of
gender differences. These themes began, of course, with the
basic opposition of gender between women and men. This first
dichotomy was then paralleled by many others: divisions
between the private and the public, the natural and the
social, the domestic and the market, and between
housework/childcare and waged work in factories or elsewhere
outside the home.
All too often these parallels between a basic gender
division of women and men and many other social divisions
appeared natural and unexplained in economic theory. Thus,
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for example, many economists suggested that because women
have babies this "automatically" or naturally' explained why
they are excluded from the market place of waged work and
remain in the home, or else explained the particular
difference of their economic position relative to that of
men. We therefore felt that in order to confront such
ideological* elements in the economists' approaches to gender
differences, we would find it helpful to juxtapose the
economic theories with a socio-economic context in which
women worked.
The history of the economic situation of women workers
in the cotton trade during the industrial revolution displays
very well the issues with which an economic approach to
gender differences has to contend. The eruption of the
industrial revolution, the transition from domestic based
industry to factory production, the early introduction of
machinery, the re-structuring of capitalist relations of
production over and around traditional social relations of
*It is significant that in our language when we wish to
assert that something is obvious and requires no explanation,
we say it is "naturally so". Nowhere is this unreasoned
argument used more often than in reference to issues
associated with gender.
*By ideological, we do not mean that the economic
theories are false in a positivist sense, for, as Althusser
(1975) has argued, ideological arguments can certainly be
logical and coherent, (what could be more logical and
coherent than the neoclassical marginalist technique?) but
that an unacknowledged practical-social concern predominates
in the theories--in this case it is the presupposition of a
"natural" world of gender differences that is implicit in the
economic discourse.
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family life, all refer to the central themes encountered in
the economic approaches to gender differences.
The period of early factory industrialization, moreover,
was a historical conjuncture that was a key moment in the
transformation of the economic livelihoods of women and men.
The period of our case study centers on the emergence of
factory production out of domestic industry. The growth of
factory production first occurred in the textile industry,
especially in the cotton trade. It was also this industry
that had made extensive use of outwork or putting out systems
of production based on domestic industry. These forms of
domestic industry were closely associated with the rise of
the factory system. Women and children played a dominant
role in outworking forms of production. Outwork was a form
of capitalist work that took place within the household and
was largely compatible with women's domestic and childcare
responsibilities.'
The textile industry was crucial for the
sOur case study is also valuable because women's
involvement in outworking suggests an alternative paradigm of
the market economy that is not centered on the factory system
or on the location of production outside the home. Such a
paradigm might define "economic" to include work performed in
the household as well as elsewhere, and would therefore be
less likely to marginalize women from economic thought.
Moreover, outworking was not merely a transitional
organization of mass industrial production that occurred
during the industrial revolution and was incidental to the
rise of the factory system. Outworking and other domestic
forms of industrial production continue on a large scale in
many developing economies, again largely as a province of
exploitative work for women and children, and again still
largely unrecognized by theorists of economic development.
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industrialization of the British economy, and, indeed, for
the modern forms of industrialization throughout the world
(Ashton, 1962). Cotton spinning was the first industrial
activity to experience the leap in productivity and social
organization of production that signified the industrial
revolution. The origins of this industry in the household,
as a traditional form of industry for women as well as men,
and its subsequent migration to the factory, where women were
often a majority of its labor force, means that this industry
offers us unique opportunities to observe the social
development of economic gender differences-in capitalist
industrialization and to evaluate how different types of
economists can understand such a development.
Other historians and sociologists have examined the
place of gender differences in the labor force during the
period of industrialization. Examples of'the analysts who
refer to this question outside of the English industrial
revolution.include Abbot (1918), Cantor and Laurie (1977),
Demos (1970), Gordon (1973), Hareven and Vinoskis (1978),
Hareven (1978), Lerner (1969), Norton (1980), Rabb and
Rotberg (1971), Smuts (1971), and Sweet (1973). These
authors have presented histories of the employment of women,
but have not generally related them to economic theories of
the place of gender differences in employment.
The intertwining of the case study with the question of
the development of economic theories of gender differences
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therefore affects the form of our presentation of the history
of the women workers in the cotton trade. We begin by
examining the so-called proto-industrialization that occurred
in European economies before the industrial revolution, in
which the putting out and outworking systems of industrial
production were developed. The cotton-textile industry is
then the focus for our examination of the industrial
revolution and the rise of the factory system. It is in this
industry that we examine the transformations of economic
gender differences associated with the new technology and
relations of production. We present in the final part of
this chapter an assessment in general terms of the ways in
which the social relations of women and men in the economy
were transformed by the development of the factory system in
the cotton trade. In the Chapter 8 we develop a broad
framework to show the relationships between the case study
and the economic approaches to gender differences that we
have previously examined and to evaluate the economic
approaches to gender differences.
Proto-industrialization.
The process of development of capitalist industry before
the industrial revolution in England, by means of the putting
out or outworking systems of production in the countryside,
has come to be called proto-industrialization. This was a
form of capitalist industry that was not based in factories,
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but was linked to agricultural production and employed
household units of labor. This production for the market was
less integrated into feudal relations of production than
agriculture, and we should distinguish it from household
production for immediate consumption (although the two often
occurred together). While merchant capitalists owned and
controlled stocks of materials and used decentralized
household labor, the direct producers in the households often
owned the.basic tools and means of production.
The transition between proto-industrialization and the
industrialization of the factory system involved the
penetration of merchant's capital into the direct processes
of production and a re-organization of the relations of
production. With mechanization came centralization:
capitalist industry gradually re-located from the site of the
household to the factory and other non-domestic work
locations, with tremendous repercussions for the economic
significance of gender differences (Kriedte 1981, Schlumbolm
1983).
Early industry originated as an intrinsic part of an
agrarian economy. Peasants and small holders were industrial
producers before the emergence of a social class that held no
land or was not associated with agricultural work.
Schlumbolm (1981) notes that the most important of these
early proto-industries was that of textiles, which was built
up on the skills and tools of the rural population. Textile
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production took place in the family, which was sometimes
supplemented by one or two outside laborers.
These rural industrial producers had to have recourse to
the intermediaries of the putters out and merchants in order
to obtain raw materials and gain access to markets. The
small-scale producers worked on direct commission from the
merchant. The dependence of the small producers on the
merchant for raw materials led to the penetration of merchant
capital gradually into the sphere of rural industrial
production. Merchants eventually owned all the raw materials
with the result that some of the means of production had been
turned into a form of capital no longer owned by the
household producers. As industrial equipment was developed
that was beyond the means of the small producer, it became
the property of the merchant, even if located in the
producer's household. Under such circumstances "the direct
producers no longer manufactured commodities which they sold
as their property; they merely sold their labour power for
piece wages (which included the upkeep of the workshops which
were also their homes)" (Schlumbohm, 1981, p. 102).
The growing dependence of the small producers on
merchant capitalists led to the removal of steps of the
production process from the producers' household and
therefore out of the family as a unit of production. In
linen-producing regions, for example, where flax and hemp
were cultivated, the cultivation and processing of yarn and
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weaving were divided and no longer occurred within the same
household. Merchants would employ family members to work on
the same tasks so that a division of labor was developed
among families rather than within the family unit.
Alternatively, family members were employed on different
tasks that were not successive or directly related steps in
the production process of the particular commodity.
Increasingly, the division of labor was organized by the
putter out and not by the family unit of production. The
original process of family organized production had required
the cooperation of family members in earning an indivisible
income for the unit as a whole through their common labor.
The greater control of the merchants and putters out led to
the family and the household being merely the location where
individual workers were engaged in production and each
received separate wages (Kriedte, 1983).
The development of the outwork system culminated in its
co-existence with the growing factory system from the end of
the eighteenth century. The final form of outworking was an
organization of capitalist mass production located in the
household. It involved a minute subdivision of processes and
was labor intensive rather than capital intensive. Outwork
tended to be repetitive, making use of basic skills,
unsophisticated tools, and its labor required minimal
training. Labor was mobile between the different outworking
trades. Industries that made use of this organization of
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production had access to large pools of labor in periods of
growing population and imperfect regional markets.
Outworking labor was unhampered by any forms of collective
workers' organizations and emerged in its most advanced forms
at a time when traditional forms of apprenticeship had all
but disappeared in the early nineteenth century. The problem
of location was solved by taking the work to the workers,
feasible because of the lightweight nature of commodities
involved (Bythell, 1978).
An essential feature of outworking was the very high
proportion of women and children employed in the various
outworking industries. By the early nineteenth century
outworking was used by many trades, including: weaving,
framework knitting, shoemaking, nailing, and chainmaking.
Although the needlework trades had always been traditionally
female dominated, Bythell (1978) notes that in all of the
outworking industries there was a tendency for the proportion
of women employed in them to increase. This was the case
even when the trade had been traditionally a male domain and
became particularly evident during the nineteenth century
when outworking continued alongside the factory system, when
women became the majority of the outworkers.
Even in the phase of proto-industrialization, some or
all of the phases or steps of the production process might be
centralized in a single center of production where wage
laborers would be employed. These workshops or
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"manufacturies", as they were called, supplemented the
traditional patterns of household based rural industry. Some
workshops employed whole families as units of labor power,
with the family receiving a single wage. This early form of
centralization of production was initiated by the merchants
and putters out, usually by building workshops as additions
to their store houses or counting houses. Some workshops
made use of advances in machinery, but many simply
centralized several traditional domestic machines or
processes in one central workshop. Most workshops remained
based on handicraft technology. All the means of production
in these workshops, however, were owned by the merchant
entrepreneur.
The Textile Industry
In England, before the 18th century, industry grew in
the countryside, moving there from the towns in order to
avoid municipal and guild restrictions, and for technical
reasons such as the availability of water power and mineral
resources (Ashton, 1962). Industrial production, as in the
rest of Europe, was the work of small independent
craftspeople working in tiny workshops in their homes,
selling either directly to consumers or to merchants.
The industrial revolution was not a quick and obvious
"revolution", contemporaries such as Adam Smith were largely
unaware of its occurrence (Landes, 1969). Some innovations,
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such as those in the cotton industry, spread very quickly,
while others took decades to be widespread, as with the power
looms for the woolen industry. Alongside the early factories
and mills remained the workshops and the domestic workers.
Factory organization of production was not dominant until the
middle of the 19th century. The period of
proto-industrialization should not be underestimated, nor
should the older organizations and techniques of production
that continued alongside the emergence of the factory system.
Certain of the "older" forms of production, notably
outworking, emerged within certain industries long after the
rise to dominance of the factory system, such as in the
trades of nailmaking and chainmaking (Bythell, 1978). There
certainly was a turning point in late 18th century England,
but this was based on older forms of social and economic
organization (capitalism had existed for hundreds of years)
and depended upon a slow cumulative development of productive
powers.
The textile industry in England began with wool. In the
proto-industrial period, the woolen trade in England was
spread throughout the country and was integrated with
agricultural work. Wool was the major industry before the
industrial revolution. The family was the unit of
production. Traditional divisions of labor within the family
were associated with age and gender differences. Women and
children would sort, clean, card, and spin the wool. Men
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would comb and weave the wool on the handlooms (Ashton,
1962). In the North of England, for example, where the wool
trade flourished, the pieces of wool cloth were carried to
the market towns, such as Leeds or Halifax, and sold to
merchants who bought the cloth in an undyed and unfinished
state. Merchants then dyed and finished the cloth and
marketed it at home and abroad (Bythell, 1978).
The making of wool cloth by families was a form of
capitalist industrial production for the market. With the
development of the outwork system, families were paid piece
rates,. either as a whole or as individuals. Production was
organized by the putters out and merchants. Only in outlying
areas of Scotland and Wales did families produce woolen cloth
merely for their own use to make into clothing.
New types of wool cloth were introduced in the late 16th
century known as the "new draperies" that were lighter in
weight and more colorful. New textile industries emerged:
linen was made from flax in Scotland with the assistance of
the government, and in the late 17th century, the Huguenot
manufacturers introduced silkmaking to Spitalfields, then a
London suburb. The output for the wool industry rose 150
percent during the 18th century (Crouzet, in Hartwell, 1967).
Technical innovations occurred early in the woolen industry.
In the 16th century, a treadle operated spinning wheel with a
flyer was introduced and replaced the hand spindle throughout
Northwest Europe by the 17th century (Schlumbolm, 1981).
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The innovations of the Dutch loom and knitting frame for
wool were often too expensive to be bought by the direct
producers in the family workshops, so that the putters out
themselves provided this machinery in central workshops or in
the family's homes, resulting in family workers becoming
simple wage laborers (Schlumbolm, 1981). The merchants often
held the raw materials in central warehouses where the
outworkers returned on a weekly basis to pick up supplies,
return finished articles and collect their piece work wages.
The producers continued to own their own tools and simple
machinery. More complex machinery, the knitting machines for
example, would be rented out from the putters out or
merchants. During the early development of the putting out
system the work was combined with part-time agricultural
labor. Later, outworkers became more obviously
proletarianized. The merchants might employ middlemen to
cope with their scattered employees and multiple sites of
production (Landes, 1969).'
The merchants had finishing workshops associated with
their workshops where they hired skilled workers to put the
'The role of merchants was important not simply in
providing the capital to finance the raw materials and to
distribute and sell the produced goods, but also because of
their knowledge of markets and their links to foreign trade.
This was particularly important when the export trade began
to grow. The subordination of many workers under the
domination of merchant capital in the putting out/outwork
system, even though the merchants and putters out did not
directly supervise production, presaged the relations of
production of the factory system.
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final touches on the goods to be marketed. Even before the
industrial revolution, the task of "fulling"7 the wool cloth
was centralized and involved the use of horse or water power,
as well as the "dressing" of the wool, the "raising of its
nap" and the dying processes (Ashton, 1962). During the 18th
century, such merchants added other workshops for printing
cotton and linen, and sometimes handlooms would be gathered
together in a central workshop. These developments were all
forerunners of the factory system. They were transitional
forms of production, largely lacking in power-driven
machinery and merely being the agglomeration of domestic
scaled activities and techniques of production.
Other harbingers of the factory system appeared in the
textile industries. In the silk throwing mills, large and
complex machinery was used, copied from Italy. John Lombe at
Derby built a large water-driven mill of five stories and 100
feet length, where he employed 300 women and children. It was
the first genuine factory in England and opened in 1717
(Ashton, 1962). By 1732, other mills were opening elsewhere.
The early cotton mills, which represented the beginning of
the industrial revolution, were imitations of these early
silk-throwing mills.
'The process of treating the cloth with fuller's earth
and beating it with heavy hammers to matt the texture.
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Rise of the Cotton Industry
It was cotton, rather than wool, that was the key
textile industry in terms of innovations and the development
of economic gender differences with the rise of the factory
system. The cotton industry followed the organizational
pattern of the wool trade, but rapidly developed new forms
and techniques of production. The transformation of economic
gender differences in the cotton industry can best be seen by
following through the transition from outworking to the
factory system. This process involved changes in technology
and relations of production that first affected the
traditional patterns of work found in the -domestic workshops.
In the outworking system, there were traditional
divisions of labor similar to those in the woolen trade, that
were associated with gender and age differences. The father
and husband would weave the weft, children would pick clean
the cotton, while older children and the wife and mother
would card and spin. Local spinsters sometimes augmented the
family's supply of yarn. Pinchbeck (1969) describes how the
family-based outwork was flexible. The unit of production
was easily assisted by the addition of outside labor. If
there was more than one weaver in the household causing there
to be insufficient yarn produced, then sometimes only the
cleaning and carding of the cotton might be completed within
the home, and the resulting "rovings" sent out to local
spinsters for spinning. From three to eight women and
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children might typically be employed in supplying one weaver
with sufficient yarn.
Raw cotton was first imported from Turkey, then the
Caribbean and Brazil. It was used in the English textile
industry as early as the 16th century, and it was being
combined with linen cloths in Lancashire by the 17th century.
At first, cotton yarn was used as a web with other fabrics,
whose warp was linen. The printing of cotton-linen fabrics,
known as calico and muslin, which were produced in India as
"East India Goods" led to a fashion for cotton clothing. The
competition of Indian clothing, however, led the English to
prohibit the import of Indian cotton goods in 1700 and again
in 1721. A cotton industry began to thrive in Lancashire and
London, and by the middle of the 18th century, a wide range
of better quality cotton goods was being produced in England
(Ashton, 1962).
By the late 17th century the cotton industry was growing
rapidly, even with little progress in technology except in
the areas of dying and bleaching. In the first half of the
18th century, the cotton industry developed more slowly. In
the first decade of the century imports of raw cotton were
about a million pounds a year (Landes, 1969). The rate of
growth of the industry was about 2.6 percent per annum, a
rate of growth governed by domestic demand.
In the 1750s and 1760s the introduction of Kay's flying
shuttle increased the productivity of weaving, exacerbating
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the difficulty of supplying weavers with sufficient yarn
(Landes, 1969). The demand for spinning intensified both
through the growing demand for cotton goods and the gains in
the productivity of weaving.
The slump in the cotton industry caused by the American
Revolution in the 1760s and 1770s enabled the cotton
industrialists to try out new machinery and develop the
factory system to discipline workers and save profits. The
slump was followed by an export boom accompanied by growths
in population. At the same time, the bottlenecks to
transportation were breached with the development of the
canal systems. Markets were widened. The cotton industry
experienced an upsurge in the 1780s and became the engine of
growth for the English economy. The French and European
markets were penetrated. A virtuous cycle had begun.
Crouzet and others have argued that the key to
innovation in the cotton industry was the shortage of labor
(Crouzet, 1972). As it became extended over large
geographical areas, the putting out system of production was
hampered by rising marginal costs. Workers spent too much
time travelling to and fro between the warehouses and their
domestic workshops. Supervision became more difficult, and
embezzlement was a serious problem. Secondary warehouses
were built. Although the solution was to try and concentrate
the outworkers in central workshops, it was difficult to lure
the domestic workers away from their homes (Ashton, 1962).
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(This was probably especially so for female domestic workers
who were also mothers looking after young children in the
home). Food prices were relatively low in the 1730s and
1740s. Labor was not mobile.
The sharp rise in money wages in the industrial North of
England at this time indicates the shortage of labor. Not
only was the new cotton industry was forced to develop its
labor force out of older industries, but it had to do so
quickly as.the demand for cotton goods rose rapidly. The
phenomenal growth of cotton production can be seen from the
following figures in Table 1 of retained imports of raw
cotton.
The rapid growth of export production of cotton goods at
the same time fueled innovation and investment. Even though
cotton was only four percent of national income of Great
Britain in 1802, it became the model for the general process
of industrialization in the textile industry as a whole and
in other branches of industry (Deane and Cole, 1962).
The transformation of capitalist industrialization by
the innovation of the factory system had profound
implications for the organization of the labor process. The
relocation of industrial production from the household
workshop to the factory also involved the structuring of
economic gender differences in the divisions of labor of
capitalist economy.
225
Table 1
IMPORTS OF RAW COTTON
(millions of pounds)
Year
1695-1704
1700-1709
1705-1714
1710-1719
1715-1724
1720-1729
1725-1734
1730-1739
1735-1744
1740-1749
1745-1754
1750-1759
1755-1764
1760-1769
1765-1774
1770-1779
1775-1784
1780-1789
1785-1794
1790-1799
1795-1804
Imports
1.14
1.15
1.00
1.35
1.68
1.55
1.44
1.72
1.79
2.06
2.83
2.81
2.57
3.53
4.03
4.80
7.36
15.51
24.45
28.64
42.92
Source: Deane and Cole, 1962, p. 51.
The formation of a factory labor force was difficult for
capitalists. Ashton (1962) notes that the centralization of
the labor process in the factory was led by innovations in
technique, particularly associated with sources of power.
The smelting and rolling of iron and the use of water and
steam power were crucial for the emergence of the factory
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system. Both in terms of its site of activity and its
relations of production, the innovation of centralization
also depended, however, on the reorganization of labor. The
loosely structured flexibility of the largely rural
industria-l outworking system was replaced. Cotton was the
vanguard sector in this reorganization, a process that tells
us much about the historical formation of economic gender
differences.
Capitalists could not easily induce workers to leave
their domestic workshops or agricultural employment because
"there was no strong desire on the part of the workers
themselves to congregate in large establishments. It was
only under the impact of powerful forces, attractive and
repellent, that the English labourer or craftsman was
transformed into a factory "hand"" (Ashton, 1962, p.76).
Ashton explains how the restrictions of settlement were
overcome to encourage the mobility of labor. In the early
factories, the employer might fail to hire a male worker
unless he was also able to provide work for his wife and
family. The early ironmasters sometimes set up textile works
near the forges to provide work for wives and children nearby
their husbands. Ashton (1962, p. 112) states that "when an
employer like Greg or Oldknow, wanted juvenile or female
labour, he was sometimes obliged to extend his operations to
agriculture, limeburning and so on, in order to find work for
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the men."' The technical innovations in power and machinery
eventually gained momentum and pressured the formation of a
factory labor force--a labor force, as we shall see, that
became highly structured in terms of gender differences.
Technical Innovations in Cotton Spinning
By the middle of the 18th century, the English economy
was advancing along a broad front. A specific breakthrough
then occurred in the cotton industry. In the 1760s and
1780s, a cluster of innovations created the new industry of
the factory spinning of cotton. The booming cotton industry
had difficulty in obtaining sufficient quantities of yarn.
Spinning remained slow and labor intensive. There were
therefore powerful incentives to invent labor-saving devices
for spinning. The factory spinning of cotton represented the
merger of two flows of technological progress: the coal and
iron technology that had emerged since the 16th century
provided the "hardware" and materials for factory production,
while innovations in textile production machinery in the
1760s encouraged the growth of the factory system. The first
cotton mill was built in 1771 by Arkwright at Cromford in
Derbyshire (Ashton, 1962).
Technical developments first affected productivity in
the domestic outwork sector. The invention of Hargreave's
spinning jenny (1770), which could also be used for wool, was
eGreg and Oldknow were early ironmasters.
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compatible with the domestic site of outworking production.
The jenny at first contained 16 spindles. A woman could spin
as many as 80 threads at once in later versions of the
machine (Ashton, 1962). Many families used small jennies as
an adjunct to their domestic textile work (Bythell, 1978).
According to Ashton, the smallness and cheapness of the jenny
and the lack of strength required to operate it led to its
enthusiastic introduction into many households. The jenny
increased the productivity of hand spinning by between 6 and
24 times (Landes, 1969). The jenny enabled spinners to
produce sufficient yarn for the domestic weavers; and
therefore, it strengthened the family economy, at least until
1820.
The invention of Arkwright's spinning frame in 1769 was
introduced in the early spinning factories and was first
powered by horse and later by water, becoming known as the
water frame. With this spinning frame, cotton spinning began
to be relocated from the household to the factory. It
produced a cotton yarn that was strong enough to be used for
the warp as well as the weft.
In 1778, Samuel Crompton invented the mule jenny, which
combined the advantages of the domestic based spinning jenny
with Arkwright's water frame and which could spin fine yarn
suitable for the weft or warp for pure high quality cotton.
(Arkwright's frame had been suitable for only coarse cotton.)
Crompton's mule was only suitable for domestic use in the
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1780s, but by 1790 it was used in the factory.
The invention of Arkwright's spinning frame and
Crompton's mule led to the first cotton factory mills. In
mills in rural areas, Arkwright's water-powered frame
resulted in the centralization of cotton spinning. In the
1780s, there were very few water-driven spinning mills, but
within a short period, many were built. Improvements were
quickly made to the spinning machines with the introduction
of the mule. By 1785, the first mills were being powered by
James Watts' steam engines. Large factories could then be
located in towns, freed from the constraints of rural water
supplies.
The inventions of the water-frame, the mule, and the
jenny meant that within a few years the limitations to the
supply of cotton yarn had been eliminated and the quality of
cotton products were greatly improved. Their introduction
was followed by the rapid rise of cotton imports in the 1770s
and 1780s (Deane and Cole, 1962). Arkwright's mill, making
use of his invention of the water frame, came to be the model
that was imitated everywhere. The mill was large and used
heavy machinery, the buildings being 100' x 30' rectangles
and 4-5 stories high. The early buildings contained about
1,000 spindles and 2-300 "hands" were employed.
For a while, two types of spinning mills co-existed:
the water-driven Arkwright machinery and the steam-driven
mules, which were larger (powering up to 50,0000 spindles and
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employing up to 2,000 workers by 1850). By 1795, the mules
were made of iron and had 240 spindles. The steam-driven
mule factories became dominant and were concentrated in the
Manchester area. James Watts' spinning jenny (a rotating
spinning machine powered by a steam engine) was first used in
the 1790s in the larger spinning mills. The earliest
spinning jenny had powered 8 spindles, but by 1780 supported
80 spindles. Although the early water frame supported 200
spindles, by 1850 water frames supported 2,000 spindles. One
worker could manage two machines with two children as
assistants. Productivity had been increased several thousand
times. By 1838, four-fifths of the cotton mills were steam
driven, and by 1850 nine-tenths were steam driven (Landes,
1969).
Transformations in Economic Gender Differences
Although spinning remained domestic, it continued to be
a responsibility of women and children. Smelser (1969)
argues that the use of the jenny in the home increased the
incomes of the female spinners as the demand for cotton grew.
For a while, the water frame and the domestic jenny continued
to be used in parallel, the one in the mill-factory, the
other in the home, for the production of cotton yarn. The
jenny remained useful for the production of the weft, while
the frame was useful for producing the warp. The jenny was
then also enlarged in scale.
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As the scale of the domestic jenny increased, the
jennies were gathered together in workshops, where they were
worked on by men. As soon as the scale of the jenny led to
its relocation out of the home, jenny cotton spinning
switched from being a female to being a male occupation. The
enlargement of the jenny led to an entry of men into
spinning, and other ancillary processes, such as carding and
roving, were also sent out of the home into the factory after
1775.
The use of Arkwright's water frame in the rural mills,
however, did not result in the factory employment of domestic
textile workers. On the contrary, the earliest spinning
mills seem to have employed adult and child labor who had not
previously been associated with the textile trade. Ashton
(1962) suggests that the mills were not successful in
recruiting adult labor. The new factories were avoided by
the adult independent laborer, as they were associated with
the Poor Law Authorities' "houses of industry" for paupers.
A major source of labor for the early rural mills in the
North of England was, in fact, imported children apprentices
sent under the auspices of the Poor Law and parish overseers.
Occasionally whole families would be sent. Under these
circumstances, as Ashton notes, the early textile plant was
rather more akin to a colonial settlement than a modern
factory.
Pinchbeck (1969) suggests that girls were often a
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majority of the child apprentices, while adult women made up
only a small portion of the adult labor force. The workforce
in the early rural mills was often displaced agricultural
workers, exdomestic servants, parish paupers, and "the
unskilled of all trades." Pinchbeck also agrees that the
domestic textile workers did not desire to work in the mills.
Smelser suggests that whole families were employed in the
early mills, alongside the widespread use of child
apprentices. Smelser estimates the proportions of adult
males in employment as only 1:10 in the 1780s and 1790s
(Smelser, 1969). Mill masters sometimes employed additional
men as builders, groundsmen, and craftsmen to build and
repair machinery and buildings. The labor force of the early
rural mills using the water frame was usually composed of
child apprentices, often females, supplemented by whatever
adult male and female labor was required for heavier work and
supervision.
Collier (1964), on the other hand, argues that there was
a greater degree of correspondence between the labor force of
the domestic textile industry and the new water-frame mills.
Based on the analysis of the wage books of early mills,
Collier found that Arkwright's machinery was adapted for the
use of women and children. Collier argues that labor of
child apprentices was favored only when there was a lack of
other local workers. Where there was sufficient local labor,
the mill owners favored the employment of women and girls
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displaced from domestic spinning.
The early mill owners had little need for adult male
labor and so did not attract the domestic weaver or his
family. The loss of domestic spinning for the wives and
daughters of the weavers, as Collier notes, however, led to
the eventual loss of the male weaver's monopoly in this trade
"by seeking employment for those members of their families
who had previously prepared their yarn, the weavers hastened
a development which was inevitable since it was found that
neither a man's strength nor much skill were required to
weave the new cloths" (Collier, 1964, p. 3).
Where mills were set up in areas of widespread domestic
spinning industry, some of the mill's labor force was
recruited from the female labor pool of that industry. Many
mills, however, were established in isolated locations
because of their need for water power and had to recruit
their labor from afar, in which case the employment of child
apprentices and the paupers was often necessary.
The water-frame spinning mills were first replaced by
the mule system and later by the steam-powered systems. The
use of the mule for spinning after 1779 encouraged a tendency
for men to become involved with spinning. Crompton's
invention of the mule had been originally intended for
domestic use, and it was used in household workshops for
about ten years after its invention in 1779. In 1790, the
mule began to be powered by water and was relocated to the
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mills. In the mills, where the mule was heavier, only men
were employed upon it. Again, we see that the relocation of
the site of production from the household to the factory, as
a result of technological advance, was immediately associated
with a transformation in the gender of the labor involved.
As the water-frame mills were being superceded by mills
using the mule system, apprentice child labor was replaced by
that of adult females in the water-frame mills in the
country, while men were recruited for work in the mills using
the mules (Pinchbeck, 1969). The employment of child labor,
especially as arranged through the Poor Law authorities had
apparently become troublesome, increasingly regulated, and
costly.
Such transformations in the gender basis of occupations
or divisions of labor were by no means permanent, as in the
1820s factory mule spinning switched to being a job for women
and children, based on a technological advance that made the
process automatic. In the early 19th century, the mule for
spinning cotton in the mills was semi-automatic. The mule
spinner had to be highly skilled and was well paid. Mule
spinners were usually young men assisted by "piecers," young
children who twisted the end of broken threads. In the
1820s, a long strike by the mule spinners in Manchester led
the mill owners to ask engineers to devise an automatic
machine that could be operated by unskilled women and
children. Such a machine was devised by the engineer Richard
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Roberts, known as the "self-acting mule". This mule was
automatic and became widespread during the 1830s, although it
did not totally supercede the older type of mule until the
1850s (Bythell 1978).
Smelser (1969) argued that the transition to the urban
factory had a two-phased impact upon the household family
production unit. From 1790 to 1820, the urban factory
employed male mule spinners along with their wives and
children as assistants. Children also worked in factories
separately from their parents and as household helps for
other families. After 1820, however, male mule spinners were
replaced by adult women and children. The family based unit
of factory labor was no longer employed. Within a short
period after 1800 the steam powered mule became dominant and
spinning with the jenny in the home had disappeared.
Arkwright's water-powered-frame spinning mills no longer
expanded.
Because the increased production of spinning in
factories entailed the expansion of weaving, weaving occupied
a larger place in the outwork sector of production. Thus,
women entered into weaving, while it remained a domestic
industry. Domestic spinning also continued after the
introduction of factory spinning for specialized tasks that
the factory could not yet accomplish. The result was that,
as Smelser has suggested, during the early period of factory
spinning, labor within the family unit of production in the
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household was rearranged rather than replaced (Smelser,
1969).
Collier's (1964) analysis of the Manchester factory of
McConnel and Kennedy in 1795 provides a useful illustration
of the symbiotic relationship between the outworking systems
of production and the early factories and of the key role of
women's labor within that relationship. Of the 300 workers
at the mill, there were many women who worked irregularly,
coming in to take work home with them when they did not
actually work in the mill. These women worked on hand
processes that did not require their attendance at the mill.
In the same factory that used the mule, only men were
spinners, but were a minority of total employees. Most of
the employees were either women, boys or girls, and they
worked at preparatory processes. Adult women and men worked
as "stretchers," boys and girls as "winders," and other young
children as "scavengers." The male mule spinners often
employed their own families as assistants (Collier, 1964).
The mule system of spinning had been water powered like
the water-frame, which it superceded. The mule began to be
steam powered at the end of the 18th century, enabling its
location in urban as opposed to rural settings and allowing
for the combination of powered spinning and weaving in the
same factories. Smelser argued that this was a further
factor that altered the nature of the labor being employed in
the mills, encouraging the employment of adult women. The
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proportion of child apprentices was reduced after 1800. The
proportion of adult males in steam-powered mule mills was
usually not more than 20 percent. Pinchbeck also argues that
the introduction of the urban steam-powered mule mills led to
mule spinning becoming an adult women's occupation in the
early 19th century.
The mill owners at this time also preferred to employ
adult women with experience in handloom weaving to work on
the new powered weaving looms that began to appear around
1820. Pinchbeck suggests that in the 1830s and 1840s these
women were often the daughters of the distressed handloom
weavers. Except for the women power-loom weavers, however,
the majority of adult women employed in textiles in the first
half of the 19th century remained associated with subsidiary
processes. Women were the "tenters" of the machines and
frames, they worked in the carding rooms, and as assistants
to the weavers and spinners. Hewitt (1975) suggests that in
the 1840s in Manchester 27 percent of the total cotton
employees were women, a proportion that increased in the
following decades. In some areas, such as Blackburn in 1871,
the proportion reached 34 percent. The gender and age
distribution of cotton workers for the years 1835-1907 can be
seen in Table 2.
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Table 2
AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF COTTON OPERATIVES, 1835-1907
(as percentages of total employed in cotton factories)
Children Women Young Adult Total
under 14 and Girls Men 14-18 Males
over 18
1835 13.1 48.1 12.4 26.4 100.0
1850 4.5 55.6 11.2 28.8 100.0
1862 8.8 55.7 9.1 26.4 100.0
1868 10.3 55.1 8.5 26.1 100.0
1874 13.9 53.7 8.3 24.1 100.0
1878 12.8 54.9 7.2 25.1 100.0
1885 9.9 56.0 8.0 26.1 100.0
1890 9.1 55.9 8.2 26.8 100.0
1895 5.8 58.8 7.8 27.6 100.0
1901 4.0 60.8 7.1 28.1 100.0
Source: Deane and Cole, 1962, p. 190
Most women factory workers, however, were unmarried, a
fact that again confirms the barriers felt by mothers to
working outside the home. Hewitt suggests that by 1901 only
24 percent of the women workers in the Lancashire mills were
either married or widowed. E.P. Thompson also confirms the
juvenility of the adult factory workers, and the likelihood
that they were not married (Thompson, 1968). Thompson
suggests that up to one-half of factory.workers were aged
under 21 in the early 19th century, and more than half of the
adults were women (making it difficult for older males,
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especially ex-handloom weavers, to get factory employment).
Young males were displaced from the mills as they became
older because of the higher costs of their wages.
The expansion of the factory-based, cotton-spinning
industry led to women assisting men with domestic weaving on
the handlooms, as domestic spinning was displaced and their
labor became available. Thus, women entered what had
previously been a completely male trade. Pinchbeck (1969)
argues that the entry of women into weaving was made feasible
by the less arduous nature of weaving machine spun yarn. The
great expansion of women as weavers on the handlooms in the
domestic locations occurred after machine spinning of cotton
on the water frames began in the mills.
The mechanization of weaving was slower and less
spectacular than that of cotton spinning as it took longer to
develop a satisfactory power loom. The cost advantages of
power loom weaving relative to powered spinning were less.
The traditional handloom had been greatly improved by the
invention of the flying shuttle in 1737 by John Kay, enabling
weavers to work faster on broad cloths without help.
Traditionally, weaving was done by a man with a boy helper or
apprentice. The shuttle doubled the productivity of weaving
and was taken up throughout the industry by 1760. Cotton
handloom weavers grew in numbers between 1780-1820 until it
became a factory industry. In areas such as North East
Lancashire, homes might have two or three looms. By this
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time, women had entered the weaving industry in the home,
with the relocation of cotton spinning to the factories, and
Bythell argues that most of the weavers were women and
children. The industry was both urban and rural. In towns
such as Manchester, Bolton, Blackburn, and Preston, there
were whole districts of handloom weavers. In the
countryside, weaving remained integrated with agricultural
work. Weavers in the towns tended to be more highly skilled
and permanently employed (Bythell, 1978).
In 1800-1804, the Lyons craftsman Jacquard invented a
weaving system that allowed complex patterns to be quickly
woven using long strips of hole-punched cardboard that
ordered the movement of the loom. The system was first used
for silk. By 1800, some power looms were introduced that
wove automatically, the first patents being held by the
Reverend Cartwright in 1785. The weaving machine was
improved during the 1800s, but was only used on coarse
fabrics (Ashton, 1962). In 1822, Sharp and Roberts of
Manchester invented a system of automatic warping that
increased the productivity of the power loom three times over
that of the handloom, leading to a spurt in its introduction
on a widespread basis by 1850. Several such looms could be
managed by one person (Bythell, 1978).
The first major investments in the factory-based power
loom for weaving occurred during the trade cycle upswing of
1825 (Bythell, 1978), by mill owners already engaged in
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cotton spinning. Handloom and power weaving co-existed after
1825, with power-weaving gradually taking over from the
handlooms. According to Bythell, the handloom weavers had
almost completely disappeared by the 1850s "the story of the
handloom weavers . . . shows that outwork was a form of
capitalist organization eminently capable of rapid expansion,
given an abundance of cheap labour; it shows that industrial
production could still be widely dispersed and its roots
firmly embedded in rural life" (Bythell, 1978, p.47).
Bythell (1969) suggests that 1826 was the peak of
activity for the handloom weavers and that in the 1830s the
number of domestic handloom weavers remained higher than that
of all the cotton factory workers. By 1850, however, the
numbers of handloom weavers had fallen to 43,000 and were
concentrated in the luxury goods trade. The handloom weavers
were virtually extinct by 1860. Handloom weaving survived in
the wool industry for a longer period. The decline of
handloom weaving is the classic story of immiseration and
technological unemployment and was the basis for Marx's idea
of the "industrial reserve army". As the general prices for
cotton goods fell after 1815, cottons were substituted for
other cloths, such as silk, linen, and woolens, and for
non-British cotton goods imported from abroad. The British
production of cotton goods wiped out the Indian cotton
industry, a social calamity described by Marx (Marx, 1972).
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The Factory System and the Gradual Decline of Outwork
The innovation of factory spinning of cotton signalled
the decline of the outwork spinning industry. In the late
18th century the most important outworking industry was
textiles, which formed the biggest sector of the industrial
economy until well into the eighteenth century. Spinning and
weaving were the most important forms of outwork production,
and until the end of the 18th century, outwork spinning
employed the most people. The introduction of new technology
in the factory system for the cotton industry led to the
total disappearance of outwork spinning in the early years of
the 19th century. Between 1770 and 1830, the location of
spinning was switched from the household to the factory.
Women and children who had been domestic spinners either went
into factory spinning or switched to handloom weaving, which
remained an outwork industry and required many more workers
as the cotton industry expanded rapidly (Bythell, 1978).
The growth of Lancashire as the world's foremost
industrial center resulted from the concentration of the
textile industry there and led to its decline in other areas
which became marginal. From being a widespread industry
worked upon on a casual part-time basis in countless
households throughout the countryside, interspersed with
agricultural work, the textile industry became concentrated
in factories employing an industrial -working class (Bythell,
1978).
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Thus, the first spinning factories did not eliminate
outwork but transferred it from spinning to handloom weaving.
Weaving did not become a factory industry until the 1820s.
The factory and the outworking systems of production
co-existed and complemented each other, growing together.
For the period of first growth of the factory system,
outworking "was a perfectly rational, viable, and adaptable
form of organization in many industries, as capable of
expansion as contraction" (Bythell, 1978, p. 36).
Therefore, even as one industrial sector or process
entered the factory system, others remained part of the
outwork systems of production. This form of co-existence of
the factory system with domestic outworking is especially
important for our understanding of the evolution of economic
gender differences in the nineteenth century. Bythell notes
that an essential feature of the outwork system was the very
high proportion of women and children employed in this form
of production in a variety of trades. As he states, there
was a tendency in the 19th century for the proportion of
women to increase:
in so far as women were employed in
manufacturing industry, (as opposed to
services) in the nineteenth century, the
bulk of them remained for long in the
outwork environment: as the significance
of outwork declined, the role of women
within it increased; for as the men moved
out, women moved in. Accustomed to low
pay, anxious for ways of adding their mite
to total family income, and generally
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incapable of self defence, women became the
key element in that persistent cheapness of
labour which was one of the prime
requirements of a viable outwork system
(Bythell, 1978, p. 163).
Bythell argued that for many women and children outwork
was either the only employment locally available or the only
sort of work they could conveniently do. This remained the
case even when outworking became largely an urban form of
production during the 19th century and had shifted from its
dispersed rural patterns characteristic of the eighteenth
century and earlier. Bythell notes that both the wives of
dockers in the East End of London and the wives of rural
agricultural laborers lived in areas where the local economy
provided low paid work that employed only men, so that wives
had to become outworkers. In other areas, however, such as
colliery towns, and in-steel and shipbuilding areas, outwork
industries employing women were not common. Industrial work
for men in these other areas, outside the home, was often
better paid, and their wages could in some cases support
wives and families.
Transformations in the Social Relations of Women and Men
The short period of transition of the relocation of
cotton spinning from the home to the factory indicated a
reoccurring pattern--men moved "upwards" into work with more
advanced technological means of production and women replaced
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them in the jobs with relatively "lower" or more backward
forms of production, using superceded machinery located
either in the factory or domestic workshop. The process was
dynamic, for as soon as a newer form of production, involving
technical innovation, became widespread and established, it
was often adapted for use by women or children, and the jobs
associated with it became deskilled.'
On a broader scale this is what happened in the
relationship between the outworking system of production and
the factory system as a whole. As the factory system
gradually replaced the outwork systems of production, women
became ever more prominent in outworking. The compatibility
of outworking with part-time and casual labor, and with the
tasks of the household and childcare, obviously had much to
do with the growing predominance of women in this sector of
production. On the negative side was the evident
incompatibility of factory work outside the home for women
who had families to look after. Bythell argues that a
further factor to be considered was the regularity and level
of men's earnings, which determined the local existence of
large pools of women engaged in low-paid outworking industry.
'The deskilling of factory work by the introduction of
machinery was examined by Marx. As we saw in Chapter 3, Marx
also noticed that such deskilling was associated with the
replacement of male by female labor. Modern economists have
continued to examine the phenomenon of deskilling, and its
association with changes in the gender composition of the
labor-force. For an introduction to the modern literature,
see Braverman (1974), Hill (1981), Friedman (1977), Milkman
(1980), Scott (1982), and Walker (1979).
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Thus, the close interaction and complementarity of the
outwork system with the developing factory system set the
framework within which women's and children's labor was
allocated between the two systems. The allocation was
constrained both by the nature of work available to husbands
and fathers and by the demands of childcare and housework
that devolved upon women.
Outwork was not succeeded by the factory system in a
swift process of change; rather, the two systems intertwined
and supported each other, and in this process of interaction
structured a pattern of economic gender differences. Only
over the very long term, between the end of the 18th century
and the beginnings of the 20th century, was the outworking
system definitively replaced by large-scale factory
production. Over this longer term decline of outworking,
women and children gradually became the majority labor force
in this domestic form of production. At the same time, their
position in the factory labor force remained consistently at
a disadvantage compared to men.
Thus, even in the earliest factories, which preferred to
employ women and children, men were employed in the small
proportion of jobs with greater responsibility and higher
wages. Even though factory workers were generally better off
than outworkers and others working outside the factory
system, when women were employed in factories they
consistently held inferior positions and received lower wages
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than men. As the factory system expanded throughout the 19th
century, it tended to become more frequently a male preserve.
The economic gender differences fostered by the
intertwined development of outworking and the factory system
were further entrenched by legislation and trade union
policies during the 19th century. The so-called protective
legislation led to women being banned from night working and
prevented them from working in certain industries (Brenner
and Ramas, 1984). Women were thereby unable to compete with
men on an equal basis for certain skilled jobs, including
mining and printing. The 1847 Ten Hours Bill limited women's
labor to ten hours per day in the textile industry only. The
legislation was later extended to other industries and to
workshops in 1867. The 1842 Mines Regulation Act prohibited
women from underground mine work. Trade unions also excluded
women from many trades, to avoid what Brenner and Ramas call
"ruinous competition" (even though unions only covered a
small proportion of total employment). When women entered a
trade, the result was usually a rapid depression of wages and
the degradation of work.
Most women withdrew from full-time work in the
factories and shops with the birth of their first child.
According to Brenner and Ramas, married women shaped their
employment around their domestic responsibilities "whereas
their sons and daughters went into unskilled waged work,
women with children gained income in those employments that
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fitted with the demands of childcare and housework:
part-time work, homework, seasonal work, taking in boarders,
etc." (Brenner and Ramas, 1984, p. 49).
When and if women could take their children to work
outside the home, they did so. The married women working in
the textile mills usually had husbands employed only
seasonally or on very low wages. Even in the textile towns
where the opportunities for women's work was greatest,
Brenner and Ramas (1984) found that married women only made
up a small proportion of the total workforce. In Preston in
1851, they state that 26 percent of women workers were
married, in a town in which two-thirds of the population
worked in the textile factories.
The shift in the location of production from the
household to the factory meant that the necessary labor of
looking after children and taking care of the household
became the responsibility of women, the modern occupation of
housewife was invented. In the pre-factory systems of
production, this work was combined with industrial production
for the market. Machine production in factories meant that
productive and reproductive work could no longer be combined.
The rise of the factory system and relations of
production centered outside the household was therefore an
important influence upon the development of gender
differences in the relations of production of the economy.
The early development of industrialization took a form in
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which women were sometimes a majority of the labor force in
certain industries (especially the cotton trade), while in
other branches of industry women's labor tended to be
excluded from the market. The process of industrialization
offers a complex picture of the integration of gender
differences. Key to this picture were the constant
limitations on women's industrial participation posed by
their childcaring and domestic responsibilities--so that
often it was younger unmarried women that were employed in
the few industrial sectors in which women predominated.
It therefore seems that the early industrial employment
of women was a process of the marginalization of women in two
senses. First, it was a real economic marginalization, as
women were isolated in certain industries that employed women
(as in cotton) or else were pushed into the declining sectors
of outworking or domestic service. Second, it was a process
of theoretical marginalization as economists discounted the
importance of gender differences in an economy defined
predominantly in terms of the work of men in factories and
other places of work outside the home. Economics down-played
the significance of forms of work (both for the market and
not) in the household, which had become the site of women's
work characterized by less modern relations of production.
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CHAPTER 8
EVALUATING THE ECONOMIC APPROACHES
TO GENDER DIFFERENCES
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In this chapter, we develop a series of thematic
relationships between the history of the women cotton workers
and our previous analyses of the economic approaches to
gender differences. To understand how different economists
view the social relations of women and men in the economy, we
combine the essential ideas of the different economic
approaches (which have their own historical and theoretical
relationships to each other) with the materials of the case
study (which obviously also have their own history, aspects
of which "speak to" the economic ideas in different ways).
Relationships Between the History of the Women Cotton Workers
and the Economic Approaches to Gender Differences
First, Smith developed abstract economics ideas,
ignoring gender differences. There is a glaring disparity
between the significance of gender differences in the
divisions of labor of both outworking and the early factory
system and their absence in Smith. We find a disparity
between Smith's economic abstraction, which ignored gender
differences, and the historical reality of these forms of
production, in which gender differences were obvious.
Second, Smith was the starting point for an abstract
structure of economic thought in which individuals are not
characterized by gender, a tradition that reappeared in
different guises in both the Marxist and the neoclassical
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economic approaches. In Marx, however, the absence of gender
in his economic categories represented only one of his
arguments. In his other argument, he referred to the
explicit exploitation of gender differences in the relations
of production of capitalist industry. We therefore examine
Marx's two arguments in relation to the ways in which women
were employed in the cotton trade during the industrial
revolution. Marx's unresolved arguments on the problem of
gender in the process of valuation of labor are re-examined
in the light of the history of technological change and
factory industrialization of the cotton trade.
Third, with Marshall and the early development of
neoclassical economics, we found a movement away from an
inherent normative direction of economics derived from Smith
(based on Smith's ideas of natural laws governing
individuals' economic behavior, which contribute to economic
growth and social well-being). This departure results in
Marshall's ambiguous economic position on gender differences.
The ambiguity stems from the separation between the neutral
technique of marginalism, in which gender is absent, and an
external normative framework of economic development, in
which gender differences are argued to be morally correct and
economically efficient. Marshall, in using a marginalist
method, interprets the rationality of individuals maximizing
their utility, and his work can therefore offer some insight
into the behavior of the economic individuals of our case
257
study materials. He did not, however, explain the social
relations of gender differences that structure the economic
livelihoods of women and men. Yet, a different aspect of
Marshall's approach--the normative ideology of women's
roles--is found to have some real resonance with the facts of
the lives of women workers in the cotton trade, but he still
does not actually explain such economic gender differences.
Fourth, the Marxist-feminist theorists coped with the
awkward legacy of Marx's contradictory positions on gender by
replacing the problem of class with that of gender. The
results of the replacement suggested new ways of theorizing
economic gender differences, essentially by positing women as
mediators between families as reproducers of labor-power and
the process whereby the labor of women and men was valued
unequally. An understanding of women's economic position was
to be found in a relationship between the natural and the
social. The case study, however, reveals how difficult it
has been for these Marxist/feminists to make such an
analysis. A theoretical impasse remains between the
genderless categories of Marx's economic concepts and the
gender-specific domain of women's roles in housework and
childcare.
Fifth, the recent neoclassicals reproduced the ambiguity
towards women that was found in Marshall. These modern users
of the marginalist technique also held ideas of the distinct
roles of women in the economy, sometimes based on biological
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assumptions and sometimes based merely on an acknowledgement
that certain gender differences among individuals were
products of "before" the market social conditions. Unifying
the domains of gender differences in the workplace and the
home by subsuming the entire field under the rubric of ,
utility maximization, Becker offered an extension of the
economic method to understand gender differences. We used
the case study, however, to help us understand that such a
unification of the field was a glossing over of substantive
differences in the nature of social relations between the
home and the workplace. Our history of the women cotton
workers also confirmed the difficulty experienced by other
neoclassical economists in separating the market and
nonmarket factors involved in the determination of economic
gender differences.
Adam Smith: The Lack of Recognition of Gender.
In Chapter 2, we found that Smith did not recognize
gender differences. Yet, in our case study of the history of
the women workers in the cotton trade, we found that women
and men frequently occupied very different places in the
division of labor. We had difficulty reconciling the
historical reality of women's work with the principles of
market economy that were developed by Smith. Women were not
treated as equal individuals with men. The economic
livelihoods of women and men were radically distinguished.
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How was it possible for Smith to think of women and men as
equivalent economic individuals?
In the period of proto-industrialization, when
industrial production occurred by means of outworking and the
putting-out system, we find that women and men had different
kinds of work in divisions of labor organized through the
family and based in the home as a workplace. In the
outworking sections of the textile industry, which continued
alongside the early development of the factories, we found
that the labor of women and children predominated. Many
women therefore worked in entirely different locations and
organizations of production than men. They worked in these
forms of production because they could thereby combine
childcare and housework with industrial work for the
capitalist market.
Outworking, especially in the textile industry, became a
form of capitalist mass production that employed mainly women
in their home workshops. Its minute subdivision of processes
between individual workers in different locations was not
like the centralized division of labor envisaged by Smith to
be the most efficient organization of production. Key to
the viability of outworking was the availability of women to
be outworkers. The availability of women outworkers, in
turn, depended on the fact that women who were mothers found
it difficult to work outside the home. These links between
the site and organization of production and the associated
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gender typing of jobs remain outside the individualistic
premises of Smith's economics.
Smith virtually ignored these older forms of industrial
organization in describing the growth of the English economy
and in elaborating his own economic principles. Even though
Smith did not recognize some of the portents of the
industrial revolution, he was well aware of the benefits of
economic centralization as made clear by his description of
the gains from the division of labor. Furthermore, as we saw
in Chapter 2, Smith's occasional references to "domestic"
economy indicate that he thought of outworking and putting
out systems of production as backward.
We cannot, however, interpret Smith as dealing entirely
with a pure abstraction of economic individuals. He
recognized the existence of social ranks and classes in his
economic categories and was, therefore, not an absolute
individualist. His idea of society and economy arranged
individuals into the ranks and orders of stockholders,
laborers, and landlords. Yet, Smith did not refer to
fundamental gender differences within these social ranks and
economic categories.
The relations of production and divisions of labor of
outworking and the putting-out system therefore contradicted
the ideals of Smith's economics. This was a contradiction
not only in terms of the divisions of labor associated with
gender in the family, which were not based on the ideals of
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Smith's division of labor, but also in terms of the
principles of organization of these older forms of industrial
production. Moreover, Smith did not comment on the basic
inequalities of the ways in which gender differences were
associated with the rise of divisions of labor in the factory
system, and with the introduction of technology in that
system (they occurred largely after he wrote) and would,
anyway, have been outside the conceptual framework of his
economics.
We therefore should not forget that Smith's economic
principles stem from the assumption of basic individual
equality. We find that Smith conceptualized the economy,
and its growth, in terms of centralized market-oriented forms
of production employing advanced divisions of labor. Smith
did not consider the economic roles of women and men to be
different. Yet, our case study showed that the place of
women and men in the economy was very different, both in
outworking and the factory. In Smith's concept of the
economy, the role of women as household workers, either for
the capitalist market or for their own family's needs, was
excluded from consideration. Although he suggests that the
market system naturally inter-relates the self-interest of
individuals through the process of equal exchange of labor
and products, he does not provide any natural, social, or
historical rationale for economic gender differences.
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Karl Marx: Cotton Workers--Proletarians Rather than Women or
Men
Marx turned Smith's idea of the natural market system
into an idea of the historical development of modes of
production. Marx saw that beneath the equal exchange of
commodities by individuals in the commercial society lay a
system of unequal relations of production that defined
economic classes. These capitalist relations of production,
however, were not seen by Marx to be basically organized
around principles of gender differences; instead, they were
defined in terms of the private ownership of means of
production in the form of capital and by the sale of labor-
power by workers in exchange for a wage. At the level of
this idea of the capitalist system, Marx, like Smith, did not
think of the economic individual as either male or female.
Yet, when we examined the development of Marx's thought,
the problem of gender differences did, in fact, emerge in a
contradictory way. We found two conflicting appearances of
gender differences within Marx's economic approach that must
both be considered in evaluating the Marxist understanding of
economic gender differences.
In turning to what happened to the women workers in the
cotton trade, we can re-examine Marx's contradictory ideas on
gender differences in the economy. Marx's first argument was
that the development of capitalism occurred in such a way
that gender differences were disregarded. His position was
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similar to that held by Smith. As with Smith, we found that
the historical situation of women in the cotton trade
contradicted the idea of the absence of gender differences in
capitalist relations of production. Women and men in the
cotton trade, in fact, occupied different places in divisions
of labor and organizations of production.
We note, however, that when Marx suggested that gender
differences would be superceded in the social relations of
the economy, his thinking was the result of an historical
argument. The key feature of Marx's understanding of
capitalist economy was the placement of individuals in
relations of production based on property ownership of the
means-of-production, a placement that was not based on gender
differences.
From this Marxist perspective, then, our history of
women workers in the cotton trade represents a transitional
economic situation in which an historically outmoded form of
economic organization based on natural gender differences is
still influential in the period of early industrialization.
Thus, for Marx, the divisions of labor that we found in the
family units of production in the cotton outworking trade are
vestiges of very old organizations of production1 that are
'We do not mean to suggest that Marx understood there to
be a direct historical sequence between primitive economy and
the early industrial period, but that in reference to the
ideal types of modes of production that Marx identified (see
Hobsbawm, 1977), the domestic outworking activity can be seen
as equivalent to primitive economic organizations in which
gender differences formed the basis of divisions of labor.
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being weakened and replaced by the advanced capitalist
relations of production based in factories in which an
individual's gender will not form the basis of divisions of
labor.
Although Marx argued that gender differences would be
eliminated in the process of capitalist development, we
showed how he goes on to analyze their exploitation in
relations of production. Marx suggested that the
introduction of modern machinery had eliminated the
traditional physiological basis to economic gender
differences, so that women and children could be employed at
tasks previously reserved for adult men. Furthermore, the
new factory machine production caused a relative deskilling
of jobs, so that traditional skills acquired by adult men
were no longer a prerequisite for employment, further
encouraging the employment of women. But instead of women
and men being employed equally, Marx argued that women would
be employed instead of men as their labor was cheaper. Thus,
gender differences were reinserted into the argument.
In our case study we show that traditional gender
differences associated with cotton spinning were transformed;
men became spinners on the new machines as production was
relocated outside the home. Thus, rather than women
replacing men as machinery was first introduced, we find that
men replaced women as industry relocated from the domestic
workshop to the factory--at least in the initial period of
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technical innovation. The pattern of gender typing of jobs,
however, was by no means constant. Women replaced men as
factory workers, as factory machine production became
established. The women factory workers, however, were
usually young, unmarried and without children, whereas the
women employed in domestic outworking were mothers with
children to look after.
There was, thus, a tendency for the jobs associated with
innovations in technology, new machinery, and new processes
of production to be at first defined as male occupations:
they were thought to demand higher skills or greater strength
and were deemed appropriate for men who were paid higher
wages than women. As the process of production became
routine and as the technology was superceded, the jobs tended
to become available for women. In certain instances,
machinery was adapted for the use of women and children.
At least in the cotton trade, factory jobs were usually
gender-specified. Marx's argument, suggesting that factory
machine production would result in the supersession of gender
differences in employment, was not supported by our case
study on the cotton trade. On the contrary, we find there'
was a dynamic and continual process of the redefinition of
the gender typing of jobs associated with technical
innovation in different sectors of the industry. Thus,
Marx's other argument appeared correct--at least for the
cotton trade and over the long term--which was that as
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technical innovations became routine and the jobs associated
with new machinery became deskilled, women were often hired
to replace men.
We must, however, still consider Marx's logic as to why
women replaced men. The implication of Marx's analysis is
that women replaced men because their labor was cheaper.
Yet, according to Marx's theory of the valuation of labor-
power, there was no reason why women's labor should
necessarily be of lower value than men's.
For Marx, the development of capitalist factory
production signified a reformulation of the concept of the
valuation of labor-power in which gender differences played
an important part, but in which, finally, the exact role of
gender was ignored and excluded from his analysis. As we saw
(in Chapter 3), Marx argued that factory machine production
would encourage the employment of women (and children).
The value of labor-power had previously been based on the
value of those goods required to support and reproduce the
labor of a skilled adult male laborer and his wife and
family; now, the value of labor-power was reformulated to
support unskilled men, women, and children as equivalent
individuals, and the circumstances of family life are
ignored. The value of the labor-power of unskilled women and
men is the same.
We cannot find such an equivalence in the value and
employment of the labor-power of women and men in the history
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of the cotton trade. Furthermore, Marx himself abandons the
idea of the supersession of gender differences, both in the
process of valuation of labor-power and in industrial
employment, by asserting that female labor will replace male
labor because it is of lesser value.
Marx, in his explanation of the valuation of labor-
power, ignored what we find are important aspects of the
organization of gender differences in the cotton trade:
women employed in the factories were usually younger,
unmarried, childless; women in the domestic outwork sector
were usually those looking after children. Furthermore,
there was, surely, a relationship between the work that women
did in the home and the process of the valuation of labor-
power, a relationship that affected both the ways in which
women's and men's labor-power was valued differently and the
ways in which they were employed. Marx examined the problem
of the valuation of labor-power only from the perspective of
capital, in terms of the value of commodities consumed in the
"production" of labor-power. It was left to the Marxist-
feminists to attempt to reformulate Marx's theory to
acknowledge gender differences.
Alfred Marshall: Marginalism Versus the Morality of the
Women Cotton Workers
Marshall's thinking was also contradictory in its
perception of gender differences, but in a very different way
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from that of Marx's. Marshall's great achievement was to
take from Smith and classical political economy the basic
abstraction of an individualistic market economy--the
commercial society--and develop marginalism as a technique of
economic analysis with which to model the whole economy. A
new idea of marginal utility, representing subjective value,
allowed for the central focus of economic analysis to be on
market prices. Marshall's contradictory perception of gender
differences then arose between the abstraction of the
marginalist technique of analysis, which was based on the
idea of individualistic utility maximization measured in
prices that did not make reference to gender differences, and
a wider normative framework of the analysis of economic
development in which gender differences were regarded as
morally correct and economically efficient.
Thus, outside of the marginalist technique of economic
analysis, Marshall argued that women had a moral
responsibility towards the care of children, which, in turn,
was a social and economic benefit. This moral responsibility
overshadowed the premise of individualistic equivalence
between women and men that underlay the marginalist economic
technique. Women, therefore, appeared to be on the margin
between a market economy of prices (the marginalist analysis
of which paid no heed to gender) and a social world of long-
term economic development (in which women had a unique moral
responsibility).
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The economic rationality of utility maximization runs
strongly through the case study; it was evident as much in
the innovations of machinery that reorganized cotton spinning
in factories as in the desire of outworkers to augment family
income. The ubiquity of utility maximization cannot be
doubted; we saw it in the desire for profits and in the need
for income; it was common among firms, families, women, and
men. Furthermore, Marshall with his theoretical advance of
an economic analysis that extrapolated from such utility
maximization to the overall economic system of market prices
certainly could understand much of the development of the
cotton trade. (As we noted in Chapter 4, Marshall was in
fact a renowned expert at sectoral analyses of specific
industries).
Pure marginalist economic analysts, however, have little
to say about the gender differences of labor. There is a
sense, nevertheless, in which Marshall's moralistic
justification for gender differences had a strictly economic
rationality. This was the idea that over the period of long-
term economic development, the role of women as housewives
and mothers would enrich the value of human capital, add to
total income, and encourage the growth of the economy.
Following from this economic logic, a series of wider
systematic economic gender differences can be extrapolated.
We can use this logic to justify women receiving lower wages
than men and their being placed in inferior positions in the
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divisions of labor of the economy--because their primary
economic purpose was to rear full-time male laborers as
highly valuable human capital.
We can, therefore, take such a logic and relate it to
what we saw happening to the women workers in the cotton
industry. We can then interpret the different economic
situations of women and men as reflections of this underlying
systematic logic that gave to women a primary economic role
of raising of adult male labor as highly skilled human
capital in the family. The basic motivation that Marshall
gives for economic gender differences, however, is not that
they contribute to long-term economic development and can
therefore be understood in terms of the marginalist
principles of utility maximization, but that they are the
desirable results of a normative morality that exists
independently of the pure rationality of economics.
Certainly, if we reconsider the morality that Marshall
uses to justify economic gender differences, we can find much
evidence from the history of the women cotton workers that
confirms the existence of such ideas. Women factory workers
were considered a serious moral problem, and they were
presumed to have caused the destruction of the working class
family and a breakdown in morals in the great nineteenth
century industrial cities such as Manchester and London.
(This was the case even though, as we have noted, the great
majority of women factory workers were neither married nor
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mothers). The supposed degradation of morality associated
with women working in factories was a major justification for
the so-called protective legislation that limited the work
opportunities of women in England.2 Similar questions of
morality were raised over the conditions of domestic
outworking--there were great reforming movements to eliminate
the exploitation of women and children in the so-called
"sweated trades."
We did not select our case study, however, primarily to
illustrate the contemporary moral or ideological
justifications for the right and proper places of women and
men in the economy. Moreover, the historical existence of a
morality or ideology that justifies economic gender
differences is a distinct problem from the capacity of the
economic approaches--in this case Marshall's--to explain such
gender differences. Yet, it cannot be denied that such ideas
may, nevertheless, have had real historical economic effects.
Marshall's ambiguity towards gender differences, as expressed
in the distinction between the marginalist technique of
analysis and the normative morality of gender roles, may
2 Marx, like Marshall, expressed moral outrage at the
exploitation of women and children in capitalist industry,
but drew different theoretical implications. Marx and Engels
saw that the other side of the supposed destruction of family
life and the degradation of morality was the reformation of
the economic and social relationships between women and men
on a higher level. Marshall saw no such possibility. More
recent historians, such as Anderson (1980) have seriously
doubted whether the family was in any sense "destroyed" by
the drastic industrialization of the 19th century cities.
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have, therefore, represented a real compromise between the
neutral economic technique and the influence of morality
(understood in a broad sense as ideological effects) on the
historical form of the economy.
Marshall also follows a similar line of argument to that
of Marx when he remarks how modern factory machine production
has broken up old hierarchies of gender, age, and skill in
the divisions of labor. Yet, in contrast to Marx and Engels'
view that the employment of women in factories marked the
defeat of patriarchy and was a liberation of women, Marshall
suggests it led women to "neglect their duty of building up a
true home, and of investing their efforts in the personal
capital of their children's character and abilities"
(Marshall, 1961, p. 685).
Even though our case study on the women cotton workers
did not focus on the problem of social mores, the real
effects of such ideas were nevertheless apparent. The
history of the women cotton workers revealed that in both
outworking and in the factories, jobs were generally
specified by gender. There were jobs for women and jobs for
men (and jobs for children). Yet, the specification of jobs
by gender was not at all constant; rather, it was a fluid and
dynamic pattern of switches between the gender typing of jobs
associated with innovations in technology and changes in the
location and organization of production. Over the long term,
a pattern emerged in which women (relative to men) tended to
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be allocated to jobs that were associated with established or
superceded technology, requiring what were perceived as lower
skills and in which they received lower pay and held lower
status--whether such jobs were in outworking or in the
factory. The actual distribution of women between outworking
and the factory was largely given by whether or not women
were looking after children.
To some extent, we find that this gender typing of jobs
was associated with moral or ideological views as to what
were appropriate jobs for women as opposed to men, even
though such views appeared highly flexible in response to
changing technology and organizations of production.
Otherwise, why were jobs so strongly associated with gender,
when there was no "objective" reason for such association,
and even as the association between gender and jobs was so
changeable under specific circumstances? People switched
their gender-typing of jobs, but the jobs did not generally
become genderless. Thus, for example, the traditional gender
typing of jobs in domestic spinning and weaving was only
broken down with the ruptures of the relocation of such forms
of production to the factory.
The moral and ideological quality of economic roles was
also illustrated by the difficulty experienced by the early
factory capitalists in luring domestic workers into the
factory. They had to resort to hiring child apprentices and
paupers under the Poor Laws. Factory work was at first
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regarded as morally repugnant.
The establishment of factory production alongside the
continuation of outwork did not mean, as Marshall desired,
that women specialized only in the rearing of male human
capital in their families. However morally repugnant the
factory might have appeared, both women and men eventually
entered its doors in large numbers, and they each took
different jobs. For women who were also mothers, work for
the capitalist market continued with domestic outwork, or
with other kinds of work that were compatible with childcare
and the domestic location.
The historical existence of gender-typed jobs associated
with traditional ideologies of what work women and men should
do, therefore, was not the equivalent of Marshall's normative
ideal of women's exclusion from the labor market and their
devotion to the rearing of efficient male labor in the home.
The actual historical pattern of economic gender differences
that we saw in the cotton trade indicated the widespread
economic participation of women, even as it was colored by
their childcaring and housework responsibilities. The
different economic roles of women and men certainly were
affected by moral views and ideologies, but these were not
simple reflections of the ideal that a woman's place was in
the home, they showed a complex picture of mobile changes in
the gender typing of jobs.
The center of Marshall's economic approach, marginal
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utility analysis, cannot explain the patterns of economic
gender differences that we found in the cotton trade.
Marshall took a moral axiom--that women's primary economic
role was as mothers and housewives--and found this to be of
long-term economic benefit to male human capital. It was
therefore a moral maxim that established Marshall's views on
the different roles of women and men and not his economic
approach that explained the existence of economic gender
differences. The marginalist technique of economic analysis,
the foundation of neoclassical economics, remained immune
from the prerogatives of gender differences.
Marxist/Feminist: Women and Men and the Value of Labor.
The recent Marxist/feminist theorists inherited a
contradictory legacy from Marx (and the later Marxists).
Feminists coped with this legacy by reworking the concerns of
Marx to complement and enrich their understanding of gender
inequality and the oppression of women. We argued that this
reworking took the form of a basic replacement of the central
Marxist pre-occupation with class by gender, so that an
alternative hierarchy of inequality was developed. We
examined the Marxist/feminist arguments insofar as they
referred to the development of theories of economic gender
differences.
The replacement of class by gender was analyzed in three
major forms. First, the idea of patriarchy indicated a realm
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of women's domestic and reproductive work that paralleled,
supported, and maintained the economic activity of capitalist
production. Second, the analysis of women's domestic work
led to a reformulation of the Marxist theory of the valuation
of labor-power so that it could acknowledge gender
differences. Third, the family was presented as an
ideological center of formation of gender differences among
individuals and as the institution in which women's
biological role in childbirth occurred, so that the problem
of economic gender differences was considered as a
relationship between the natural and the social.
In our history of the women cotton workers, we focussed
on the place of gender differences in the historical
development of relations of capitalist production, both in
the household and the factory. We did not consider in any
detail the ways in which women performed domestic work that
was not for the market--how they coped with childcare and
housework as well as doing their factory jobs or their .
outwork. Nevertheless, the case study did suggest that a
system of economic gender differences was established between
the work of women as reproducers of labor-power in the home
and as workers for the capitalist market. This inter-
relationship took many forms and had many effects on ways of
understanding economic gender differences.
Thus, for example, in the development of proto-
industrial systems of production based in households, we
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observed that women and men worked at different tasks, the
divisions of labor of which were based on gender and age
differences. The work of reproducing labor-power was
combined in the same location with work for the capitalist
market. Before the development of a mass labor market for
wage labor, these domestic divisions of labor associated with
gender differences did not involve systematic differences in
the value of female and male labor, as the family was a unit
of production and reproduction, and the labor it "produced"
was not sold as wage labor on the market. The family was
compensated as a whole with the piece rate wages of the
putting out system.
In this historical context, therefore, the work of women
at home in reproducing labor-power was not distinct from the
market valuation of labor-power, as labor-power in general
was not marketed. When households owned means of production
and worked on commission or piece rates, no social mechanism
was available to account for the domestic work of women in
reproducing labor-power, or to treat the labor of men and
women differently due to the facts of women's domestic and
childcare responsibility.
The gradual transformation of these domestic relations
of production, and the historical creation of an industrial
working class, changed the social mechanisms in which
economic gender differences were established. We find that
both women and men entered into the new relations of
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production in the factories and mills, and they also
continued to work for the capitalist market in their
household workshops (subject to the patterns of gender/job
typing and inequality that we observed). Now the work of
women in reproducing labor-power in the home was an activity
distinct from the market based valuation of labor-power.
Yet, such domestic work affected the valuation of labor-power
in the market; affected such valuation differently for women
and men; and was associated with the different patterns of
employment of women and men.
Marx and the Marxist/feminists have presented the
problem of gender differences in the valuation of labor-power
and in the employment patterns of women and men as two
distinct processes. Taking the direction of the
Marxist/feminists, and looking at the history of the women
cotton workers, we see that the actual social process of
valuation of labor-power simultaneously involves the
distribution of gender differences in divisions of labor and
patterns of employment. The valuation of labor-power and the
place of women and men in the labor market are both subject
to a single process in which gender differences are effective
in a system that operates between households and the labor
market. We can illustrate this process with some
hypothetical examples from the history of the women cotton
workers.
A woman outworker, spinning cotton yarn in the household
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workshop, was occupying a place in relations of production
(or division of labor) that was given by her gender, a place
that she required because she was also looking after
children. Looking after children, she was also creating the
value of future labor-power, a value that included both the
"use-value" of her time and the exchange value of the
commodities purchased from her (and her husband's) income
from exchanging the products of their labor (or exchanging
their labor-power for wages). The value of the labor-power
of the woman outworker was itself affected by the constraints
of her domestic responsibilities, her skills could not be
advanced very much, her time was restricted, the location of
her work was limited by her children's needs.
The adult woman factory mule spinner in the 1820s, on
the other hand, represented a different picture of the
relationship between the valuation of labor-power and the
place of gender in the division of labor. This woman was
generally unmarried and childless and her work on the new
factory machinery was not highly skilled, and she did not
need to invest a lot in training or education. The fact that
this woman was also not supporting children and was expected
to leave the labor market should she have children,
contributed to the lowness of the value of her labor-power.
The adult male employed in the cotton factory worked on
advanced new machinery that was considered to require higher
skills, and he was expected to have a longer-term commitment
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to such work that might justify investments in training.
Furthermore, the expectation was that the value of such work
in the form of the wage would at least partly support the
reproduction of his wife and family. This worker, however,
might have found himself without a job once the processes of
machine production were routinized and deskilled--and his
wife or daughter might have been employed in his place at
lower wages. The wage of the skilled adult male worker
confirmed the divisions of labor in the family that
associated his wife with specializing in the domestic work of
reproducing labor-power, thus lowering the value of her
labor-power and detrimentally affecting her place in the
employment patterns and divisions of labor of the market.
Although we can select these ideal-typical individual
examples from the case study of the relationship between
individuals' gender, the value of their labor-power, and
their place in relations of production or divisions of labor,
we find it more difficult to develop a systematic
understanding of these inter-relationships as a social
process in the economy. The Marxist/feminists' attempt to
develop a systematic theory of the relationships between
gender and capitalist economy have been caught between the
poles of Marx's theory valuation of labor-power (which does
not explicitly recognize gender differences) and their own
understanding of the impact of gender differences in the
social relations of the economy.
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The question then becomes: is there a way of
understanding the valuation of labor-power and the place of
women and men in divisions of labor that can unify the
distinct social fields of gendered domestic work and labor in
the capitalist market? It is ironic, but it is exactly such
a theoretical unification that was achieved by Becker's
extension of the neoclassical economic approach to gender--an
approach, however, that in unifying the domestic and the
market lost the significance of gender differences as
distinctly ordered in these two domains.
Neoclassical: Women Cotton Workers as Utility Maximizers.
The recent neoclassical approach to the problem of
economic gender differences reproduced the ambiguity towards
women that was found in Marshall's economics. Again, we find
that the marginalist technique of analysis was based on a
form of individualism that did not differentiate gender.
Yet, as with Marshall, the later neoclassical economists had
particular ideas about nature and associated ideas of what
were right and proper economic roles for women and men that
conflicted with the individualistic premises of the market
analysis.
The extension of neoclassical economics to include
gender differences was exemplified in the work of Becker.
Becker extended Marshall's marginalist approach to apply it
to all human behavior, assuming that all human action is
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based on utility maximization. Becker asserted that gender
differences operated between the household and the labor
market as a result of unified process of utility maximization
by individuals in families. The gender differences
associated with individuals' was, nevertheless, given by
Becker from biological origins. Women's supposedly natural
roles in childbirth and childcare led them to specialize in
these activities, which then affected their labor market
participation. For Becker, unlike the Marxists and
Marxist/feminists, there was no theoretical problem in
relating the work of women in the home with the work of
individuals' in the labor market.
As with Marshall's marginalist technique, from which
Becker's approach descends, we can use Becker's idea of
utility maximization to interpret the history of the women
cotton workers, and thereby consider its value for
understanding economic gender differences in general.
However, again as with Marshall's approach, we find that the
final cause or origin of the explanation of economic gender
differences is not given by the economic approach, but by an
external principle: in Marshall's case it was a moral maxim
that specified a unique role for women in the economy; in
Becker's case it is a biological argument that determines the
different economic status of women and men.
Following Becker's analysis, we can take the
hypothetical situation from our case study of a household
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with a husband and wife who are both involved in cotton
textile production in the home. The wife spins yarn and the
husband weaves on a loom. Both husband and wife have
invested in skills for these activities as their human
capital, and both commit themselves full-time to these
activities. They decide to have children. Regardless of
biology until this point, it has been most efficient for
husband and wife to specialize completely in the tasks for
which they have been most invested as human capital. The
wife has a greater comparative advantage in spinning, the
husband in weaving. The complete specialization of both wife
and husband benefits the total utility of their household.
When the couple decide to have children, however, it is
a biological argument that Becker uses as to why the wife
should specialize full-time now in domestic childcare and
completely give up her spinning. Women are argued to have a
biological commitment to the production and feeding of
children and are also biologically committed to the care of
children in other ways.
From this primary biological justification for women
specializing in domestic work and abandoning the labor market
(or their spinning work in the home in our example), Becker
elaborates other justifications. He finds that men generally
earn more than women in the labor market, which added to the
biological rationale, further confirms that women's domestic
specialization adds to total household utility. The husband-
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weaver earns more than the wife-spinner anyway. His argument
is circular: men earn more in the labor market than women
because they specialize in market work, women earn less than
men because biology makes them specialize in domestic work
which is not for the market. Most importantly from the
neoclassical point of view, this specialization is of mutual
benefit for women and men, because it increases the total
utility of the household.
The trouble with Becker.'s rationality from the point of
view of our history of the women cotton workers is, first,
that biology is an inadequate explanation for the
specialization of women in domestic labor, and, second, the
fact that women generally earn less than men in the labor
market is not adequately explained by such specialization.
At this point, we see how Becker's collapse of the
distinction between household and market, by treating both
equivalently in terms of utility maximization, results in the
weakness of his explanation of economic gender differences.
By denying the distinction between the domain of gender
differences in the household and in the labor market, Becker
is left with an explanation in terms of a deus ex machina:
biology.
We do not need to argue against the importance of the
effects of women's role in childbirth and childcare in
structuring their economic roles and opportunities--this was
made very obvious by our examples of the women outworkers who
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were mothers looking after children, and by the women who
worked in the early cotton factories, who tended to be
unmarried and childless. We should, however, note that there
are limits to the impacts of such biological "facts" that are
historically given by specific social relations. Only under
certain social conditions is an individual mother obliged to
devote herself full-time to the care of her children. The
biological limits to such care are very limited indeed--as
indicated by such historical examples as the aristocratic use
of wet nurses and nannies, or the modern use of parental
substitutes and the high-tech care of children in the absence
of their biological mothers.'
Furthermore, we must consider whether or not Becker's
rationality of utility maximization merely serves to justify
the status quo. If we reconsider our example of the husband-
weaver and the wife-spinner, we can imagine that if this
household were in existence at the period when domestic
weaving was driven out of business by factory loom-weaving,
then the labor of the wife would certainly have had greater
market value than that of the husband. She might even have
'A more important and interesting question is whether or
not women as mothers wish to devote themselves full-time to
childcare, and under what kinds of economic and social
conditions this is possible (must it require the support of a
breadwinner husband?). If they do not, then what are the
options for other kinds of childcare that benefit children?
If there are, indeed, only limited biological imperatives
involved in women's childcare, then the question of men's
involvement in childcare is a key question, one that has not
been raised by the economic approaches we have examined.
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been hired as a factory hand on the new power-looms that had
driven her husband out of work. In this situation, we can
imagine that the so-called biological demands of her domestic
childcare responsibility would have been resolved rather
simply--the father or some other substitute for the childcare
work of the mother would have been introduced.
The problematic results of Becker's analysis led us to
consider ways in which other neoclassical economists
specified the boundary between an economic explanation in
terms of the market and the wider domain of gender
differences. In contrast to Becker's reduction of the entire
problem to the terms of utility maximization, these other
economists portrayed gender differences as either "before" or
"within" the market. Yet, it seemed impossible for the
neoclassicals to demarcate the boundary of what the market
could explain, as their market explanation foundered on
problems of discrimination and labor market segmentation,
which appeared to have origins (or to extend) both "before"
and "within" the market.
Thus, while the neoclassical economists offered ways of
integrating gender differences between households and the
labor market, they are inadequate for the task of explaining
what we find to be the patterns of gender in the economy, as
illustrated by our case study. The neoclassicals must either
reduce the explanation of gender to the format of utility
maximization (sometimes with biological justifications) or
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admit that the market cannot be used to explain the economic
patterns of gender differences. Either solution was not
capable of interpreting the complex historical place of
gender in the cotton trade.
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CHAPTER 9
THE LIMITS OF ECONOMICS AND THE PLACE OF GENDER
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Drawing together the history of the women cotton workers
and the analyses of the economic approaches to gender
differences, we have arrived at the question of what it is
that economics has achieved. Our original question was, how
did economists deal with the problem of gender? Now, our
question is, what is it that economists were trying to do,
given that their economic theories were developed largely
without taking gender seriously (or by conceptualizing gender
inadequately)? Our problem of evaluating the economists'
ways of understanding gender is also one of determining the
purpose of gaining knowledge or understanding of the economy.
We can evaluate the approaches to gender differences only
within a wider purview of the purposes of economics.
As we will show, the economists' understanding of gender
differences reveals the nature of the way in which economists
think. We reveal economics as a highly purposive method of
abstracting from social reality. The goals of economists
have not generally been to understand the place of gender in
the economy. Instead, their goals have been to understand,
broadly, the creation of national wealth and the accumulation
of capital, through the system of market exchange and
capitalist production. (This goal has been similar whether
the economists have supported capitalism or desired to see it
overthrown). We see economics, therefore, as a system of
power to recognize those aspects of society that economists
desire to know.
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Furthermore, we show, that if economists were to treat
the issue of gender seriously, their methods of analysis
would be severely threatened. If economists were to take
gender seriously, they would alter the nature of economic
thought.
The Goals and Purposes of Economics
All the economists we have analyzed were concerned with
understanding the creation of national wealth. They
understood wealth as the accumulation of capital (whether as
money, material, or surplus value). All of their related
economic concepts refer back to this central notion of
wealth. Smith's theory of natural laws was designed
expressly to understand how individuals behaved in such a way
that they produced wealth through the market system. Marx
also sought to understand the capitalist achievement of the
market-based economy that produced commodities. Marshall
wanted to model the laws of the market so that he could
understand and improve the economy. Whether or not the
economists approved or disapproved of capitalism, they shared
an economic perspective in which they wanted to know how
material wealth was produced in a market system of monetary
exchanges.
This shared focus on the market production of goods and
services, on priced transactions of exchange, represents an
emphasis on specific areas of economic activity and social
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life. The emphasis partly removes the concern of these
economists from many social relationships in which
individuals are involved in other kinds of economic
activities and in which the social relationships of gender
are highly implicated.
Their economic thought is centered on market production.
By production, we mean that these economists centered their
concept of economy on the production of goods for exchange in
the market--the production of commodities. By market, we
mean that these economists were only concerned with what was
exchanged in priced transactions. Certainly, some economists
emphasized the production side of the economy, as with Marx,
while others, such as Marshall, emphasized the market, as the
key area through which the economy was to be understood.
Either way, a similar delimitation of what is economic has
been specified.
The centering of economics on market production has
profound implications for the ways in which economists have
understood labor and the activity of work. Market production
only concerns labor that is waged, or paid for as a commodity
in the Marxist sense. All other kinds of work, laboring, and
productive activity that is not waged or exchanged in the
market falls outside of the concern of the economist. As
defined through market production, economists cannot relate
nonmarket work to the economy (or it can only be related in
terms of shadow prices or asserted effects). Furthermore, in
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order to reduce the act of waged-laboring to a homogenous
factor input or commodity form, economists have had to
abstract from the social relationships in which work is
embedded and from the qualitative characteristics of
individuals who work. The precise ways in which such
abstraction occurs varies among Smith, Marx, and Marshall, or
their descendants, as we have shown.
In looking at how these economists have dealt with
gender, we have also, by default, looked at how they excluded
so much of productive social activity from their
understanding of what is economic. When we saw how Smith set
up an idea of abstract ungendered individuals active in
market exchange, we also saw that Smith excluded all the work
that women and men performed in their homes that was not
intended for exchange in the market. Marx's theory of value,
coming from the perspective of the capitalist production of
commodities, meant that he could not theoretically see the
effect on the value of human labor of childcare and housework
performed by women. Such work, and its value, could not
appear in Marx's theory of the economy. Marshall's model of
prices that defined the economy, similarly, excluded all
those social activities of working and production that were
not priced and in which, so often, women have been the
primary workers. Furthermore, the exclusion of women from
much of what was defined as economic, was also the exclusion
of other ideas of what might be considered productive,
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valuable, and useful in social activity--different ideas of
the quality of life, welfare, and even human happiness.
Although we cannot say that this restricted definition
of the economy as market production means that the work of
women is completely excluded from consideration, we can
suggest that many of the social activities in which women
have been more involved than men have been marginalized from
economic consideration. The work of women in reproducing
labor and in supporting male labor has definitely been
rendered insignificant by such a definition of what is
economic. Moreover, the very idea of what is economic has
been restricted to what is productive, or of value, as
defined only in terms of the production of material wealth.
The economists whom we analyzed can assert that women are
included in the definition of the market, or in relations of
production, but there remains a vast domain of social life in
which most people (women and men) are active that has been
excluded from economic thought.
It is, therefore, not simply a question of the exclusion
of women, it is also an issue of the qualitative definition
of what is economic activity. The partial exclusion of
women's work from economic consideration implies more than
its absence from the definition of what is economic. It also
represents the devaluation of the kinds of work that women
have most often performed. The ordinary business of living,
rearing children, making households work, and reproducing
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human society, has, thereby, been denigrated and dismissed
from the serious consideration of economic thought. In its
place, economists have raised on to a pedestal the capitalist
production of commodities by waged labor (whether or not this
is understood to be exploitative) as the central concern of
economic thought.
What would happen to this view of economics, if
economists were to take seriously the social relationships of
gender?
The Implications of Gender for Economics
The limits of Smith's economic approach to the issue of
gender were unclear. The absence of gender in the way that
Smith abstracted an economic model from social reality was
both progressive and illusory. His abstract view of
individuals as equal, equivalent, and subject to natural
laws, suggested that individuals were not differentiated by
gender. We find it remarkable that Smith did not refer to
the distinctions between the economic roles of women and men.
Yet, the apparently progressive quality of his abstraction
also served to mask the gendered quality of individuals'
economic activity. Smith's individualism begs the question
as to whether or not his economics had, thereby, eliminated
women from economic consideration.
We find that Smith did not explicitly exclude women from
consideration; neither did he distinguish them by any
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theoretical difference from men as economic actors. This
remained the case even as he compromised the ideal equality
of economic individuals with the introduction of the
historical reality of unequal social status: the social
ranks of landlords, masters, and workers, which corresponded
to the economic categories of rent, profit, and wages. Given
Smith's recognition of unequal economic and social ranks, we
conclude that Smith remained committed to a view of economic
individuals who lacked differentiation by gender but which
included women.
The obvious silence concerning gender by Smith
nevertheless speaks loudly about the nature of his way of
understanding social reality. Smith begins with ideal equal
individuals--women and men--who all are subject to natural
propensities to engage in economic behavior. Individuals
naturally seek to exchange, exchange naturally encourages the
division of labor, the division of labor leads to the
historical growth in commercial society, commercial society
results in the accumulation of wealth and property and the
appearance of economic rank. Within this logical-historical
trajectory, Smith's conceptual spotlight zooms in on the
structure of economic relations between landlord, master, and
worker, but leaves the differences between women and men off
in the wings.
Smith began with the desire to understand the growth of
national wealth. His economics thus derived and progressed
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from strong goals. The direction of his thinking did not
call for the revelation of the place of gender differences in
the concept of the economy. If we imagine how Smith could
have considered gender in his understanding of the economy,
we can see more clearly the specific abstractions required to
make his economics possible.
Smith could have posited a dualistic natural law that
applied differently to the behavior of all women and all men.
The natural propensities of all men would be to truck,
barter, and exchange. All men would be economic individuals
and would be landlords, masters, or workers depending on
their success in commercial society. The natural
propensities of all women would be to have babies, to be
entirely responsible for their care and rearing, and to be
responsible for all housework. Women, by natural law, would
be excluded from activity as economic individuals in the
market. The economy of the market would thus be a male-
gendered social system. The imaginary introduction of gender
into Smith's economics reveals how far from such a position
Smith's own views actually were. It also reveals how
dependent Smith's economics was on very strong definitional
assumptions that abstracted from the complexity of social
reality--including an abstraction from the complexity of
gender.
Marx's form of economic abstraction was very different
from Smith's, but also involved the idea of an economic
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system in which gender differences were not readily apparent
as characteristics of economic individuals. Yet, Marx's
abstraction was contradictory in this regard, and we find two
conflicting lines of thought in his economic approach, which
at one and the same time asserted both the elimination and
the exploitation of gender differences in the historical
development of the capitalist mode of production.
Marx defined relations of production in terms of
ownership and control of means of production by economic
classes that were not specified in terms of gender. Yet,
Marx's method of abstraction was historical, so that the idea
of individuals' social relationships was given by the
particular ways in which labor (or production) occurred in
history. This gave Marx an entry into theorizing gender
differences in economic terms.
The precise way in which Marx theorized the
relationships between such supposedly natural gender
differences and the historical and social relationships of
economic development, however, remained confusing and
contradictory. Gender emerged in a contradictory way in
Marx's theory of value--its place was defined narrowly from
the perspective of capitalist production and not from the
wider perspective of social relations in the family or
household. This weakness leads us to consider what would be
the implications for Marx's economics if gender had been made
internal and fundamental to his form of economic abstraction.
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As with our imaginary introduction of gender into
Smith's economic abstraction, Marx could have started with a
concept of the individual as a gendered being. Unlike Smith,
however, Marx did not define individuals on the basis of
immutable natural laws, but on the basis of historically
evolving social relations. Neither could Marx assert a
simple biological determination of economic gender
differences, because he insisted on the social evolution of
natural constraints to human individuality (though Marx
certainly does hold that natural differences of gender are
nevertheless significant, even if subject to historical
development). On what basis could Marx define economic
individuals in terms of gender?
Marx would have had to consider seriously the whole
complex of historical, social, and biological conditions that
demarcated gender differences according to the specific
conditions of historical periods. The different civil
status, ideological treatment, cultural status, familial
responsibility, and biological constraints on individuality
given by the status of gender would have to be taken into
account. Then such demarcations would have to be
interpolated between his economic abstraction that went from
the individual to the class structure.
Thus, for example, the place of women and men--and
children--in different patterns of domestic work and
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childcare would inform the ways in which Marx theorized their
entrance into the social relations of capitalist production.
This, in turn, would have implications for his theory of
value. No longer could he theorize about value only from the
perspective of capitalist production. In order for gender
differences to be recognized in Marxist economics, he would
have to consider value from the wider perspective of domestic
work as well as capitalist production. It was exactly the
problems of such a theoretical development that were
confronted by the Marxist/feminists.
Marx, moreover, would have difficulty in systematically
asserting a social division between women and men that
counterposed all women and all men in a monolithic social
division comparable to that between capitalist and worker.
At least in capitalism, the division of gender does not
amount to a social division that automatically assigns women
and men to entirely distinct economic roles or social
activities. This could perhaps be the case if, for example,
all women were housewives and did not participate at all in
the capitalist labor market; then, he would have found it
possible to maintain a gendered class division that
paralleled and crossed over the class division based on the
social relations of capitalist production. (The difficulty
of constituting gender as a social and economic class system
was revealed in our discussion of the Marxist/feminist
approaches). The historically contingent attributes of
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gender that affect individuals could at most be modifying
characteristics that affect an individuals' placement within
Marx's theory of the economy.
In the absence of a theory of the social structure of
gender, Marx in his concept of classes and the mode of
production can only crudely refer to the economics of gender
differences. From our examination of the strengths and
weaknesses of the Marxist approach, we find that the theory
of production requires redefinition if we are to comprehend
the social relations of gender.
Such a redefinition of production would not be limited
to the production of commodities in places of work outside
the home, and it would require a redefinition of Marx's
theory of the commodity. (In redefining the commodity, Marx
would have to recognize the gendered attributes of the human
commodity of labor-power as well as the influence of such
attributes on the valuation of commodities produced by such
labor for exchange in the market). Production would include
the production of the value of human labor-power and its
specifically gendered qualities. Production also would
include both the use-values or utility of goods and services
that are not exchanged as commodities in the market
(including therefore the economic "value" of much of the work
performed by women outside the market), and it would continue
to include the production of commodities as exchange-values
in the market. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
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redefinition of production would include the production of
gender itself as a social and economic category.1
We find a further example of the way in which economics
was a form of abstraction that ignored gender differences in
the work of Marshall. Marshall's form of abstraction,
however, was different from both that of Smith and Marx.
Marshall's focus on market prices, like Smith's idea of the
natural propensities of individuals, allowed him to set up a
complete autonomous model of the economy. As with Smith,
Marshall needed to abstract from differences among
individuals so that he could generalize an economic model.
However, unlike Smith's idea of economic individuals as all
sharing naturally given propensities, Marshall achieved a
similar effect through the assumption of all individuals'
operating according to the principles of maximization of
marginal utility. Market price became the fundamental
economic signifier, replacing Smith's natural laws.
The centering of marginalist economics on market prices
removed it from any qualitative understanding of individuals
'I am following the idea of West and Zimmerman (1987)
that gender is a routine recurring accomplishment that is a
feature of social situations. Thus, gendered work, such as
housework, childcare, and the definition of jobs as male and
female, is not only a question of the allocation of time,
skill, or power, but is in a fundamental sense also the
actual symbolic production of gender. The housewife in doing
housework is also "doing" gender. So too with the male
breadwinner earning the family income. "Insofar as a society
is partitioned by "essential" differences between women and
men and placement in a sex category is both relevant and
enforced, doing gender is unavoidable" (West and Zimmerman,
1987, p. 137).
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in social relationships. The only social relationship
pertinent to the neoclassical economics was that between
individuals and the price of goods (the utility preference).
The strength of Marshall's neoclassical economics, as
with Smith, was its abstraction, an abstraction that also
removed it from the problems of gender that we wished to
understand. The attribute of gender held by individuals was
invisible to the marginalist calculus, the very power of
which depended on its abstraction from such qualitative
characteristics of individuals in society.
We find, nevertheless, that the problem of gender
differences was certainly present in Marshall's economics,
but it came from the outside, as it were. Gender differences
were given by a normative morality of women's domestic and
childcare responsibility that colored the neutral technique
of the marginalist analysis, but the morality remained
distinct from the pure economic approach. In his economic
approach, as such, Marshall had nothing to say about gender
differences.
Would it have been possible for Marshall to have
introduced gender within the marginalist technique? How
could the dualism of the neutral technique of marginalism and
the morality of gendered economic roles be integrated? The
integration of the marginalist technique and gender could
only occur if the notion of individual subjective value or
utility was redefined in such a way that it varied uniformly
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with corresponding differences associated with gender.
Again, as with our imaginary introduction of gender into
Smith's natural laws, Marshall would have to assert uniform
differences of taste between women and men that were
reflected in patterns of supply and demand. Yet, even if we
could show that there were uniform distinctions in subjective
taste shared by all women that were different from all men,
we still need to show how such distinctions would affect the
wider purpose of the marginalist economic technique and its
overall model of the economy. For, after all, the strength
and power of this form of economics was its remarkable
capacity to abstract from just such sectoral, localized, or
individualized characteristics and aggregate a picture of the
total economy in terms of the uniform measure of prices.
What is more interesting is not whether gender could be
inserted into the underlying model of individual utility that
supports the marginalist method (which would contradict the
goals and purposes of this technique), but how Marshall's
normative morality of gender can or cannot be integrated with
this form of economics. As we argued in Chapter 4, Marshall
only succeeded in unifying his moral views on women's
economic roles with the marginalist technique by asserting a
long-term economic benefit of women rearing high quality male
labor and their associated partial exclusion from the labor
market. Yet, such a "benefit" could only be perceived given
the terms of Marshall's prior normative judgments as to the
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right and proper course of economic development that put
women's primary economic place and purpose in the home. In
the case of a society in which such domestic systems of
support for male labor was not available, Marshall's economic
technique would not have been at all affected, confirming the
break between his moral views and his economics, as such.
Marshall's morality of gender reflected a view of a
social world external to the economy of market prices, a
world in which women occupied the boundary between the market
economy and a wider moral universe. For Marshall to have
integrated these two worlds would require that he redefine
economics away from its basis in uniform marginal utility
expressed in the form of prices. The redefinition of
economics would then have to include the "other" world with
its moral dimension of gender which cannot be expressed by
the marginal calculus. If he did such a redefinition of
economics, he would have to abandon the basis of the
marginalist technique that depends for its operation on the
abstraction from qualitative characteristics of individuals
in social relationships. The only way that he could combine
the two worlds of the marginalist technique and the morality
of gendered roles would be through an extension of the
principle of utility maximization to apply to what have been
traditionally noneconomic fields--which is exactly what
Becker attempted. Yet, as we argued in Chapter 6, this
unification takes place at the expense of ignoring the
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substantive qualities of the fields that are thereby
incorporated into the economic analysis.
When we return to the reformulation of the Marxist
economic approach by the recent Marxist/feminists, we find
that several key issues were clarified, but that the
feminists who reworked Marx remained unable to integrate the
gender differences associated with domestic labor and those
found in the labor market--a relationship was indicated, but
an operational theoretical system had not been established.
The Marxist/feminists showed that a relationship existed
between women's domestic labor, the value of labor-power in
general, and gender differences in the value of labor-power
and in its employment in the market. We observed some
instances of these kinds of relationships from the history of
the women cotton workers. Yet, we could not establish this
relationship as a theoretical system that explained economic
gender differences, because the underlying Marxist theory of
value held that women's domestic labor was unvalued because
it was work that was not exchanged in the market.
Furthermore, there were aspects of women's domestic labor,
especially their role in childbirth and childcare, that
remained particularly immune to the usual Marxist economic
form of understanding. Marxist/feminists could reduce
gendered work such as housework and childcare to the formal
properties of the theory of production, but they failed to
explain their gendered quality.
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Of course, the Marxist/feminists wanted to develop an
economics that concerns gender, and in so far as they
stretched Marxist categories towards that goal, they
succeeded. In this sense, the purposive direction of this
form of economics inevitably came closest to our needs and
interests in understanding the economics of gender
differences.
The great irony of the history of the economic
approaches to gender differences was that Becker's
neoclassical economics, derived straight from Marshall's
absolutely genderless marginalist technique, succeeded in
unifying the domains of gender differences between the
household and the market. (The unification was weakened,
however, by the derivation of gender differences within the
economic approach from external biological assumptions).
In the same way that we asked what would have been the
implications of Marshall integrating his morality of gender
with his economic technique, we may ask what would happen if
Becker took seriously the biological assumptions that are
taken for granted. In expanding the idea of utility to refer
to the allocation of time as well as income, Becker widened
the scope of economic analysis beyond its traditional concern
with the market production of goods or services. The
gendered division of labor in the household (and thereby in
the labor market) is determined partly by "biological
differences" and partly by different investments in human
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capital (see Chapter 6). The exact degree of determination
of biology, Becker acknowledges, cannot be known. Yet, it is
exactly this kind of determination that is the crucial factor
in his analysis of gender specialization. The logic of
utility maximization that results in gendered specialization
of women in housework and childcare, and their inferior
position in the labor market, derives from this pre-given
determination. Becker only explains what already has been
predetermined. What would Becker have to do to take
biological determination of economic gender specialization
seriously?
Becker would have to consider Marx's idea that the
biological constraints on human individuality are subject to
historical change and development. What was a biological
constraint of gender 500 years ago is a very different
constraint in 1987. The weight of such constraints and their
economic impact must have changed dramatically. Certainly we
would expect the biology of childbirth to impact the gendered
division of labor, but such impact will vary according to
social conditions. What was once a biological constraint is
perhaps now an ideological or moral effect determining the
roles and responsibilities of women's work. Without the
prior acknowledgment of the interaction of biological
constraint with social conditions, the logic of utility
maximization is bound to repeat the status quo in
interpreting the economics of gender specialization.
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Yet, for Becker to take biology seriously in this way
would be to threaten the whole basis of the economic
approach. Becker operates by applying economics on a plane
of already given assumptions of social reality. As soon as
these assumptions are examined, as when we question whether
we can actually specify how gender specialization is
determined by biology, then the whole pack of cards is likely
to collapse. If we cannot say how biology determines that
women specialize in childcare and housework, and thus are
less invested in as human capital for the labor market, then
we cannot feed such assumptions into the logic of utility
maximization that justifies such specialization.
Yet, there is a larger picture revealed by the ways in
which the different economic theories approached the problem
of gender. Whatever the distinctions in the structure of
economics devised by Smith, Marx, and Marshall and their
descendants, they shared central characteristics. Economic
thought, although not always an explicitly purposive
activity, has been directed towards specific goals and needs.
In abstracting from social reality to build an economic
model, the economist desires to recognize certain social
features and not others. The economist sees what she/he
selects to be made visible. The forms of absence and
appearance of gender in economic theory reveal what is made
visible by. economists. In this sense, economics is a system
of power, a power designed to make visible what is desired to
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be known. In making what is desired to be known visible, the
economist makes invisible or distorts whatever is of no
concern.
What then does economics do? Each economist that we
have examined, abstracted from social reality a functioning
systematic model of relationships between individuals and the
material and social world. The purpose of these models was
to understand the system of market production, in one way or
another. The models all required specific concepts that
delimited the nature of individuality and its social
relationships. It was within this delimitation that gender
was recognized or denied.
Yet, although the place of gender in economic thought
reveals what it is that economics does, there remain certain
qualities of gender that pose particular difficulty for
economics to deal with. The economic problem of gender is
not merely one of the visibility of gender (as if the mere
acknowledgement of gender would solve the problem we are
interested in). Gender is everywhere. Gender is so
ubiquitous in the social world, so "natural", that it does
not demand attention, examination, or explanation. Gender
has always been so obvious that it is invisible. Making
gender visible is therefore a step towards the problem. But
this also means that economic theories, even if they have not
referred to gender specifically or explicitly, have in a
certain sense, always been about gender. It is the ways in
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which they have been implicitly about gender that has been
the problem.
Furthermore, the presence of gender in all social
relationships is not merely the representation of gender in
social relationships, but also the production of gender
through social relationships. The work of mothering,
housework, being the breadwinner, being a coalminer, being a
secretary, is not merely the production of value (for Marx),
the expression of utility preferences (Becker et al), or the
fulfillment of natural propensities (Smith); such work, as
with all social interactions, is the creation and
reinforcement of gendered identity. Economic activities are
also the construction of gender. It is this production of
gender in all social relationships (including the economic)
that has remained the most invisible aspect of the obvious
nature of gender in society--and in its theoretical
representation in economics.
The limits of economics with regard to gender have
revealed to us the wider limitations of economics. In
thinking of how economists could have thought more seriously
about gender, we have discovered that economists cannot think
seriously, or very well, about many other aspects of our
social lives that could, and should, be thought of as
economiz. Economists' focus on market production has
resulted not only in the marginalization of gender.
The abstractions economists have made in order to model
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successfully market production have inevitably been
detrimental for our understanding of the economy of human
livelihoods outside of those limits. The dominance of the
ways of thinking of economics, however, makes it hard for us
even to conceptualize what economics could be., if it did
refer to a wider domain of social life and activity. The
question of gender, nevertheless, has pointed us in this
direction. We can see that the domain of social life that we
would want economics to refer to is not simply that of the
market and the cash nexus. Illich (1982) has called this
wider context of economic activity "the vernacular," meaning
all those forms of subsistence that extend beyond the market.
The point of view of economists has been that of capital
(again, whether or not such a view reflected a desire to
abolish capitalism). The point of view of an economics that
could deal with gender and a wider social domain would be
developed from the needs of human livelihoods. By this, we
mean that a new order of logic or goals would guide the
purposive direction of economics. If economists have been
directed by the logic of maximization (of utility, of capital
accumulation), a new logic would reflect the needs and values
of people rather than commodities. The understanding of the
economy would be directed towards social and political goals.
Thus, we have seen that there is a need for economists
to recognize gender, arising from our recognition of the
place of gender in economic activity--a place that extends
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beyond the market. It is a place, in the case of gender,
where the political values of the women's movement have
demanded recognition and social change. The recognition of
this need suggests a direction for the development of
economic thought, towards a qualitative understanding of
social relationships.
Yet, recognizing such limits, and thinking of such new
goals or forms of logic for economics, assumes that the
present form of economics can be changed. We have shown how
the consideration of gender would alter drastically the
nature of economics. For economists to have a new starting
point, one based on the diversity of human needs and
interests, rather than the unilinear logic of maximization
given by the market or capital, would involve abandoning the
forms of abstraction used to develop models of the market.
Instead of abstracting from the complexity of social life and
individual characteristics (such as gender), economists would
now have to represent such diversity. Economics could no
longer be based on the principles of homogeneity (whether
given by prices or relations of production). As such, a new
economics would not be generalistic, it would be fragmentary.
Such a fragmentation would not achieve the powerful model of
social integration offered by existing economic theory, but
would recognize the qualitative differences that express
human needs and interests. Such an economics would not be an
economics as we have so far known it.
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